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# THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

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PART I

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## ORIGINAL PAPERS

### HOMOSEXUALITY, MAGIC AND AGGRESSION <sup>1</sup>

BY

H. NUNBERG

NEW YORK


It is not my present purpose to attempt an exposition of the problem of homosexuality in its entirety. This problem, as you are aware, is an extremely complicated one, for the solution of which, as Freud himself has said, psycho-analysis cannot be invoked, since homosexuality is rooted in an organic substratum. This is by no means to say, however, that psycho-analysis has nothing to contribute to the elucidation of the psychology of the homosexual. On the contrary, everything of importance that we know concerning the play of instinctual forces and the course they follow in the homosexual we have derived from psycho-analysis.

Thus we have learned from Freud that the factors which produce homosexuality in the male are very numerous. I will instance only the most familiar of these, such as mother fixation, identification with the mother, the tendency to a narcissistic type of object choice (including herewith the overvaluation of the male genital), and fear of the father or, in other words, castration anxiety. Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, homosexuality is favoured by a passive-anal attitude towards the love object.

From this very multiplicity of ætiological factors the purely theoretical expectation would arise that there must exist a number of different types of homosexual, and experience confirms this expectation. There is the type, for example, which takes flight from the woman to the

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<sup>1</sup> Paper read before the New York Psychoanalytic Society, March 26th, 1935.





man from fear of incest ; while another type identifies himself with the mother and seeks his like among boys (that is, he loves boys in the same way as his mother once loved him). This latter type is subdivided by Ferenczi into two, in which (a) masculinity is retained (object-homoerotism), or (b) masculinity is given up (subject-homoerotism). Freud has described still a third type, arising out of the inhibition or restraining of aggression against the brothers or the father. Evidently this enumeration does not include all the types of homosexuality that exist ; but we are not yet in a position to distinguish others clearly, the more so since all the types so far recognized very seldom occur in pure form.

The first two types take flight from love for the female, the third from aggression against the male. I believe that there is still a fourth type, in which aggression is not avoided but, on the contrary, makes up an integral part of the subject's homosexual love. It is this type of homosexual which I wish to discuss in the following paragraphs.

Pure homosexuals seldom present themselves for treatment. Much more frequently we meet with manifest bisexuals who do not usually enter analysis on account of their homosexuality but for some other reason. In the course of the analysis it soon becomes evident, however, that their major conflict revolves around the struggle with their homosexuality. Freud has stated that the love object of the homosexual is a compromise, representing a condensation of male and female and a projection of the subject's own bisexuality.

It is my belief that likewise the *aim* of the homosexual represents a compromise—a compromise between aggressive and libidinal impulses. I should here like to present the observations bearing upon this which I have been able to gather from a number of cases. Obviously I cannot report in detail upon all these cases on the present occasion, and so I shall select a section of an analysis of a single case as an example and discuss it at length. As I have already mentioned, pure types of homosexuality are encountered very seldom in psychoanalytic treatment ; in this case, too, we find the characteristics of various types intermingled. In the present discussion, however, I shall concentrate upon the disguised aggression, keeping subordinate such other elements as also occur.

We have to do with a young man of about 30 years of age. This patient, too, came to analysis, not on account of his homosexuality, but because of another complaint ; but his homosexuality quickly became the principal subject of the analysis. In typical fashion his



homosexual tendencies first made their appearance at puberty, when he was at a boys' boarding school. At first he was satisfied with masturbation to the accompaniment of homosexual fantasies, but later he went on to overt behaviour with boys of his own age. Despite severe inner struggles his homosexual relationships continued until, at the age of about 22, he entered for the first time upon a heterosexual relationship. In characteristic manner he chose a girl with a slight limp. In this respect as well as in her entire appearance she resembled one of his sisters so much that his friends called his attention to this fact. His conscious motive for entering into a heterosexual relationship was the desire to protect himself against his homosexuality; but he was unable to tolerate the relationship very long because the girl's passionateness gave rise to anxiety on his part. He feared on the one hand that she would destroy him physically; on the other, that he could not satisfy her, that for example his arms were not strong enough to embrace her with sufficient force, that his genital was too small, etc. Finally he came to fear that the girl's father would beat him if he learned of the relationship. So he turned suddenly to another girl much older than himself who impressed him as being motherly rather than passionate. From her he not only expected but demanded actual protection and help in every situation in which he might find himself. How strong his mother fixation was will be apparent to every analyst from this alone.

In spite of these heterosexual relationships, his homosexuality did not leave him in peace. At one time he would enter into relationships with men, at another he would masturbate to the accompaniment of homosexual fantasies or would seek out the company of men and strive in inconspicuous ways to bring about physical contact with them. Eventually he left the woman and lived exclusively with men, while nevertheless continuing to long for a woman.

What type of man was it which attracted him? The classic form of homosexuality would lead us to expect that the patient would be drawn towards boys; but this was not so. It was only at the time of puberty that he loved boys, and then in order to suit him they had to fulfil the condition of being tall, strong and handsome. Subsequent to puberty he preferred older men, but again only those who were tall, strong and handsome. He could not emphasize often enough that in any man he loved it was his powerful chest and the strength of his arms which excited him to an incomparably greater degree than did the lower part of the body. He envied these men in the extreme,



*wanted to be like them*, and was convinced that women could take pleasure only in men of this sort and that only such men could possess any woman they desired. He himself, he thought, was weak, ugly, inferior ; no woman could love him.

From this alone it is evident that the castration complex constituted an important component of the inferiority feeling from which consciously he suffered so extremely. To the development of his inferiority feeling, amongst others, his mother's attitude also contributed materially. He felt himself insufficiently loved by her, to the severe injury of his self-esteem ; indeed, she continually wounded his narcissism. She constantly found fault with him, considered him lacking in manliness, upbraided him on this account and demanded that he be different. She had manifested her dissatisfaction with him rather openly from the beginning, but after the separation from her husband, which took place in the patient's seventh year, she had displaced her hatred for her husband on to her son. She inveighed against both of them. She reproached her son for being as ugly, small, weak and unmanly as his father. She demanded that he grow up quickly and become strong. It is comprehensible enough that he suffered severely from the behaviour and attitude of his mother. She was his ideal, he wanted to have her love, but he felt that he was constantly rejected by her. Incessantly he was tortured by the thought that she would never be able to feel pride in him, that she could love only large men and despised men of small stature.

The second source of his feeling of inferiority, of his wounded narcissism, is traceable therefore to an insufficiency of maternal love. Through his life-history there runs like a scarlet thread statements of how filled his life was, from earliest childhood onwards, with the effort to become a big and strong man. He took an enormous amount of physical exercise, and expended the greatest care upon his diet. Daily he stood against the wall, stretched himself to his full height, made a mark on the wall, measured the distance between marks and kept track of his growth in this manner ; this he continued to do for years, until about the age of twenty. At boarding school he even got up at night as soon as the boys were asleep, and in the dark went through complicated gymnastic exercises with heavy weights. Often he ran for hours across country in order to strengthen and harden himself. He did not have his hair cut so as not to lose strength. In order to strengthen his lungs, he practised expanding the chest by the hour. *These and other similar performances* bordering upon the absurd



remind one almost of the *magical measures* carried out by schizophrenic hypochondriacs.

In spite of all the patient's efforts to become big and strong, he continued to feel inferior, weak and small, incapable of a masculine deed. The first person from whom he came to hear castration threats was naturally his aggressive and highly neurotic mother. The patient's recollection postponed to the fourth year the earliest occasion of being threatened with the loss of the penis; but dreams point to an earlier date. Even to-day he has the feeling of having a small genital, although he has often measured it and convinced himself that it is no smaller than that of other men. His mother for a long time compelled him to urinate in a sitting posture, on which account he envied his father intensely his ability to urinate in a standing position. As far back as he could remember, he had always endeavoured to look at others' genitals so as to be able to compare them with his own. As early as the end of the latency period he was seizing every opportunity to go into public lavatories to observe men in the act of urinating, and was reduced to despair by this visible proof that his genital was smaller than that of adult men.

At the time of puberty his interest shifted from the male genital to the chest. This change was brought about by the following circumstances. His mother thought he looked unwell and had him examined by a doctor. The physician declared that he was perfectly well but was flat-chested and had a weak heart. He told the patient to his face that he masturbated and advised him to give up the practice. Thenceforward his interest was diverted to his chest and heart. He took breathing exercises, which have been spoken of, and had the feeling of having strengthened not only the lungs but the heart by this means. He estimated men henceforth, not as previously by the criterion of the size of their genitals, but of the more or less full development of the chest, the arms, and, as he imagined, also the heart. As he himself expressed it, the heart took the place of the genital, it became for him a genital. From this time forwards his infantile wish to be big and strong became crystallized into the craving to *have* big, strong men, to *possess them sexually*.

It seems almost like *sympathetic* magic that he should believe that through mere contact with a man of strength, or through an embrace, or through a kiss, he would absorb this strength and become himself as strong as the man whom he desired. That passage in the Bible describing how the sick and the unclean were healed—that is, made



strong—by the touch of Jesus's garment made a deep impression upon him. Often he lived through such a scene in fantasy, playing the part of one of the unclean who was thus purified, i.e. of the sin and the consequences of masturbation. In this connection he masturbated often with the fantasy of touching the genital of a young priest whom he had heard preaching. The priest seemed to him to be especially pure, and he believed accordingly that he would himself become pure through sexual contact with him.

From the man he loved he wanted always to get something, to appropriate something belonging to him. *He was convinced that through contact with a masculine man he would himself become masculine.*

His desire to take possession of a man or of some part of him, or to be the recipient of something from him, went far back into his childhood. Above all, it was conditioned by the relationship of his parents to each other. When they separated, the father troubled himself very little about the family, according to the patient, and let them suffer from want. His mother was tireless in convincing her son that it was because his father was not concerned about him and did not provide the family with the barest necessities that he was such a weakling. Again and again she sent him to his father to demand money. Thus the boy became accustomed to perpetually demanding something from his father, although the latter usually refused him. To give a single example: On a certain occasion, when he was about nine or ten years old, he followed his father, who had refused to buy him a new hat, into a moving-picture house. There he became so importunate that his father fled from him by leaving the theatre through the back door. Scenes of this sort were enacted frequently.

This pursuit of the father had the significance not only of aggression, however, but likewise of love. The period prior to the separation of his parents seemed to the patient paradisiacal in many respects. He recalled lovingly the times when he sat on his father's lap and was kissed by him. The impression that this had made was so strong that even in the analysis he repeated the scene in only slightly disguised form in dreams. An expression of his childhood which he does not himself remember having uttered but which his father often repeated to him was said to run as follows: 'I should like to be tied to you with a string, so that we might always be together'. The events prior to his seventh year could be dated fairly accurately, since his parents changed their abode almost every year. Thus at this period which



seemed to him so paradisiacal he could recall having admired his father and having wanted *to be like him*. He wanted, for example, to urinate like his father, standing up; he stretched on tiptoe in the effort to urinate into the closet, and was in despair over his inability to imitate his father in this respect. At about the age of five he went on a long walk with his father through the fields. When his father stopped to urinate *en route*, the boy was fascinated by the size of his penis and the amount of urine he passed, and he imitated his father on the spot. When he got home, the first thing he did was to tell his mother, full of pride, that he had passed a quantity of urine such as he had never before attained. The normal rivalry with the father for the mother is thus at this time unmistakable. He wanted to have as large a penis as his father had, and perhaps to have his father's penis itself.

It is easy to imagine, therefore, how deeply the boy felt the separation from his father which then took place. He greatly missed him, who was the only male member of the family, which consisted besides the mother of two younger sisters and an aunt; briefly and crudely expressed, he longed for the large penis of his father. In this longing his mother supported him unwittingly. She stirred up his hatred for the father, so that love assumed the form of the aggression which must have much earlier existed, obviously, alongside of love. The burden of her constant fault-finding was: 'Your father has deserted you, he doesn't support you any more, so you are small and weakly. If you want to become a big, strong man, go to your father and get money from him'—that is, food nourishment—and as the patient conceived, 'masculinity, virility'. This challenge of his mother's the son fulfilled willingly and *literally*. He followed his father and demanded things of him constantly, a present of any kind, in other words, a proof of love. He did the same thing later on, moreover, in the case of the men to whom he became attached. He asked of these as a present, some article of clothing which belonged to them, or he allowed himself only too willingly to be invited to dinner at a restaurant.

He laid special stress upon eating; he had a very large number of oral dreams and fantasies, and even developed a characteristic symptom which still made its appearance occasionally during the analysis. This symptom consisted in his experiencing a salty taste in the mouth. Analysis of the dreams bearing upon this produced first the recollection of an expression of abuse common among the boys at the boarding



school: 'You have salt in your mouth'. This expression was an allusion to homosexuality, and meant, 'You take a salty penis into your mouth'. When he heard this expression, he was naturally greatly disconcerted; he thought that they knew of his own homosexual tendencies and were alluding to them. It was true that he swallowed his own semen, and even made a number of attempts to suck his own penis.

I need not go further into the analysis of this symptom, except to mention the fact that the most important part of the sexual act with a woman consisted in sucking her breast, and that in his homosexual masturbatory fantasies he sucked the penis of the man. But when it came to the actual case of sexual activity with a man he could not make up his mind, at the beginning of the relationship, to take the other's penis in his mouth. On the contrary, he forced the other to suck his, the patient's, penis. During this act the patient would feel enormously superior, would have the feeling of humiliating and debasing his partner, and would abuse him in such terms as 'You dirty beast—you son of a bitch', etc. He also used to fantasize that his sexual partner was his slave, and would murmur to himself, 'Now I have you'. It is interesting, and perhaps has a deeper significance besides, that even in passivity a sadistic gratification may be enjoyed. After this pleasure had been exhausted, he would turn to the active rôle and suck the penis of his partner; but this sucking soon became biting—biting often severe enough to injure the other.

It is clearly apparent that the patient was impelled to incorporate the man, first through contact, even through the mouth. This desire was evidenced both in dreams and in fantasies which he eventually expressed in the words, 'I should like to suck in the man through every pore of my body'. Numerous men attempted to approach him, but he never yielded to their solicitations unless they were strong and masculine and possessed a large penis. After intercourse with partners of this type, he himself felt strong and *masculine* and dreamed and had fantasies of women, while in the matter of actual intercourse with the latter he was more potent than previously and more completely satisfied. *It is as if through sexual congress with men he himself became masculine.*

Naturally his return to the female was only of brief duration. After gratification at her hands there again awoke in him the longing for a man, exactly as Freud described in his paper on jealousy. This longing was no longer clothed in cannibalistic fantasies, however, but



in fantasies of an anal-sadistic character which nevertheless only very slowly and by degrees took on tangible shape. There first occurred a dream that a man defæcated into his mouth—a dream which he had had a number of times before the analysis began. Such a perversion as this seemed to him to represent the greatest humiliation and abasement which any human being could possibly suffer ; he shuddered with disgust as he spoke of it.

Apart from its avowal of the feeling of guilt which he displayed at other times as well with his homosexual desires and with which he strove to ward these off, the meaning of this dream was not at first altogether clear until he admitted that one of his frequent masturbatory fantasies consisted of *his* defæcating in the mouth of another man. Thus in the fantasy the reverse of his masochism of the dream made its appearance as sadism. In what way, however, are these anal-sadistic and masochistic fantasies the counterpart of each other ?

In connection with the foregoing fantasies the patient produced the fantasy that he had wormed his way into the favour of a well-known ruler said to be homosexual, and that he had murdered him in the course of their sexual congress and had thus freed humanity from a tyrant. Thereupon he recalled a fantasy which over a period of many years had repeatedly obtruded itself upon him : He was a boy and lived in the household of a wealthy old man who had a predilection for boys. This man abused him sexually and treated him very badly. He fed and clothed him very ill and compelled him to carry out disgusting tasks, such as cleaning the toilet. When he was twenty years old, the old man's entire fortune fell to him. In this way he himself became the possessor of great wealth and acquired mastery over the old man, who now became his servant and whom in retaliation he now insulted and humiliated in the grossest manner. Furthermore, he came into possession of a magic wand. He dreamed also of a certain flower vase containing a little jewel-box which he kept guard over.

Analysts will scarcely need to be informed of the meaning of this whole fantasy : The patient insinuates himself into the good graces of his father in order to rob him of his potency <sup>2</sup> and gain possession of the pregnant mother (the flower vase symbol).

The patient's whole life, from early childhood, was dominated by the idea of getting money away from the father and appropriating

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<sup>2</sup> The same word, *Vermoege*n, may be used in German for both wealth and potency.



everything he possessed. Money, indeed, the patient had stolen very early. It was impossible to ascertain exactly when he had committed his first theft, but at all events he stole as early as his fourth year. At that time he was on a visit to his aunt ; on that occasion he abstracted a few pennies from her pocket-book and bought candy with them. It was at about this time that his younger sister was born. That money was for him a symbolic penis we have just seen. That money has also the significance of fæces and child is a fact perfectly familiar to the analyst. It can scarcely be a coincidence, therefore, that at the very time of the birth of his sister he appropriated a symbolic penis, fæces, or child. We have already knowledge of the patient's oral symptoms and fantasies. (For the money, he received candy in exchange.) It may therefore be assumed that by the symbolic equation, mother—breast—penis—child—fæces, he materialized the fantasy of biting off the children (fæces) from the mother in the womb. Such a fantasy would be in complete agreement with fantasies which I have seen appear as memories in other patients of the same type. The passive-coprophagic dream that someone defæcates into his mouth thus corresponds to a sadistic fantasy of biting off the penis from the father, fæces from the mother. That fantasy was totally repressed, but was obviously reflected in the fear of suffering injury genitally and anally. This fear served to a certain extent as a protection against his sadistic impulses. In fact he had long fantasied penetrating by force into the anus of his love-object and tearing it asunder, and breaking off (biting off) the penis in the case of a man, the breast in the case of a woman. As a matter of fact he now and then attempted *coitus per anum*, but was invariably deterred from it by fear of injury to the genital ; and, although extremely excitable in the anal region, for a long time he did not contemplate passively surrendering himself because his fear of injury to the anus was even greater than his fear of injury to the genital. In the course of time he became no longer able to control these impulses and finally yielded to their insistence.

On one occasion he happened to be solicited by two men at the same time, one of whom was large, of powerful build, and masculine, the other small, of delicate build, and feminine ; the patient decided in favour of the former. The oftener he had relations with him, the more intense became his desire to have congress with him *per anum*. This he dared not do, however, since the man was too strong and had too large a penis. So he went to the other, the small and feminine, man, and tried it first with him. While the latter was lying beside



him exhausted after intercourse he suddenly seemed very familiar to the patient ; he appeared to have blond hair (although in reality his hair was dark), but the patient did not know of whom he reminded him. It suddenly came to him that it might be his youngest sister, who is blonde. He had two sisters, one a year and a half, the other three years, younger than he. Of the younger sister he was extremely jealous ; she was a good deal of a tomboy, and his father had always shown a preference for her, often remarking that she ought really to have been a boy and the patient a girl. The oft-repeated aspersions of this sort on his father's part wounded him deeply. In order to make up for this humiliation and to convince his father of the contrary, he would compete with this sister in childish mischief, but he always got the worst of it, even though she was younger and was *only* a girl. On one occasion a remarkable scene took place. Some children dared this sister to kiss a dog underneath its tail. Without hesitation she did so. Our patient was shocked, but at the same time filled with admiration. How glad he would have been to have done it so as to show that he too was *courageous*, as it is proper that a man should be. Repugnance made it impossible for him, however. Perhaps we may now understand more fully his passive and active coprophagic dreams and fantasies. If in addition we realize that he not only envied this sister and so wanted to be like her, but also loved her and expressed this love in fantasy-created games, it will become wholly intelligible that he dared more readily to become aggressive towards a feminine man and to have anal relations with him than with a masculine man. The feminine man represented, indeed, the sister, a girl, a being who in spite of its masculinity nevertheless did not possess a penis and thus was less dangerous than a man.

After intercourse with the feminine man he did not want to have anything to do with him and returned to his masculine friend. It seemed as if his encounter with the former had given him courage now for the first time to behave aggressively towards the latter ; he now carried out sexual intercourse with him with a violence such as he had never before dared attempt, but such as he had always fantasied doing. Not content with this, he forced his friend on to his back, after intercourse from behind carried out with excessive violence, and wanted to have relations with him in front. But since the latter's penis was in the way, he fantasied tearing it off him, boring a hole in his abdomen, etc. This man then appeared to him flabby, weak, effeminate—he who till then had been such an object of admiration on account of



his masculinity. The patient could not explain this change, considered his lover from every angle, and felt satisfied only when he was able to tell himself that he must have been mistaken. Thenceforth he saw in this friend at one time a masculine man worthy of admiration, at another a feminine partner. He did not remind him of the feminine friend above referred to, or of his younger sister, but of the motherly sweetheart with whom he had temporarily broken off relations. But at the time this friend satisfied him psychically to an incomparably greater degree than his sweetheart ever had. He felt that the friend had become much closer than she, and loved with an intensity and joy in self-sacrifice such as he had never experienced in the case of a woman. He asserted that all his life he had longed for such a love, and that now his longing was fulfilled. He moved into his friend's house and felt safe and secure in his presence. At this time there appeared dreams which clearly shewed that this friend represented his mother.

His love object thus represented a condensation, a compromise between man and woman, and to a certain extent a reflection of his own bisexuality—as Freud says.

The only question is whether the aggression against his homosexual object applies also to the mother. This question may immediately be answered in the affirmative. In the first place, his masturbatory fantasies had a content of aggression not only against men but against women as well; and, in the second place, he had sadistic impulses in connection also with sexual intercourse with women, but in intercourse with his younger sweetheart he felt too weak to indulge these impulses, and with the older one did not trust himself to let himself go as he would have liked.

As is inevitably to be expected in the case of a homosexual, our patient's ability to love was intensely tinctured with narcissism. He was simply intoxicated by the idea that his insatiable need *to be loved* had at last been fulfilled. He had always felt the lack of being loved, and now it was with pride and joy that the realization of his lifelong desire was being accomplished. He asserted that he had never before felt so well, as now that he was receiving proofs of devoted love from so many sides. He rose in his own estimation, his self-awareness increased and he felt masculine; he had become 'somebody', whereas formerly he had been 'nobody'.

How is the narcissism to be reconciled in this case with the aggression? I do not wish to enter into a theoretical discussion in this place,



but would prefer to let the material presented speak for itself. In the first place, as we have seen, the aggression against the father subverted the positive œdipus complex. The patient wished to incorporate his father in order that he might strengthen his ego to the point where he should be able to take possession of his mother. But he was unsuccessful in effecting an identification with his father, for every attempt to do so ended in that primitive forerunner of identification which is characterized by cannibalistic impulses. That a disturbance of the development of the super-ego should have resulted is not surprising, but this is an aspect of the matter which I shall not go into on the present occasion. In the second place, the patient's entire life history shews in unequivocal fashion that his narcissism was continually, and chiefly at the hands of his mother, subjected to severe injury. For this he revenged himself upon her. A simple instance from the patient's daily life may perhaps most readily illustrate how much he hated and rejected her: he could not bring himself to offer her his arm to help her at a dangerous street crossing. Yet in spite of this he had a strong libidinal fixation upon her. One of the habits he had upon going to sleep supplies a picture of this latter. He could only fall asleep if he lay on his left side and held his right arm stretched in front of him as though wishing to embrace someone. This habit is easily explained, for up to his eleventh year he slept in the same bed with his mother and held on to her with his right hand. Our patient therefore loved his mother just as intensely as he hated her. But only the hate was conscious, the love unconscious. It is of course difficult to say when this hate first made its appearance. It is certain that he already felt it when, at the age of three, the younger of the sisters was born. He had two recurrent dreams in which he flew into such a rage against his mother that he was hardly able to contain himself. In one of the two dreams, his mother touched some object belonging to him, such as an article of clothing; in the other, she came into the bathroom while he was naked or while he was on the toilet. Both dreams were to some extent a repetition of reality, for the patient actually had attacks of rage if his mother wished to put his clothes-closet, bureau, or bookcase in order, or if she entered his room while he was dressing or undressing. At a deeper level these dreams refer to the rage which the patient felt when his mother caught him masturbating and threatened him with castration, or when she tried to give him enemas. But since the patient, as we have seen from other dreams and fantasies, had a tendency to effect repression through reversal



into the opposite, these dreams might also mean that he desired to approach his mother sexually, or to watch her while on the toilet, was prevented by her from doing so, felt this as a narcissistic injury, and reacted thereto with rage. This interpretation was confirmed by a whole series of memories. Thus the craving to revenge himself on his mother often assumed almost criminal form: As a boy, as well as in adult life, he several times set fire to the house. The very worst thing that he could possibly do to his mother, according to him, was to turn to his father when she denied him anything. For example, once when she did not comply immediately with his request to play the piano for him, he asked his father to do so, although he well knew that by doing so he hurt her feelings. On other occasions he took revenge on his sisters if he was hurt by his mother. On an occasion when, at the age of about twelve, he threw himself into his mother's arms, kissed her, and tried to put his tongue into her mouth, when she reprimanded him sternly for this, he first became greatly disconcerted and then furious. When his mother sent him to boarding school about the time of puberty, he protested violently and had attacks of rage; his attraction to boys, which, as already mentioned, began at that time, is undoubtedly to be considered as being in part a protest against her. In later life he behaved in a similar manner when it seemed to him that his sweetheart did not love him enough, and furthermore became jealous of another man without apparent reason; he indulged in wild fantasies of revenge against her and ended up finally by turning to men.

Thus it is clear that in his homosexuality the patient wanted to be revenged on women and to triumph over them.

On the other hand, the homosexual act represents also a triumph over the man—over the father. Not only does he overcome him and appropriate his strength, but he makes a woman out of him and feels himself sufficiently masculine to *take possession of* his mother. Both serve to restore his wounded narcissism and to strengthen his weak ego. The fulfilment of his homosexual desires resulted indeed in an increase in his self-esteem, in the confirmation of his infantile feelings of omnipotence, and gave him an exalted feeling that a certain magic power emanated from his personality. Magic was the main means by which he tried to outbalance the disturbance of his narcissistic equilibrium.

We know that the overvaluation of the ego is characteristic of paranoia. But we also know the significance which homosexuality has in paranoia. Thus it cannot be an accident that the case of a



paranoid brought it home to me for the first time that the aim of homosexuality is not only gratification of the libido but gratification of the impulses of aggression as well. This led me to compare in retrospect the non-psychotic homosexuals whom I had previously treated. That comparison made me realize that aggression plays a part of importance not only in the object choice of the paranoid but also in homosexuality in general, and is at least to be regarded as characteristic of a certain type of homosexual.

It is hardly necessary to say that this type does not appear in absolutely pure form ; as I remarked at the beginning, one hardly ever finds such things as pure types. Even the aggressive type displays certain masochistic traits *also*, even though these are not always well marked. We may therefore speak of a sadistic type when sadism predominates ; of a masochistic, when masochism predominates and leaves its impress upon the homosexual. In the present paper, however, I have set myself the task of discussing only the aggressive type.

The singling out of this type seems to me important also for the following reason. All the cases which I have had the opportunity of observing shewed certain paranoic tendencies such as mild ideas of reference and of persecution ; even the patient whom we have been discussing in detail had mild delusions of being poisoned. None of these cases, however, exhibited any other paranoic symptoms, and none developed a psychosis subsequently, as far as I am aware. It therefore seems, at all events, as though this type of homosexuality stood in somewhat closer relation to paranoia, and possibly represented something intermediate between neurosis and psychosis.

Some are of the opinion that a comparison between homosexuality and paranoia cannot stand a close criticism because the paranoiac projects while the homosexual does not do so. It is quite true that the mechanism of projecting is characteristic of paranoia ; it is, however, equally true that this mechanism plays an important part also in homosexuality, as for instance with that type where the object is chosen according to the pattern of maternal love. The question is whether projection can be found in the case I have described above. The answer is given by the patient himself, for he projects his ideal of a handsome, strong, tall man into the outside world. (The fact that he often succeeds in finding his ideal in reality may be responsible for protecting him against paranoia.) What, on the other hand, distinguishes him from a paranoiac is the fact that sadism in paranoia is for



the main part transformed into its opposite in masochism, while the aggression with our patient remained almost unchanged in those strata accessible to analysis, that is, those which are the most turned toward the outside world. In other words: while in paranoia libido *and* aggression turn towards or against the Ego, it seems that in our case only very small quantities of aggression have undergone this turning and transforming process. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, however, I do not want to state that this is the only difference between paranoia and homosexuality.

The question why it is that out of the same fundamental situation a paranoia develops in one instance and in another does not, must remain unanswered for the present.

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# INTELLECTUAL INHIBITION AND DISTURBANCES IN EATING <sup>1</sup>

BY  
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Psycho-analysis has shewn that the infant's first relation is to the mother's breast, and that this relation, together with his attitude to food, may prove significant for the whole of his reactions to the external world. In the words of a schizophrenic patient : ' At bottom everything, reading, going to the theatre, paying a call, is like eating. First you expect a lot, then you're disappointed. When I come to analysis, I eat your furniture, clothes, and words. You eat my words, clothes, and money. If you work, your employer eats you up. But at the same time you do some eating yourself. At times I'm very hungry, then once again I can eat nothing '.

The functions of the sense organs stand in the service both of the instinct of self-preservation and of (modified or unmodified) libidinal instinctual aims. Furthermore, reception via the sense organs, like intellectual assimilation, is equated with oral incorporation, so that affects of greed, pleasure, anxiety, inhibition, etc., get transferred from food to these (cf. the expressions ' intoxicated with beauty ', ' devour with the eyes ', ' a feast for the ears ', etc.). Instinctual conflicts can accordingly either inhibit or favour the function of the sense organs, and the sense of reality based on them, in two ways : (1) Through conflicts relating to the libidinal instinctual aim in whose service the sense perceptions stand (e.g. inhibition or impulses to sexual curiosity). (2) Through disturbances of libidinal trends which become secondarily amalgamated with the function of the sense organs or with the processes of thought (e.g. if seeing, smelling, or thinking are perceived as oral activities, inhibitions in eating can be replaced by inhibitions affecting sight, smell, or thought).

Our attitude to external reality corresponds for the most part to our attitude to internal reality, to our affects ; for only through them do we acquire a relation to the external world. The affects are generally equated with the contents of one's body, with the incorporated objects.

Abraham shewed that the receptive function in eating forms the prototype for all later intellectual understanding, and this has been confirmed by other analysts. All the cases of intellectual inhibition I

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<sup>1</sup> Part of a paper read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society in September, 1933.



have analysed could be traced back to an earlier inhibition in eating. In those cases where the inhibition in eating is not replaced by an intellectual one, intellectual ingestion seems to be regarded as less real and less aggressive and so arouses less anxiety than actual biting up of food.

The schizophrenic patient previously mentioned had suffered in childhood from severe disturbances in eating. These had developed as a reaction to her strong oral wishes. About the age of ten she overcame this inhibition to a very great extent, since anxiety compelled her to over-compensate the feelings of disgust and aggression towards her mother which found expression in the refusal of food : better that she should eat of her own accord than that she should be compelled to do so by her mother and perhaps have the food forced into some other opening—eye or anus. Her shyness with people was determined by the same motives as her inhibition ; but a still greater anxiety compelled her to overcome this anxiety, to be ' polite ', to do always as others did and to eat everything. A thing was of real value in her eyes only if it was acquired in secret—food stolen between meal-times. Yet her excessive anxiety would not let her gratify these impulses. If anyone knew what she possessed, ate, studied, etc., it at once lost its value ; it might be taken from her, or her enjoyment of it might be interfered with (as in the case of masturbation)—consequently it was better that she should give it up of her own accord.

This attitude to food was decisive for her attitude to money and knowledge. She reacted to her wish that her parents should give her a lot of money (oral greed) with an extraordinarily strong sense of guilt. Consequently she wanted to avoid accepting anything from them. But since this attitude was bound up with the aggressive wish to be independent of her parents, to be grown up (oral defiance), this had in turn to be over-compensated by assuming the part of a small child dependent on its parents. This latter was also determined by her overwhelming fear of poverty (starvation).

She was under a very strong urge to study, but, as in the whole of her intellectual development, was inhibited to such an extent that at first she impressed one as mentally defective. Her wish to know everything, by knowing to be omnipotent and independent of her parents, to be admired and feared, expressed her impulses orally to incorporate an omnipotent penis. The various courses of study represented male, female, or sexless persons. She was unable to study because she could not allow herself a preference for any one particular subject, or person, or food. She had to study all subjects, incorporate



all people, all at once. She felt guilt if a subject had been neglected, anxiety if it had been begun (food bitten into but not eaten). If she could not master all subjects at once, she must give them all up. Her defiance also found expression here: 'All or Nothing'. This was strengthened by fear of the knowledge to be acquired.

The incorporation anxieties which had inhibited eating found expression in the most varied fears that study was bad for her health. In particular she could not study sociology because the different theories in this field would work in her mind like ill-assorted food in her stomach. (It is dangerous to incorporate the sadistic antagonistic parents.) These incorporation anxieties were somewhat mitigated if she worked with others, and so proved to herself that they could take in the knowledge, just as her anxiety had been less great if she ate with her mother. But then she was hampered by the anxiety and rivalry felt for her comrades. Besides, she did not want what others had, but rather something quite unique, something that had never before existed. If she had taken this in (eaten or learnt it), she was like God. In order to become like God, she had to be alone, have no human relations or sexual impulses. Another reason for having to be alone was to escape the envy of others. She was afraid that the food given by her mother and the knowledge dispensed by the teacher would prove bad, injurious or worthless. So she had to acquire valuable knowledge on the sly. But to avoid awakening in others the suspicion that she was secretly looking for something better, she had also to incorporate the food and knowledge offered her. As she did not know where the 'good' object (breast, penis, fructifying semen) was to be found, she had to consume everything in existence, and the impossibility of doing so paralysed her. She suspected that anything accounted as worthless was alone truly to be valued, consequently she had to pay special attention to all subordinate matters, but might not appear to be doing so. She was under a compulsion to buy old books, partly in the hope that these would prove to be of especial value, partly because she identified herself with them and felt they would rot away, since nobody else wanted them. She suffered from a sense of guilt toward subjects she did not learn, akin to that she felt for old books she did not buy, as well as rubbish she failed to collect, food left uneaten, abandoned children. Therefore she might not favour one subject at the expense of another. But then anxiety arose that she would not be able to look after so many children and that she herself would be hungrily devoured by them. In the same way, she wanted



to keep a number of domestic pets, but feared she would not be a good mother to them, would not have enough food or time for them, etc., or might treat them cruelly. She would only be able to study if she had kept and studied mice and rabbits and proved her worth with these. But then she was afraid that if she did this well (were a good mother, i.e. feminine), she would have no right to give it up, to study (be a man). Her ideal was to be both sexes : consequently she had to have everything at once, know everything, incorporate everything (father and mother together), be man and woman at one and the same time, so as to become equal to God. By being both sexes or neither one becomes equal to God.

I have only been able in this paper to adduce some of the motives responsible for the patient's severe intellectual inhibition. They are remarkable in being diametrically opposed and consequently admitting of no compromise. As in other cases, I found that the most powerful factors inhibiting oral-intellectual ingestion were : Fear of the envy of others corresponding in intensity to one's own envy of their possessions ; fear of one's sadism (of destroying food, damaging knowledge, depriving others of it by one's incompetence, i.e. sadism), and, further, numerous incorporation anxieties. An additional motive of importance emphasized by various writers is oral defiance ; a refusal to take in knowledge because as a child one did not obtain it at the time or in the way or as fully as one wished.

The influence of oral factors is not solely an inhibiting one ; in many cases they favour intellectual development. Greedy longing for food is often replaced by curiosity, thirst for knowledge or riches, etc., knowledge being regarded as concrete and equated with the penis, body contents, etc. An intellectually uninhibited patient prized knowledge only if it was inaccessible to others, if he acquired it in secret, ' stole ' it. His main anxiety was that a woman would devour his brain or that his scientific work would prove to have been plagiarized (stolen). He equated knowledge—ideas—with the contents of his head, and these with the contents of his body. As retaliation for primitive incorporation wishes directed to his mother he feared the woman would devour the contents of his head or that his child (scientific work) would turn out to be stolen from his mother.

It seems that scientific work is very largely based on the oral sexual theory that one can only give birth to a child if one has first orally appropriated and incorporated parts of the parents' bodies. Thus, psychologically, plagiarism seems to represent a central problem



in scientific work. Normally, retaliation anxiety is avoided by legalizing plagiarism with quotation (reparation to the author). This sexual theory also finds expression in the work ritual of many people who, e.g. can only work well if they have first consumed a juicy beefsteak or who eat sweets or smoke while they work.

A patient who had occasionally stolen during puberty (mainly sweets and books) later shewed a certain inclination to plagiarize. Since in his eyes activity was bound up with theft and scientific work with plagiarism, he could only get away from these prohibited impulses by means of a really far-reaching inhibition of his activity and intellectual work.

Intellectual disturbances can extend to disturbances in production as well as in understanding. For productive work, excretory and birth symbolism is of paramount importance. Thence arise numerous disturbances: many people, for fear of remaining barren, empty (robbed of the contents of their body), can only write a work if they have already mentally finished the next one. A patient felt guilty towards work which had been completed and sent in to the editor; he had abandoned his child, sent it to strangers. So long as it lay in the drawer, it was safe, like a child in bed. Often anxiety also relates to the work itself: the various ideas (children, excrements) are like troops which must be laboriously brought under control to prevent them fighting among themselves (contradictions) or rebelling against their commander. A patient with an insect phobia compared his work with a millepede. The footnotes represented the numerous feet. Frequently hypochondriacal fears and worries are transferred from body to thoughts and from these to work. However, I do not wish now to enter more closely into these factors, but only to emphasize the part played by oral factors in inhibiting productive work.

A patient had, with great effort, given some lectures and after a further lecture reported very contentedly that—as anticipated—it had again been a failure. The bad lecture, like his tedious associations, proved to be a revenge for all the bad lectures he had been compelled to hear, for all disappointing knowledge, in the last resort for insufficient feeding. On another occasion he cancelled a lecture at the last minute. Lecturing gave him power over the audience. Here he identified himself with a nursing mother who is in a position to give good or bad food (knowledge) or to refuse it altogether.

The motives which I have here illustrated by reference to journalistic and scientific works and lectures can also be shewn at work in writing



letters, homework, giving answers at school, repeating poetry, etc., etc., and even in the ordinary conversation of adults and children. Once again these motives exercise an inhibiting influence only in some cases; frequently they form a powerful stimulus to intellectual development.

Generally it may be said that oral factors will exert a beneficial influence on intellectual development if the oral longing sublimated into curiosity is intense while not calling up anxiety or guilt as a result of the associated sadism (alternatively, if anxiety and guilt are bound without inhibiting intellectual development). Apart from the importance of excretory symbolism, the most favourable condition for intellectual production is an identification with a good mother who dispenses food and knowledge, and—on the genital level—with a potent father.



# THE TRANSITION FROM ORGAN NEUROSIS TO CONVERSION HYSTERIA<sup>1</sup>

BY  
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In the course of analyses of patients with gastro-intestinal symptomatology it has repeatedly come to my attention that the symptom for which a patient entered analysis was at times replaced by another symptom or symptoms. Often a conversion symptom of hysterical nature was concurrent with and incident to at least temporary cessation of the original organ neurosis. The present paper represents an attempt to trace the transition from an organ neurosis to conversion hysteria and an analysis of the material at the time of the replacement.

It is realized that such a separation of organ neurosis from conversion hysteria cannot be considered a fixed one. However, it is customary to restrict conversion hysteria to symptoms occurring in the voluntary and sensory systems and to speak of organ neurosis in reference to function disturbances of organs whose functions are autonomic and under normal conditions not subjected to voluntary influences. It has been observed that in organ neurosis the psychological factors involved are usually very definitely pregenital in character,<sup>2</sup> whereas in conversion hysteria later phases of instinctual organization are prevalent, more specifically the phallic phase. I shall attempt to trace the progress of the dynamic structure during psycho-analytic treatment from early pregenital to the phallic level coincident with the change from gastric symptoms (peptic ulcer) to conversion symptom in the following case:

This patient is a forty-one-year-old female attorney who came to analysis for recurrent duodenal ulcer, agoraphobia, handwriting difficulties and a feeling of social maladjustment. She is the youngest of three children, having a brother seven years her senior and a sister five years older. Her brother is a successful attorney. The sister, who was

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<sup>1</sup> Read before the American Psychoanalytic Association, St. Louis, May 6, 1936.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander, F.; Bacon, C.; Levey, H.; Levine, M.; and Wilson, G.: "The Influence of Psychologic Factors upon Gastro-Intestinal Disturbances: A Symposium—a report upon research carried on at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis." *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, October, 1934, Vol. III, pp. 501-588.



unmarried and with whom the patient made her home, is a forceful, ambitious and competent schoolmistress who married during the analysis. Her father is a well-known rabbi. The mother is an ambitious but entirely ineffective person, who during the patient's childhood suffered continuously from gastro-intestinal symptoms which were diagnosed as psychogenic in origin. She had been very attached to her mother as a child and found it impossible to leave home until after she was thirty years of age. As a child she took great pride in being her mother's nurse, caring for her, waiting on her and rarely leaving her side, for she had fears that her mother would die and leave her. These almost constant fantasies, together with her mother's continuous illness, kept her in a state of anxiety for several years. Her ulcer was inactive at the time of beginning the analysis but became active and demonstrable through Roentgen ray examination in a phase of the analysis which I shall describe later.

This patient exhibited certain personality trends described as frequent in ulcer personalities.<sup>3</sup> Specifically I refer to the intense incorporating tendencies which are repressed and lead to over-compensation through increased activity and ambitious effort in life. She was an aggressive, hard-working, efficient and successful attorney. She maintained a very independent attitude towards other members of the firm and refused to accept favours from anyone. The deeper oral receptive and aggressive tendencies were almost but not entirely denied. In relationship to her sister she did live out some of these tendencies by living with and permitting the sister to feed and treat her as in a distinctly mother-child relationship. That this relationship produced considerable unconscious guilt, and also attempts to relieve the guilt, was demonstrated in her attitude towards her sister and other members of her family. She spent money in entertaining her sister, assumed the financial responsibility for their household and sent money and other gifts to her parents and her brother's children. To these children she felt a particular responsibility and, in addition to her gifts, fantasied financing their musical education, something which she herself had been denied, and their college careers.

Much of the material of her analysis revolved about seduction by

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<sup>3</sup> Alexander, F.; Bacon, C.; Levey, H.; Levine, M.; and Wilson, G.: *loc. cit.* This patient may be identified as patient 'A' in 'Quantitative Dream Studies,' by Alexander, Franz, and Wilson, George W., *Psycho-analytic Quarterly*, 1935, Vol. IV, pp. 371-405.



her brother. This occurred when she was ten years of age and consisted in her being masturbated by him at irregular but rather frequent intervals until she was fifteen, when he married and left home. Before this rejection she began to masturbate herself, and continued this until just before beginning her analysis. There were many periods during this time when, out of fear and an obsessive belief that she was 'damaging' herself, as she in fact believed herself to have been 'damaged' by her brother, she would discontinue this practice. The same idea was prominent throughout her analysis, for she soon began to accuse the analysis and the analyst of injuring her. Many times she made the accusation that the Institute and the analyst had promised to relieve her of conflicts, and this had not been accomplished. In fact, she found herself much worse than before she began the procedure. Before the analysis everyone thought of her as a well-adjusted person, but after coming to analysis she had great difficulty in handling her work as well as her social adjustments. Although she insisted that her ulcer did not have a psychogenic basis, nevertheless she blamed the analysis for its recurrence. She pointed out that it was healed when she began and became active during the process.

During these intervals she consulted countless male and female gynaecologists for the purpose of receiving assurance that she *was not* damaging herself and that she had not been damaged, as well as for a means of aiding her in discontinuing this practice. She received all kinds of advice, ranging from that of using her 'will power' to one suggestion that she undergo an operation which was described as similar to circumcision and consisted in rotating a piece of mucous membrane over the clitoris.

The patient successfully blackmailed her brother during most of her life. It was he who paid for her education, financed her frequent trips to physicians for her gynaecological complaints and her gastric symptom. But more than mere finances were involved in the manner in which she expressed her hatred for him. He was blamed for all her symptoms, as well as her failures in heterosexual adjustments and her lack of success in life. (Actually she was quite successful unless asked to assume responsibility.) Her inabilities in any given direction were directly attributed to her experiences with him and therefore to him. Very early in the analysis she became conscious of the wish to make him suffer as she believed herself to have suffered. She wanted him to feel guilty and was intensely envious of his success and his obviously



good adjustment in life. She hated his wife and was pleased when she had a miscarriage. Many times she succeeded in arousing his guilt feelings through complaining of illness, of her inability to concentrate on her work, her need to take vacations, etc. On at least two occasions he was summoned from some distance to her bedside because of somatic symptoms which she admitted were used as a means of punishing him as well as a way of receiving attention.

Although the most of her hostility for men was expressed towards her brother, she frankly confessed a hatred for most men. She constantly depreciated her father and described him as being weak and ineffective, a sentimental old bookworm who was at the same time cruel and sadistic. She complained that he gave her much affection when she was a small child, but later completely rejected her. She complained of his religious intolerance. At the same time the patient greatly admired his intelligence, his knowledge of literature, history and music. She had been very attached to him as a child, followed him about and enjoyed his company a great deal, but later detested him, blamed him for most of the family quarrels, which were frequent, and felt he was the bad influence in the whole family situation. She had fantasies of his beating her, and much of her early material offered a striking example of what Freud has described in 'A Child is Being Beaten'.<sup>4</sup> However, most of this hatred was lived out in reference to her brother. Obviously she turned from her father to her brother for affection and physical contact as well as making him the object of her vengeance. This fact becomes of paramount importance in analysing the development of her conversion symptom.

The stage setting for the seduction is also of importance to the understanding of later developments. She claimed this took place while they were lying on her parent's bed in a room overlooking a hospital watching ambulances going in and out. She said they had spent many hours passing the time this way while alone in the house. Her brother often stroked her back and patted her hip, and it was following such common practice that he, on this occasion, exposed and masturbated her.

From the very beginning she exhibited an intense fear of the analysis. She cancelled the first three hours because of the sudden development of acute respiratory symptoms which resembled a

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<sup>4</sup> Freud, S.: 'A Child is Being Beaten,' *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 172-201 (London, Hogarth Press, 1924).



common cold.<sup>5</sup> She was late for her first hour and felt a strong disinclination towards coming. She appeared very frightened and complained of the difficulty about having to talk. She also expressed her dislike of having a male analyst, that she would have much preferred coming to a woman. She thought it would be much easier because many of her difficulties she believed were probably sexual in character and her early training had probably produced inhibitions against telling those things to a person of the opposite sex. Then she immediately referred to fears of her father and said that she had always been afraid of him. She followed this with a confession regarding her masturbation episodes with her brother and her fears of having been damaged. Her early dreams contained distinct references to her castration wishes toward men and her fears of the feminine rôle. This transference situation continued for about forty analytic hours. Then her whole transference attitude changed and she began to neglect her work, her compensatory giving to her sister and other members of her family practically ceased and she began to express with increasing frankness her passive dependent relationship to her sister and to me. She spent entire days in bed, during which time her sister prepared the meals and waited upon her as a mother would a child. She complained bitterly of the necessity of earning her own living and wanted to become totally passive and dependent. For her the ideal solution would be to spend the rest of her life in bed, reading, resting and day-dreaming, removed from all contact with reality. This frankly expressed infantile attitude illustrated a commonly observed fact: that when a symptom or a behaviour pattern becomes threatened by the analytic procedure, it may become intensified as a defence reaction.

Obviously beginning the analysis had for her a meaning similar to that of the original seduction by her brother. She was afraid of the analysis, afraid of a male analyst because this constituted to her unconscious a reproduction of the original intimate relationships with her brother. There was not only the fear of having her genital desires aroused as they were at that time but there was the added fear of her castration wishes towards him which she unconsciously realized would

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<sup>5</sup> In this connection see Menninger, Karl: 'Some Unconscious Psychological Factors Associated with the Common Cold,' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, April, 1934, Vol. III; also Saul, Leon: 'Psychogenic Factors in the Etiology of the Common Cold' (to be published).



be reproduced in the analytic situation. Obviously then she took flight into the mother-child transference relationship.

At this point, because her oral dependent relationship to her sister had been thoroughly analysed in the transference situation, it seemed advisable to recommend the discontinuance in real life of the gratification of these tendencies. The analytic situation seemed opportune for such advice for the reason that these exaggerated indulgences had an obvious defence significance for her. Therefore she reacted violently to this advice, refused to make any change whatever and became more dependent and demanding than before.

Immediately following her refusal to co-operate, she began to have gastric symptoms similar to those which had been active during her 'ulcer' periods. She found it impossible to eat anything except bland foods and began to restrict her diet to milk and soups. Severe epigastric pains were complained of after eating as well as insomnia, and more or less constant nausea. She consulted her former gastro-enterologist, who advised a roentgenological examination. This was done and an active duodenal ulcer with pylorospasm was demonstrated. At the same time she admitted an intense jealousy of her sister, who had become interested in a man whom the patient considered inferior. She did everything possible to prevent their proposed marriage. She transferred some of her dependent attitude to other more sympathetic mother-substitutes and succeeded in getting a great deal of attention from them. In this way she offered an excellent demonstration of exacerbation of gastric symptoms coincident with her stubborn determination to hold on to her oral incorporating tendencies, at the moment when the analyst not only through interpretations but through recommendations interfered with their gratification.

She attempted to frighten me with the severity of her gastric symptoms and suggested that she take a vacation both from work and from analysis and remain at home attended by her sister. Coincident with my discouraging this and the actual setting of a wedding date by her sister, she suddenly developed a new symptom. This consisted of intense pain starting in the upper lumbar region, continuing down the spine, and radiating into the left hip. This was accompanied by a lateral scoliosis causing her to lean towards the left. The spinal condition became so painful that she could not walk and had to be assisted from her bed. She consulted several orthopaedic surgeons, who expressed varying opinions, but a diagnosis of spinal arthritis was finally made. Her brother was, of course, immediately notified and



came to Chicago to aid her. She remained at home for two weeks after the onset of this symptom. During this time she was treated with the common remedies for arthritis—rest in bed and applied heat, but her condition did not improve. On the contrary, the pain and scoliosis became worse, and it was finally decided to take her to the hospital for Röntgen ray examination, after which she was to be mechanically stretched and a plaster of Paris cast applied to her back. Then all of her gastric symptoms disappeared and she could eat anything, but out of fear restricted herself for the most part to a bland diet.

I was informed of her intention to undergo these drastic therapeutic measures and therefore asked her by telephone if she would like to have me come and see her. Her answer was, 'No', but that *if* I came she would have to receive me out of courtesy. I called immediately, expressed an attitude of friendly interest in her illness, and then inquired about her mental condition. She replied by telling me a dream of the previous night which had disturbed her considerably.

*Dream*: She saw several soldiers with fixed bayonets. They all belonged to the same army. Suddenly they began to attack and fight each other. She feared that in the confusion she might get hurt.

Without actual confirmatory associations, I told her I believed the dream represented what she was doing in reality to the several doctors (including myself), playing one doctor against another; and that in the dream there was a fear of being hurt and an obvious need for punishment as a reaction to the wish to injure others. Her reaction to this interpretation was a negative one. She replied that she needed competent medical advice, that analysis could probably straighten her out mentally, but she had a real physical, pathological illness which I was ignoring, or at least minimizing.

I advised an immediate Röntgen ray examination of the vertebral column to determine further what pathological state actually existed and attempted to discourage both stretching and application of the cast, at the same time offering to have her transported to and from my office each day if she wished to continue her analysis. She reserved her answer and two days later I received a letter from her. She was in the hospital, the Röntgen ray examination had *not* demonstrated any vertebral lesion whatever, but the stretcher had been applied and the cast was to follow. In the same letter she complained that her friends (mother-substitutes) were really her enemies. I replied to this letter by again recommending that she discontinue her attempts of getting herself 'damaged' and return to the analysis. I also indicated that



probably she was her *own* worst enemy. These were only reiterations of former interpretations.

However, this letter seemed to have the desired effect, because she left the hospital and returned to the analysis. Her posture was very stiff with distinct deviation to the left. She walked with difficulty. She gave three definite reasons for returning. The first was my interpretations in regard to her being her *own worst enemy*, the second some insight into the manner in which she was 'fooling' the doctors, and the third was that her gastro-enterologist told her he believed her back symptoms were largely psychogenic and that she had better return to analysis.

For several succeeding hours her material contained repeated accusations that everyone wanted to damage her, that doctors were all incompetent, that the sooner psycho-analysis and medicine got together the better it would be for the innocent victims of both. She insisted her pain and deformity were due to some spinal pathology and that the doctors simply could not find it. However, her condition continued to improve.

The development of the new symptom was coincident with thwarting of her last desperate attempt to maintain her passive dependent relationship to her sister. When I began to force her out of this situation, not only with interpretations but with a recommendation that she discontinue the relationship, she evidently made an emotional effort to abandon the pregenital attachment to the sister and face the problem of heterosexuality. An added incentive for such an attempt was that of the sister's impending marriage which drove her into competition with her sister on an adult feminine level. The internal obstacles to this progress are known from her previous analytic material. The way to a heterosexual adjustment was blocked by the intense hate and fear reactions towards men. The sexual episode with her brother intensified her aggressive and castrative wishes towards men to such a degree that it necessitated a projection of these wishes and she attempted to place all the blame on to men. The projection solution then became: It is not she who wants to castrate men. They damage her. Her brother damaged her. I believe that this muscular spasm had a direct relationship to this conflict, a conflict centering about castration wishes towards men and the resultant fears of retaliation. The psychological circumstances under which the symptom occurred corroborate this belief.

At this time when the symptom was at its height I encouraged her



to be more socially aggressive, because I anticipated that she was about ready to face the problem of heterosexuality and assumed that the previous analysis had blocked her escape back to a pregenital dependence upon her sister (and mother). I told her specifically that I thought it expedient for her to seek the company of both men and women but more particularly that of men and to make some overt attempts toward friendly relations with them. She laughed at, belittled and rejected my suggestion. She said she had no friends except women, she was out of touch with eligible men. Then she brought the following dream :

*Dream* : It was all about beds. They seemed to be on a quiet beautiful street. The streets seemed to criss-cross. One was Willow Street which seemed very soothing to her. It was a little eerie too because of the darkness.

It is interesting that before telling this dream in the analysis, she repeated it to her sister.

In associating to the dream she stated that her sister said she wanted to retreat. Patient says this is not true. She is only interested in being straight and out of pain again. This is such a blow to her pride. She must wear a support, which she despises. The night of the dream a man and his wife were quarrelling in the next apartment—and a boy had an argument with his parents. She envied this boy his ability to argue with his parents without any apparent fear of retaliation. She was always afraid to argue with her parents. There was all kinds of excitement and a radio was going full blast. The people quarrelling expressed themselves beautifully, but excitedly. It reminded her of the good old days at home and her mother's and father's quarrels. She is disturbed about having so many doctors treat her. Maybe she does play one against another. She can see that she is acting like a prostitute except that instead of men in general she is using doctors. She actually lied to two of them and did not realize at the time that she was attempting to get them to quarrel with each other. She has had the feeling that she would like to sleep with several men, a different one every night. She remembers a song from the Gilbert and Sullivan opera, 'The Mikado', about a little bird who sat in a tree all day long and sang. When asked why he sits and sings all day, the answer is the same monotonous refrain, 'Tit Willow'. No matter what he is asked, the answer is always 'Tit Willow'. She was greatly impressed by this opera, but could only



remember the song of the dickey-bird who sang over and over again the same monotonous refrain.

This dream expresses clearly and dramatically the deeper dynamics of my patient's psychology in this phase of the analysis (i.e. the phase in which the transition from pregenital conflicts corresponding to the emotional background of peptic ulcer and the genital conflicts expressed in the conversion symptom as described, took place). The dream obviously contains a threat which was only partially grasped by me at the time and was followed by the carrying out in reality of the threat contained therein. For these reasons I have chosen to examine and interpret the dream rather thoroughly, not only in relation to its manifest and latent contents but in respect to material previously obtained during the analysis.

The dream expresses an intense spite reaction to my advice that she abandon the oral dependent relationship to her sister and mother-substitutes and that she mix with the opposite sex. To this she reacted as though it were a rejection by me towards whom she had an oral dependent transference similar to the relationship to her sister, and all the fury of a rejected girl is contained in the dream. In the dream she accuses me as a girl might accuse her mother. She says, 'You drive me into the street, into prostitution'. (This is expressed by the beds in the dark street.) The depreciation of a sexual life is clearly shewn in the associations. The criss-cross streets to which she associated the quarrelling couple refer to the parent's quarrels and a sado-masochistic conception of intercourse. At the same time the dream also expresses the wish to regress to the security of the analytic situation which is treated as analogous to a mother caring for her child. Willow Street had for her a soothing significance and the tit willow as well as the monotonous refrain refer to the soothing effects of a lullaby.

It is of interest to observe that every element of this dream contains such a double and opposing meaning. Sexuality is referred to as being prostitution, and at the same time the reference to the security of the parental home and the wish for a mother-daughter relationship is clearly shewn. The dream also contains a reference to another type of reaction, namely, fear of the female sexual rôle as shewn in her identification with the boy previously mentioned in the associations. The main content of this dream is the rejection of heterosexuality because of its danger. Verbalized it would be, 'You refuse me, reject me, want me to become a woman. That means you really want me to be a prostitute like my mother'. The opposing meaning is the wish to



retreat from the danger of sexuality to the protection of the mother. Also the analyst's interpretations are felt as soothing lullabies. This is shewn in her association to Willow Street which had a soothing influence.

But this too has a negative meaning. The analyst's interpretations, particularly those referring to her oral receptive and aggressive desires, likewise the monotonous repetition about being damaged by her brother and by the analysis, are monotonous refrains. It is not impossible that she also accuses the analyst as she accused her brother. Verbalized it would be, 'You force sexuality upon me just as my brother did'. This, as we shall see, is at least partially a projection of her own wish to damage first her brother and later men in general. Her fear of the darkness (the street in the dream was eerie too) is a reaction to her fear of seeing her prostitution wishes. This may also express the wish to keep the analyst in the dark.

The dream as well as the symptom expressed a drastic defence against genital desires: desires so active and so feared for the reasons stated that she had to build up some defence which would render heterosexuality impossible for her. The complaint against the brother also contained this defence element.

In this phase of the analysis when she is confronted with the problem of sexuality she feels driven into it. She repeats the same reaction which she experienced when her brother 'forced' a sexual relationship upon her. This reaction was one of retaliation fear because of the castration wish, and resulted in rejection of the feminine rôle and an identification with men to avoid the suffering rôle of a woman. The oral dependent attitude toward the mother was transferred to a wish to incorporate the penis orally. The previous material shewed that the wish to incorporate her father's and brother's penis was due not only to resentment and fear but also to the wish to own something, the possession of which pleased the mother.

We see that she had two methods of escape from the problem of heterosexuality. One was a regression to the oral level, the resumption of the oral receptive, dependent relationship to the mother; the second was an escape on the phallic level, an identification with the man by castrating him and incorporating his penis. As I have pointed out in the first part of the analysis the transference material, dreams, etc., express castration wishes towards men which were later followed by an oral-dependent attitude towards me as well as towards her sister and represented a re-living of the defence against the genital desires. The



analyst for a long period represented (in the second instance) the mother who would protect her against heterosexuality, but when the conversion symptom developed, this mother-transference had been abandoned and she not only was expressing frank sexual wishes towards me but this frank expression was followed almost immediately by carrying out of sexual impulses in life. When she was driven out of this oral type of solution, she reacted with attempts corresponding to the second pattern, that of masculine identification. Concurrent with this attempt she developed the hysterical symptom previously described.

The psychological meaning of this conversion symptom cannot be fully reconstructed. However, I am inclined to assume an important relationship between the anatomical localization of the symptom and the erotic pleasure-sensation which she experienced when caressed by her brother. This part of her anatomy which was originally connected with pleasure sensations became the seat of pain. This is obviously due to guilt feelings as a reaction to receiving pleasure from her brother and at the same time out of revenge wishing to castrate him. A complete analysis of the symptom is not of paramount importance to the purpose of this paper. However, it appears that with this symptom she symbolically made of her body a penis, a stiff but damaged one. It is not justifiable, however, entirely to separate the two solutions, (6) masculine identification and (7) regression to the oral level. The conversion symptom which led to the contortion of her body not only expressed the phallic solution but at the same time permitted a regression to early dependent attitudes in life. She became entirely dependent, obtained satisfaction out of being nursed, fed as an infant is fed, and received a great deal of attention. She remained in bed and removed herself from all touch with reality.

That the symptom also had a further defence significance in relation to assuming an adult rôle in life is well illustrated in her material. The symptom developed at the time she wished to indulge her passive dependent wishes but was forced into some activity in the reality situation. She repeated many times that her back was less painful when she remained quiet and inactive, that exertion increased her

<sup>6</sup> Freud, S.: 'On the Physical Mechanisms of Hysterical Phenomena,' *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 24-42. (London, Hogarth Press, 1924.)

<sup>7</sup> See particularly Lewin, Bertram D.: 'The Body as Phallus,' *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1933, Vol. II, p. 24.



pain. She reasoned that having to work, to come to analysis, to perform the ordinary daily function of life all contributed to her discomfort. At the same time she reported dreams in which she would be sitting, lying or standing quietly, but in danger of being *injured* usually by something being projected in her direction and there was always the feeling in the dream that she must *not* move. She felt secure providing she made no movement. That these dreams refer to insight in the analysis is obvious, but, in view of the fact that her fears of genitality were so intense and that this symptom was clearly a defence against progression to an adult attitude, I believe we are justified in assuming that it contained quite specifically a protest against adult feminine activity, against walking, standing on her own feet in the sense of psychologically growing up. The projectile nature of the danger in the dreams quite plainly referred to her fears of the feminine rôle in intercourse.

The masculine identification represented a new attempt to solve her Œdipus conflict in relation to her mother on the phallic level. Previously she found a solution through renouncing all competition and assuming towards her mother the rôle of the helpless dependent child. Now she wants to possess a penis with which she can please the mother as the father does and in consequence continue to receive from her. With this new attempt at solution on the phallic level the hysterical symptom develops, whereas during the period of her peptic ulcer symptom the psychodynamic background corresponded to a pregenital, i.e. an oral, solution.

As previously mentioned, the patient made an attempt to carry out in reality the threat contained in the dream. She managed through her brother to meet a male friend of his in Havana during the vacation period and with this meeting began the realization of her dream.

In the first hour following the vacation period she reported that she had had intercourse with this man and that it seemed a very ugly experience. She stated that he was exactly like her father in every respect, that he liked her, said nice things to her and made love to her. She thought him very intellectual but not very aggressive. She said that they talked for hours about things which she had discussed as a child with her father and that for her it was a real mental feast. He was very kind and understanding and never interpreted anything she said or did. He was very affectionate and she enjoyed kissing him, particularly his hands. They spent whole days together, and after two days decided to sleep together. They planned to stay at her hotel, but



when they arrived on this particular evening, she found that she did not possess a key to her room. Afterwards she learned that he had it in his pocket (an obvious reference to her lack of a penis and his possession of one). She began immediately to menstruate, which caused a postponement of the sexual relationship. After menstruation finished, they made another attempt. She was quite frigid and the intercourse was painful. She reported that at one point when he placed her head in his lap it almost queered the whole procedure. She thought that the penis was the ugliest and dirtiest of organs and was both disgusted and mad. She said that she could have died laughing at the analyst's interpretations of penis envy. It was very difficult for her not to shew him how much she hated him. Very sarcastically she referred to herself as having been analysed, and laughingly told him she supposed she envied him his penis, at the same time saying, 'That is all poppy-cock'. He told her that one organ could not function without the other, which observation she said made her feel just fine and dandy. She said she believed most women felt the same way about intercourse, but would not admit it. It disturbed her when he called her 'pal', because this had been one of her brother's pet names for her. She told in detail of her preparations for intercourse, how she undressed with a do-or-die precision and laughed hysterically when, after undressing, she ordered the light to be extinguished and he pushed the wrong switch illuminating the whole room. She felt that the room was full of men and women watching them. What she enjoyed most in the whole procedure was his masturbating her. Then she referred to her frigidity and said that there must be some anatomical and not an emotional reason for it. Her sister told her that in the beginning of sexual relations frigidity was very common.

Following this episode she became convinced that she was madly in love with this man and wanted to quit her position, move to Havana and live with him. This, however, he quite emphatically discouraged and frankly informed her he had no intentions of getting married and was not at all anxious to be tied down to any permanent affair. Following this rejection she decided she wanted to return home, became very anxious to return to the analysis, and felt that anyway she had made a distinct advance toward successful adjustment. But at the same time she felt this was the only man who could possibly care enough for her to overlook her age and other believed deficiencies. She said she felt quite uninhibited in his presence, that she could 'act' with him, that she enjoyed singing to him and entertaining him in other ways. In



many respects their relationship assumed a homosexual flavour. She felt that he was somewhat feminine in his actions ; that he was very fixated to his family, that he was passive and indecisive, that he probably was quite neurotic but very good company and that anyway he was exceedingly kind to her. Following this recital of her Havana experiences a major part of the analysis as well as her fantasy life consisted of a repetition of this experience.

It was pointed out to her that she had lived out her unconscious transference wishes in this episode, that she received from this man what she could not get from the analyst, i.e. overt manifestation of affection (physical contact) and that she did not receive the things she disliked in analysis, viz., interpretations and objective behaviour on the part of the analyst. Also the evident hostile castrative wishes were interpreted. She accepted all the interpretations except the one referring to hostility. She even claimed that probably this man was hostile to her, that he used her and that he certainly misused her, but there was no hostility on her part whatever. It is obvious that emotionally she equated three experiences : (1) the masturbation episode with her brother ; (2) the sexual experience in Havana ; (3) the analytic situation. All three she rejected and maintained that they damaged her.

Following this she became openly hostile toward me in the analysis and at the same time experienced a slight recurrence of her spinal symptoms. As often observed in analysis, after overtly expressing the hostility which is under pressure of intense guilt, she again attempted a flight from making conscious her hostile wishes into a passive receptive attitude. She reported a dream in which she attacked her mother, had the feeling that she had killed her and fled in terror. The dream changed and she was passing around a bottle of liquor which someone had given her. This dream demonstrates how when she was faced with making conscious her hostility for her mother, she again fantasied the original type of solution, i.e. repression of the hostile wishes and attempted to relieve her guilt through compensatory giving.

The oft-repeated claim that her brother and the analyst damaged her had for her the meaning that her brother in the first instance and the analysis in the second instance stimulated her sexual desires and a need for sexual satisfaction. In neither experience was this need gratified. Therefore the wish to damage, as well as the projection of that wish, became for her not only a rationally justified wish for



revenge but also contributed to her difficulties when she attempted a genital solution in the analysis. She reached this level only to be thwarted and left unsatisfied ; these intense fears of rejection caused her to vacillate between attempts at solution on the oral and phallic levels. The genital conflict is always active, in the conscious material it forms the centre of organization and the oral helpless dependent attitude is kept in reserve as a defence.

To summarize briefly the observations which I have discussed and the conclusions drawn from those observations : A transitory hysterical symptom characterized by a spasm of the muscles of the lumbar region with the resultant left lateral deviation of the body developed during a critical period of analysis. During this period the patient was forced by analytic insight and some active encouragement by the analyst to face the problem of heterosexuality from which she had previously regressed to a pregenital dependent attitude in relation to older female members of her family (mother and sister). The patient's dreams and the association material which she produced in connection with the conversion symptom dealt with the resentment towards the brother and analyst but more specifically with castration wishes and masculine identification. Although the specific symbolic meaning of the symptom cannot be reconstructed with actual proof as to its correctness, it probably expressed a fantasy of incorporation of the male genital with intense guilt feelings as a reaction to the incorporation. The anatomical localization of the symptom is obviously identical with that part of the body which was connected with erotic pleasure sensations experienced by the patient during the sexual episodes with her brother. If the unconscious material which was presented in connection with the hysterical conversion symptom is compared with material which appeared at the beginning of the analysis in connection with the gastric symptoms, striking differences may be observed. The character of the material connected with the gastric symptoms was preponderately pregenital in character and centered about the dependent, demanding attitude towards the patient's older sister and was highly charged with feelings of guilt and inferiority.

In contradistinction to this, the material which appeared in connection with the hysterical symptom belonged to the phallic period of the instinctual development. The masculine identification and rejection of the female rôle was the paramount aim during this phase of the analysis.

This observation is in accordance with the assumption made by



Freud and accepted by most psycho-analytical authors that hysterical conversion symptoms express tendencies belonging to the phallic and genital phases of development. It also indicates that in the neuroses of vegetative organs (organ neuroses) pre-eminently pre-genital tendencies are involved. In this case the hysterical conversion symptoms developed and the gastric symptoms ceased coincident with the patient's attempt to renounce the regression to oral dependence and face the problem of heterosexual adjustment.

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## REMARKS ABOUT THE RELATION OF INFERIORITY FEELINGS TO GUILT FEELINGS<sup>1</sup>

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It is no exaggeration to say that there are no other emotional reactions that play such a permanent and central rôle in the dynamic explanations of psychopathological phenomena as guilt feelings and inferiority feelings. Since guilt feelings can be considered as a variety of anxiety—fear of conscience—their outstanding significance in psychopathology is self-evident, anxiety being generally recognized as a central issue. The importance of inferiority feelings becomes on the other hand obvious if one thinks of the close relation to envy, competitiveness and ambition. In our literature inferiority feelings and guilt feelings are often dealt with rather summarily as more or less parallel manifestations of a tension between certain ideals and the actual personality, as a kind of tension between what one is and what one would like to be, between what one does and feels and what one should do or feel. In structural terms we speak of tension between Superego or ego-ideal and ego, and consider both inferiority and guilt feelings as different but very closely related expressions of this same tension.

In the following I will try to demonstrate that in spite of the fact that in structural terms inferiority feelings and guilt feelings can be described with the same formula as a tension between ego and ego-ideal they are fundamentally different psychological phenomena, and as a rule their dynamic effect upon behaviour is opposite. Individuals under the pressure of guilt feelings are apt to behave, with their factors remaining the same, in an opposite way than under the pressure of inferiority feelings. I go so far as to call these two types of reactions dynamic antagonists, comparable in physiology with the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems or with extensor muscles and contractors.

In making certain generalizations about the relationship of inferiority feelings and guilt feelings to each other, I shall use the method of approach which seems to me most promising in describing psychodynamic correlations. This is the method of establishing

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<sup>1</sup> Read before the American Psychoanalytic and American Psychiatric Association, Pittsburgh, May, 1937.



certain elementary emotional sequences for which I have proposed the term *emotional syllogisms*, the sum of which constitutes the logic of emotional life. Just as rational thinking can be reduced to a few logical syllogisms also the more primitive emotional sequences in the mental apparatus can be reduced to a few elementary emotional syllogisms which are universal and characteristic for man. I am inclined to see in these universal emotional sequences the fundamental principles of the biological process of life as they reflect themselves subjectively in the individual mind. Guilt reactions and inferiority feelings, or in other words the psychology of conscience and narcissism, can also be reduced to such elementary emotional equations. We get acquainted with these emotional sequences during the study of free associations and dreams and transference manifestations of our patients because all these phenomena are to a higher degree subject to elementary emotional dynamisms than the phenomena of rational thinking and therefore reflect the principles of emotional life in more or less undistorted fashion.

What we call the psychology of conscience in fact consists in a series of such primitive emotional sequences, the most important of which is the syllogism that is known as the principle of Talion. This conscience reaction can be defined as the expectation of retaliation provoked by one's own hostile aggressions. This expectation is a fearful one, therefore it belongs to the category of anxiety and properly can be called fear of conscience. All shadings of the sense of guilt are only quantitatively different: the sense of guilt is always felt as a pressure, as an unpleasant tension, the expectation of an impending evil, of a deserved punishment. It has been sufficiently demonstrated in psycho-analytical literature that the fear of conscience is nothing but the intrapsychic reduplication of the fear of an external danger, the fear of retaliation on the part of those persons whom one has attacked, is attacking or wants to attack. If the fear is directed against external persons we speak of retaliation fear, if the fear is independent of external objects and is an internal reaction to one's own hostile tendencies, then we speak of guilt feelings or fear of conscience. We speak also of an unconscious sense of guilt. This expression however is not quite adequate. What might be unconscious in this phenomenon is not the anxiety element in it. There is always the sense of either free-floating anxiety, a pressure, a fearful expectation, an uneasiness. What is often unconscious is the underlying repressed hostile aggression, the cause of the anxiety. All conscience reactions can be reduced to this syllogism:



'Because I wish to hurt someone, I shall be hurt and should be hurt'. The discussion of its origin, of those experiences from which this emotional axiom has crystallized itself, does not belong to the scope of my present study.

As a form of anxiety, the fearful expectation of an inevitable and deserved suffering, the sense of guilt is primarily an inhibitory phenomenon. Under its pressure the individual is apt to avoid the expression of those impulses which have evoked and contributed to his guilt feelings. At present there is little doubt that these impulses are probably exclusively of a hostile destructive nature.

In certain forms of neuroses and psychoses, especially in paranoia, guilt feelings may have a paradoxical, not inhibitory but excitatory, influence upon the expression of hostile impulses. The emotional logic which makes these paradoxical reactions intelligible can be described about as follows: 'It is true that if I wanted to hurt him I should deserve punishment—but I do not want to attack him—he attacks me, he is the guilty one; I act only in self-defence'. This emotional syllogism eliminates the inhibitory effect of guilt feelings and makes out of them a source of aggressive behaviour. The phenomenon of guilt projection is therefore not contradictory to our more fundamental statement that guilt feelings have an inhibitory effect upon the expression of aggressions. The projection of guilt is one of those mechanisms by which one rids himself of the inhibitory influence of guilt feelings. Other equally common and important mechanisms by which guilt feelings are relieved are self-inflicted punishment and provocative behaviour by which others are incited to aggressive behaviour.

The psychological content of guilt feelings can be verbalized about as follows: 'I am not good. What I want to do (or what I did) is mean or low. I deserve contempt and punishment'. In this feeling, in a way, always a sense of justice is implied. One feels guilty because one wants to attack or has attacked somebody who does not deserve it. Such a sense of justice must be present if we are to speak of genuine guilt feelings because whenever one feels that a hostile intention or attack is justified, guilt feelings disappear. Therefore self-defence is never connected with guilt feelings. Without the feeling that one's hostilities are unjustified, there is no guilt feeling. Otherwise the phenomenon of guilt projection would be unintelligible. Whenever one can convince oneself that the object of one's hatred deserves the hate by giving adequate reason for being hated, the feeling of guilt is



abolished. This also explains why the most severe guilt feelings develop in sons of loving, understanding and mild fathers who do not give any justification for hostile feelings.

In summary : guilt feelings belong to the category of fear. They have an inhibitory effect upon the expression of hostile tendencies. This inhibitory effect implies a sense of justice. The different types of reaction to guilt feelings are : (1) the avoidance of the expression of hostile tendencies ; (2) self-inflicted punishment ; (3) provocative behaviour ; and (4) guilt projection. All these mechanisms presuppose a sense of justice or in other words the feeling of one's aggressions being unjustified.

Comparing this dynamic analysis of guilt feelings with the psychology of inferiority feelings we find that inferiority feelings on the contrary have as a rule a stimulating and not inhibitory effect upon the expression of hostile aggressions. Inferiority feelings seem even to create directly hostile aggressions. It is true that at first sight the self-condemnation which is at the basis of inferiority feelings sounds similar to the self-condemnation contained in guilt feelings. Also inferiority feelings are a type of self-criticism. The feeling as in the sense of guilt is : ' I am no good, I am contemptible '. But further inquiry shows an important difference. This feeling of inadequacy is not connected, like guilt feelings, with any sense of justice. The feeling is not so much not being good in a moral sense but being weak, inefficient, unable to accomplish something. In inferiority feelings it is not implied, as it is in guilt feelings, that the self-condemnation is the result of wrong-doing. It is a self-accusation based on a comparison, on the simple fact that one feels weaker than another person. This explains why inferiority feelings stimulate competition. From guilt feelings one tries to rid oneself by renouncing further aggressions or by atoning for them. From inferiority feelings one tries to free oneself by just the opposite type of behaviour, by ambitious competition, by trying to take up the fight again, to take revenge on the one who has no other fault than being stronger than oneself.

The common neurotic reactions to inferiority feelings are (1) increased hostile aggressiveness, (2) an attempt to depreciate the competitor, and (3) fantasying oneself as superior, as in megalomania. It is important that in all these reactions aggressive behaviour is stimulated and not inhibited as in the case of guilt feelings. Comparing the common reactions to guilt feelings with those to inferiority feelings we see that the former consist of an inhibition against expressing



hostile aggressions, the latter consist in a heightened expression of aggressiveness.

The objection might be raised that this distinction between inferiority and guilt feelings is artificial and hair-splitting. One may say that in both cases one accuses oneself of some kind of deficiency. In the case of inferiority feelings one says to oneself, 'Are you not ashamed that Bob is stronger than you and licked you?' In the case of guilt feelings: 'Are you not ashamed that you steal chocolate from the drawer?' In both cases the same expression is used, 'Are you not ashamed?' Closer inquiry shows however that here the use of language is somewhat loose, and the same expression 'shame' has a different connotation in the two cases. Shame for being licked by Bob stimulates hostile competition and ambition, or will lead to an attempt to depreciate Bob. The effect of guilt for stealing chocolate is paralyzing. The first type of shame can be eliminated by licking Bob, that is to say by aggressive behaviour. The second type of shame can be eliminated only either by atonement or by future avoidance of stealing, that is to say by a higher inhibitory pressure upon the instinctual life.

If doubt still remains that we deal here with two entirely different emotions a brief reference to a clinical example will clearly demonstrate the antithetical dynamic effect of these two forms of self-criticism. The structure of many neuroses consists precisely in the conflict into which the coexistence of strong inferiority and guilt feelings brings the patient. In a case of chronic alcoholism this conflict became evident shortly after the beginning of the analysis. This middle-aged man, the middle child of three brothers, showed from the beginning of his remembered life up to the present age an extremely pronounced self-consciousness connected with vivid sensations of inferiority. He always compared himself unfavourably with his brothers and others, had great athletic ambitions in competitive sport but never had confidence in himself. In the course of years he developed an extremely modest and submissive personality. His ambitions to excel and compete remained restricted to fantasy. In life he was a retiring type, non-conspicuous, conformist, always polite, avoiding contradiction, with the tendency to minimize his abilities. This overt attitude of modesty and submissiveness however put him under extreme pressure and created intense inferiority feelings in him. These became most tormenting in relation to his chief. The patient never would contradict his chief, would follow his suggestions, accept blame while talking with him; but after he left the office he was filled with self-



contempt and would tell himself, ' You should have answered. You should have said *no*. You should have demonstrated to him that he was not right. You are no good and you never will be any good '. This self-depreciatory attitude usually became so unbearable that he would have the urge to drink. Alcohol dissipated his sense of weakness and inefficiency. As soon as the alcohol began to make its effects felt his spirit was lifted ; he felt courageous and strong. But apart from the effect of the drug, the act of drinking itself had the significance of a rebellious act for him. He secretly enjoyed the feeling that in the middle of the day during office hours he escaped his duties and indulged in a forbidden activity. In this alcoholic mood he would also indulge in promiscuous sexuality in a rebellious spirit against limitations imposed upon him by external social standards, by the voice of his otherwise so strict conscience. Obviously these alcoholic and sexual escapades relieved his sense of inferiority because under the influence of alcohol he dared to commit such offences which he would never have ventured without alcohol.

But soon after he thus successfully escaped the pangs of inferiority feelings he ran into a new conflict, that of guilt. The most interesting part of this observation pertains to this second phase of his alcoholic spells. As soon as the effect of the alcohol began to wear off, he began to feel guilty—guilty and not inferior. Now after he had committed all these forbidden sexual and nonsocial acts in order to show his independence and thus escape his inferiority feelings his conscience began to work and make itself felt in the form of remorse. To get rid of this remorse he again had to turn to alcohol which had also the effect of ridding him of his guilt feelings. An ingenious physician whom I analysed used to call the Superego the alcohol-soluble portion of the human personality. In this case certainly the alcohol dissolved both types of reactions, inferiority feelings and the sense of guilt. The emotional sequence however was unmistakable : First an extreme sense of inferiority and self-contempt because of his conformist, submissive attitude, and then as a reaction to this, aggressive uninhibited behaviour, and finally sense of guilt in the form of remorse. While the victim of guilt feelings he would make up his mind never to drink again, to stop illicit sex relations ; while tormented by inferiority feelings his attitude became just the contrary. ' Why not drink ? Why not do forbidden things ? Only a weakling gives in to every external or internal pressure ! '

In this connection I may also refer to a similar vicious circle caused



by the antithetic dynamic effect of inferiority and guilt feelings which I have demonstrated in certain criminal cases. An intensely ambitious and competitive hostile attitude towards brothers and father in the little boy leads to strong guilt feelings and retaliation fear. Under the pressure of guilt feelings and fear the competitive attitude gives place to a submissive attitude by means of which the inhibited and intimidated boy tries to gain the love of his dangerous and powerful competitors. This submissive inhibited attitude now creates intense inferiority feelings, hurts the male pride, and leads to aggressive criminal behaviour by means of which a tough, independent, stubborn unyielding attitude is demonstrated and every dependence denied. This attitude becomes a new source of guilt feelings which lead to new inhibitions which cause again inferiority feelings and stimulate again aggressive behaviour. This mechanism finds a simple explanation after one has recognized the antithetical effect of guilt feelings and inferiority feelings. In order to escape inferiority feelings the criminal is driven to commit acts which give him the appearance of toughness, bravado and aggressiveness. But this behaviour which seeks to avoid the Scylla of inferiority feelings drives him into the Charybdis of guilt feelings.

In a previous paper I tried to define inferiority feelings as an expression of deeper instinctual conflicts and contrast them with guilt feelings which derive from the later structural differentiation of the mental apparatus. The deepest source of inferiority feelings consists in the childhood conflict between the progressive wish to grow up and be like the adults on the one hand and the deep regressive force towards the early dependent forms of existence on the other hand. Whenever this regressive wish makes itself felt the ego which identifies itself with the progressive attitude reacts to it with the feeling of inferiority. This conflict becomes further intensified when the first genital cravings develop around the Oedipus period. These genital tendencies are not only in conflict with the oral dependent attitude of the child but are also connected with the feeling of frustration on account of the discrepancy between instinctual cravings and somatic maturation. Accordingly inferiority feelings are pre-social phenomena, whereas guilt feelings are results of social adjustment. It is noteworthy that under the pressure of guilty conscience the human being may assume such an amount of inhibition and may be driven so far back towards a dependent and help-seeking attitude that it becomes incompatible with his narcissism. To remedy this narcissistic injury caused by very



strong dependence, he may recourse to extreme forms of independent and aggressive behaviour. In this way social inhibitions may become the very source of non-social behaviour.

Very recently Horney again described this vicious circle which is created by the conflict between love- and help-seeking attitude and competitiveness.<sup>2</sup> She considers this conflict as a typical phenomenon of our present competitive civilization.

It seems to me most probable that sociological factors may contribute to the intensity of this fundamental conflict. One would expect that in a civilization in which masculine aggressiveness, competitiveness and independent accomplishment are highly esteemed this conflict would be accentuated. Horney has correctly pointed out that in our civilization the one requirement of social adjustment which demands a certain amount of subordination of individual interests stands in an obvious contradiction to another social asset, namely to ambitious competitiveness. In other civilizations in which not individual initiative and achievement but subordination, obedience and submissiveness are considered as great social virtues, this conflict may be less intense. Where giving in to authority, accepting a submissive attitude or even one of self-humiliation are not felt as shameful by the group, such attitudes will not cause such an extreme narcissistic injury as we observe it in most of our patients. On the other hand psycho-analytic experience shows that originally the human being is an individualistic creature and his social inhibitions are later acquisitions. In the Œdipus situation every boy still has a competitive attitude. The conflict between inferiority and guilt feelings, competitive individualism versus dependence and submissive subordination (or at least co-operation) is a universal conflict and corresponds to two sides of the basic instinctual structure; to the progressive tendency towards growing up and becoming an independent biological organism on the one hand and to the regressive tendency towards the dependent forms of infantile existence on the other hand. Standards prevailing in different civilizations may increase or diminish the individual's difficulty in solving this universal conflict. It would be erroneous however to attempt to explain it entirely as a phenomenon of our individualistic competitive era. It would be a challenging undertaking if it were possible to compare the intensity and frequency of this

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<sup>2</sup> Karen Horney, 'Culture and Neurosis', *American Sociological Review*, April, 1936, Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 221-30.



conflict situation during different phases of historical development for example during the individualistic periods of the renaissance, compared with the mediæval centuries in which a rigid hierarchic social order prevailed, based on acceptance of authority. Perhaps even cultures existing at present would offer opportunity for such comparative studies. The individualistic competitive West and the introverted East with its rigid caste system would represent possibly the greatest extremes in this regard. It is noteworthy however that in the analysis of a Chinese student conducted in the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute by Dr. Saul the conflicts between aggressive ambitious competitiveness and submissive dependence were most conspicuous. The question whether or not this should be explained by the fact that the far East is in rapid process of accepting Western ideology can hardly be answered on the basis of this one experience. There is no doubt, however, that the structure of civilization contributes only in a quantitative manner to this fundamental conflict of individualistic independence and narcissism versus fear, guilt and dependence. But this leads us to a question to which at present there is as yet no answer: to the question as to the degree of socialization of which the species *homo sapiens* is capable, and as to how far—under any form of culture—man necessarily retains his individualistic nucleus.



# A NOTE ON THE RELATION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND PSYCHICAL DIFFERENCES IN BOYS AND GIRLS

BY

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I propose first to investigate some of the ground preceding the awareness of physical differences, the time at which such awareness sets in, and the possible variety of reactions now included under the name of penis-envy. In the second place I wish to consider the question of psychical versus physical differences, from the point of view of children's difficulties in developing abstract thought, and thirdly to take up some specific interactions of physical and psychical differences.

There are a few familiar functional differences between boy and girl babies—such as that girls begin to walk and talk earlier than boys, are less difficult to rear, and so on, but I do not know how these are related to the differences in their sexual organs. Neither do I know that there is any general agreement about the age at which sex differences in this sense first arouse the child's interest—that is, I do not know of any evidence which would with any exactitude relate the baby's distinction between the father and the mother, leading on to the distinction between men and women, and between boys and girls, to the distinction between their sexual organs.<sup>1</sup> The baby's relation to the mother's feeding breast cannot lead quite directly to classification of men and women as those who have no breasts and

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<sup>1</sup> With regard to the baby's own activity at the breast, to describe it as a feminine one with the mouth acting as the vagina would be to ascribe a far more passive rôle to the masculine penis-nipple than really belongs to the penis in coitus. These identifications come about later, but cannot be shewn to be inherent in a situation which actually is a different one, whatever the similarities may be and to whatever extent it may become a prototype of the later one. To make the sexual act the prototype of suckling is a reversal surely not contemplated by Freud when he ascribed a sexual component to the act of suckling, and called it 'this first and most important of all sexual relations'. \* The baby's activity is the activity of a being with sexual differences present but not developed. The baby boy's erections at the suckling age must have a counterpart in the invisible stimulation of the baby girl's sexual organs, with the physical differentiation of the bodily organs and their sensations still at a minimum.

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\* *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sexuality*, 1910, p. 82.



those who have, however much one might expect this to be the first and most important sex differentiation. For every baby comes into contact with many women who do not feed him and whose possession of breasts is of no greater direct importance to him than the father's absence of them. One of the lines of agreement between Melanie Klein and myself is the belief that difficulties<sup>2</sup> can form the basis of the Œdipus relation to the father in an oral-erotic and sadistic attitude to the father's penis. But I see no reason to think that the more secure part of the baby's interest in and love for the father involves any turning away from the mother, if both are sympathetic to the child. And I think that between the basis of feeding and weaning difficulties and the Œdipus relation to the penis there is always a history of the failures of other attempts to establish a satisfying feeding relation of some sort with the father—in sucking his finger, being held against his chest, gaining more generalized excitement from him, in satisfaction in feeling his knees and hands under the body, or in his tending the child in the same way as the mother for excretory processes, and so on. I am not convinced that, apart from strong external stimulus, this turning to the father settles the age at which the child regards the penis as the most important distinguishing mark between the father and the mother, or as the most important part of the father. We know that quite little babies will distinguish between handling by different people to the extent of unhappy crying with one and quiet content with another. Sex differences certainly play no part here. The first quite clear differentiation is of the breast or bottle from everything else in the world. From the age of two months the baby begins to smile at the human voice and face—any human face<sup>3</sup>—and after three months to differentiate familiar from unfamiliar faces.<sup>4</sup> Evidently, then, at this age the human face calls out the baby's greatest powers of differentiation, since these now relate to more than one person, while the relation to the mother's breast relates only to 'that' and 'not that'. This facial differentiation has to do with familiarity and not with sex, and applies to father, mother, sister and brother versus strangers. The baby's early powers of grasping with the hand

<sup>2</sup> I agree with Melitta Schmideberg that we have sometimes put too exclusive an emphasis on weaning difficulties.

<sup>3</sup> Charlotte Bühler. *The First Year of Life*. John Day, 1930, pp. 55, 60, 176, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Stern. *Psychology of Early Childhood*. Allen & Unwin, 1930, p. 110.



as well as with the mouth determine another line of interest in those parts of the body which he can seize and hold. While hair comes in for a large share of attention later, the finger, his own and other people's, is, other than the breast and the face, the first part of a person to be differentiated from the whole, while the power to grasp an object like a finger precedes the relation to the breast. Ordinary observation recognizes the proportionately greater frequency of the father's relation to the baby by the proffered finger, as compared with the greater variety of approach to him by the mother and in general by other women too. One would suppose that texture, size, and smell all help to differentiate the father's finger from the mother's, and to connect it with differences in the face above. By seven months the baby has mastered spatial difficulties and can begin to reach for what he wants and sees.<sup>5</sup> From a year he begins to reach for what has disappeared.<sup>6</sup> I know of no behaviouristic observations which give an indication of a baby with mouth or hand reaching towards the father's genitals. I think one can safely say that they are rare until a later age. Certainly, were such observations not forthcoming, we should still have no grounds for saying that a desire for the father's penis was not in the baby's unconscious. But since the barriers between the unconscious and the conscious are either non-existent or without rigidity at that age, I think we should have grounds for saying that such a desire was not in that part of the unconscious which was at all clearly affecting the baby's emotions and actions. Yet primal scenes and the sight of the father and mother urinating while the baby is in the cot, or crawling about the floor, in very many cases provide plentiful stimuli,<sup>7</sup> one outcome of which may be very pronounced and compulsive early masturbation. But without some behaviouristic evidence of the frequency of the baby's attempts to grasp the father's penis, I suggest that we should at least be ready to delay our judgement about the important part played by the penis in the psychology of all babies of, say, a year or eighteen months old. On such subjects I am in agreement with Wälder's<sup>8</sup> temperately worded plea for

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<sup>5</sup> Charlotte Bühler. *Op. cit.*, p. 181.

<sup>6</sup> Charlotte Bühler. *Op. cit.*, p. 432.

<sup>7</sup> See Helene Deutsch. 'Zur Psychologie der weiblicher Sexualfunktionen', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Band 1925, S. 19. Quoted by Ernest Jones, *JOURNAL*, Vol. VIII, 1927, p. 465. A girl-child of eighteen months viewed a penis with apparent indifference.

<sup>8</sup> Wälder. 'Zur Frage des Genese der psychischen Konflikte in



caution. The facts that at one time observers could omit so much from their recognition of children's typical behaviour, and that the hidden life of older people could be so different from their public life, their unconscious from their conscious minds, should not, I think, drive us to the extreme of drawing a picture of the mind of a baby which definitely conflicts with behaviouristic observations, although these can only take us a limited distance. It is difficult, for example, to say how much of a baby's trampling on the genital regions is directed towards the lap as a whole, and to the differences in it made by trousers and skirt, and how much to this specific part of the lap. We do not know how much and how early his feet feel the differences here between his father's body and his mother's, adding tactual perceptions to visual ones of genital as of breast differences. Pronounced movements of withdrawal or of amused stimulation on the part of the adult would certainly increase such awareness. One would expect considerable individual differences here, and I have no decisive material to give on the subject. Some of the importance in the treatment room of children's trampling and stamping with shoes or without on upholstered versus unupholstered furniture, or on the rug versus the uncarpeted floor has been related not only to the dressed versus the undressed body, but to these double and complementary differences in genitals and breasts in the bodies of the parents. But I cannot say to how early a date in the children's lives this was referable. If to a time before the setting in of repression, and if the early perceptions were at all definite I should have expected to find the child both in the treatment room and in babyhood using the grasping hand as well as the feet much more often and definitely in such a connection than seems to be the case. For some time I have believed that little girls may at their first sight of a penis sometimes liken it to a finger out of place, as well as to a nose, or if it is a small baby's, to a distorted piece of flesh. The latter is only likely if the first sight of it was not in the act of urinating, for in this case it would be the function which would take the chief place in interest. The boy has always his experience of its function on which to build. I am sure we should differentiate more carefully than we have hitherto done between little boys' and girls' attitudes to the *function* of the penis, or to the functioning penis, accompanied by pride in the boy, and admiration degenerating to



envy in the girl, and the attitude of both to the *appearance* of the non-functioning scrotum and penis, which arouses different feelings. A little girl patient aged seven, working over the subject of differences between boys and girls quite unmistakably and in a variety of ways, including drawing of boys' and girls' clothes, put great stress on hang-nails and then on the position of her fingers (two upstanding, the rest doubled), as well as, to a lesser extent, of pointed toes. She asked me to draw her in several of these postures just before she went into the lavatory to urinate. Here, I think, and the child agreed with the interpretation, we have both the distorted flesh and the finger phantasy. The former was connected with passivity and helplessness, with an unbeautiful thing she could not herself put right, the latter with energetic, firm and graceful function which she herself could at least attain in other ways. Both phantasies were equally employed in the service of competitive envy and aggression to a particular boy, with more depreciation in one, and admiration in the other.

We are familiar enough with the fact of the finger symbolizing the penis; it seems at least likely that the penis understood as a finger, and therefore capable of continuing the affectionate relation to the father in terms of his finger, provides a basis for this symbol, and must precede it if it is true that interest in a finger precedes and is more important to a baby than interest in the penis.<sup>9</sup>

Wälder<sup>10</sup> gives a striking instance of a little girl of three previously unusually free from anxiety, who for some months after the sight of a boy's naked body not only shewed clear signs of anxiety when her mother's hand approached her genitals to dry them, but also at about

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<sup>9</sup> The presence of hair on the genitals of the parents as well as under the arms and sometimes on the father's chest plays a disturbing part in all such sights, one which has received much attention, and on which I will make only one comment at the moment—that it is at least logical and in terms of what is familiar and allowable to connect genital hair with hair on the head or chin, continuing the 'hidden face' connection between penis and nose, and later labia and lips. Cf. the remark of a Somali—a race which does not tolerate hair on the sexual parts—on seeing a European girl's hairy pubes; 'There is a head in your vagina'. (Roheim. 'The Psycho-analysis of Primitive Cultural Types'. JOURNAL, Vol. XIII, p. 261.)

I am also omitting in this paper the effect of the knowledge of menstruation.

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, S. 554.



the same time refused to give her father her hand, saying, 'I won't give you my hand, I will only give you a finger'. Asked why by the astonished father, she said in her nursery language that it was because her father had a penis and a 'little bag', or scrotum. We cannot doubt the connection between finger and penis, scrotum and hand. This becomes clearer still when we realize, first, that the child, herself apparently unaffected by the sight of the little boy's organs, had been present at many talks on the subject between her mother and elder sister (the latter had been far more disturbed by the same incident); and secondly, that in these talks the scrotum had not been mentioned. I think we can be sure, although it is not a point expressly mentioned by Wälder, that we have here the child's reaction to the talks in which she was not included as well as to the original sight of the boy's organs, and that her action and speech to the father were a tremendous effort to be superior to both mother and sister. She dared to say openly and to the father himself that she did not like the penis or scrotum, and to shew that she could mention just that part which her mother had ignored. Thus we get the doubled fist and protruded finger as her own version of scrotum and penis, and a version and expression of it which would reduce differences between herself and her sister, and herself and the boy, and between her father and mother.

We are very familiar with the little boy's dismay at the discovery that what he had taken for granted, and what his castration anxiety needed to take for granted, could really be absent. We are also very familiar with the little girl's penis-envy—both thoroughly well-established phenomena. But I do not think we are in the best position to help either little boys or little girls at such times if we feel that the little boy can find nothing but threat in the body of the little girl, and nothing to admire, and that the little girl can find nothing but a cause of envy in the little boy's body, and nothing at all to prefer in her own.<sup>11</sup> Some years ago I heard a tale<sup>12</sup> of two children, in which at the time, in the prevailing fashion, I was inclined to see nothing but penis-envy. Two little girls of about three, in different families, each exclaimed on their first sight of a boy baby's penis, 'Look, Mummie,

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. Joan Riviere. Review of 'New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis'. JOURNAL, 1934, Vol. XV, pp. 336/7. Also Fanny Hann-Kende. 'Über Klitorisnerv und Penisneid'. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1933, Band XIX, S. 416/7.

<sup>12</sup> From Sylvia Payne by whose permission I quote it.



he's torn'; while one added 'Put on Ponds'. These remarks were undoubtedly actuated to some degree by aggressive feelings to the baby, and yet were a fairly logical surmise to account for the presence of that unexpected piece of flesh. This type of phantasy is less likely with the sight of an older boy's penis, and less likely still with the father's, while in this as in all other situations, a likening to what is already familiar which insists on ignoring the possibility of the unfamiliar is to that extent an outcome of anxiety.

A little girl patient of seven, with definitely aggressive and depreciatory intent, represented the boy's genitals as an untidy hat of plasticine with an untidy ornament hanging down. This was during a swing of the pendulum, after a rebuff, from a state of acute admiration, envy and longing for boys' attention. I think we can be sure that the form of representation chosen after the envy had changed to depreciation (of an anal type) had played some part in her attitude before the envy had set in as acutely. Later she got me to make a tidy cap with a peak.

It is some time since I have analysed a boy, but looking back on the material of a three to five-year-old in particular, I can see how much of his readiness in emotional crises to take out his penis and urinate was not only the desire to concentrate his emotions there in action and sensation, and thus deny castration fears, and shew that he had a form of control I had not, not only the substitution of fighting water for hurt water (tears), but also an expression of competition with his sister and mother transferred to me, shifting from emotions to appearances, both in face and in genitals. Only with a functioning penis could he adjust the balance according to his own artistic sense in his own favour. He was unusually gifted in his power of swift clean drawing of animals, the sense of movement particularly strong, dislike of the *look* of a dog's penis playing an important part.

I think we have under-estimated the effect of the scrotum both on the little girl and on the little boy. It was always implicit in the idea of the penis as a prolonged nipple, the scrotum obviously being a little breast. I remember particularly a boy of eleven's very tentative approach to the subject and request for information about it, as well as his relief when I was able to tell him he thought that his desire to keep his mother's breasts to himself by feeding on them had led to the punishment of their growing out in the wrong place, one in which they were useless to him; while a little girl's anxiously aggressive attack on me as her father because I had 'bumps in the wrong place', e.g. my



forehead, and not enough in the right place, had its contribution from the attitude to scrotum as well as buttocks and penis.

At this point I would chiefly stress a plea that we should not be too stereotyped on the subject of penis-envy, either in regard to the age at which it sets in, or as the unvarying and complete account of the little girl's immediate reaction to the sight of the little boy's penis, or on the subject of castration-anxiety as eliminating every other reaction of the little boy to the sight of the little girl's body.

One other factor I would touch upon before specifying in greater detail a little of the variety of mutual reaction possible. It gave Freud considerable trouble to arrive at any clear idea of what constitutes masculinity and femininity,<sup>13</sup> and recently Hermann<sup>14</sup> has brought weighty considerations against identifying too closely masculinity with activity, and femininity with passivity. That which has given trouble to Freud and others for purposes of scientific definition cannot be expected to be without its difficulties in less exact thought for children. I have looked with more than one child through page after page of babies' and children's photos, all accompanied by the query 'Is that a boy or a girl?' and have at length realized that not *all* the concern is about the photographically hidden criterion of penis or no penis, greatly as that contributes to the anxiety problem. There is the problem of subtle differences of sex in faces. And behind this

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<sup>13</sup> Freud. *New Introductory Lectures*. International Psycho-Analytical Library, 1933, p. 146. 'You must conclude that what constitutes masculinity or femininity is an unknown element which it is beyond the power of anatomy to grasp'.

p. 148. 'I advise you not to . . . identify activity with masculinity and passivity with femininity. It seems to me to serve no good purpose and to give us no new information'.

p. 149. 'You are now prepared for the conclusion that psychology cannot solve the riddle of femininity'.

Marjorie Brierley has suggested that the latter will be in terms of integration, and Sylvia Payne finds that it consists in the combination of four qualities.

M. Brierley. 'Some Problems of Integration in Women', *JOURNAL*, 1932, Vol. XIII, p. 433.

Sylvia M. Payne. 'A Conception of Femininity'. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Vol. XV, p. 20.

<sup>14</sup> Hermann. 'Die Verwendung des Begriffes "aktiv" in der Definition der Männlichkeit'. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1934, Band XX, S. 261.



subtle difference in feature and expression there is the problem of boyhood and girlhood, that is, of characteristics, qualities, abstractions and concepts. And how difficult it is to be scientific and definite in terms of abstract thought and to keep it duly related to concrete thought, not only little children and Freud at the other end of the intellectual scale know, but also all those who have persisted in the attempt despite its obvious and its less obvious, or its conscious and its unconscious, difficulties. No wonder that children tend, discouraged, to fall back on over-determined physical differences, not vague or shifting, and the more acceptable the more they can be a refuge from anxiety instead of a stimulus to it. It is true that in later life we may often encounter abstract thought used in its turn as a refuge from anxiety connected with concrete situations; few days pass without adult analyses giving clear evidence of such a use of abstract thought. But that tells us little, because there is no function and no situation which anxiety cannot turn to its own uses. Children more frequently and permanently take refuge from concrete situations into phantasy than into abstract thought. The two are, of course, not to be confounded, however difficult it may be to distinguish between them, and however much phantasy may either impede or enrich abstract thought.

The emotional difficulties preventing the development of abstract thought in children are many, and the results are varied. Briefly summarized, they spring from fear and distrust of all that cannot be tested by their senses, because their own intangible and invisible wishes and emotions are at the time convincing them of the predominance of bad over good. For example, after they have been very aggressive, and the aggressiveness is still in existence, they demand that the analyst shall perform some definite actions, give some special present and so on, in the endeavour to gain concrete proof that they need not fear the omnipotence of harmful wishes. At such times it is seldom sufficient, without at least the preliminary doing of what they want, to give them acceptably anything as intangible even as words, much less silent friendliness itself without some expression of it open to the test of the senses—a fact familiar in all adult analyses.

On the other hand, when they are very wild and their defences are very weak against a threatened eruption of the unconscious, and when their aggression is very defined and concrete, help can best be given in more abstract terms. Thus a little girl started directly she came into the room to attack me quite dangerously with a brass knob, because I



had an inflamed patch on my face. At the same time she put her hand to her genitals. The significance was too obvious, taken in conjunction with the unrestrained wildness, not to be regarded as a temporary symptom. Any reference on my part to masturbation or to phallic aggression would only have increased her wildness. Therefore I said she wanted to be a man or boy because she thought they would not mind hurting or being hurt—an ego-syntonic and pre-conscious interpretation she at once accepted. At a quieter time, with fear of damage through sexuality and sexual knowledge less rampant, we could get nearer to the subject of physical differences between boys and girls.

There is much more to be said about abstract and concrete interpretations as one part of the subject of abstract and concrete thought, but at the moment I only want to indicate a generally neglected factor leading with many others to the over-determination of the cathexis of physical differences between boys and girls.

I had prepared a long list of physical differences in connection with psychical differences, a theme on which I think there is much work still waiting to be done, but I must limit what further I have to say to a few suggestions only. Karen Horney opened this line of thought in her paper 'On the Genesis of the Castration Complex in Women'<sup>15</sup> where she laid particular stress on the real advantages possessed by the boy in the boy's permitted opportunities of looking, exhibiting, handling, and of re-assurance as compared with the girl's. Here we must clearly add also the boy's greater exposure to external danger, connecting with it his bravery, often more or less reactive, about external hurts in play and fight, as compared with the girl's greater readiness to make a fuss and be dependent on re-assurance from grown-ups, or to take an attitude of 'you can't catch me'.<sup>16</sup> We must also add, on the subject of looking and exhibiting, that the boy can not only expose his genitals more casually but with greater dignity, while with the girl it cannot be such a casual affair. An undignified posture and more complete

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<sup>15</sup> JOURNAL, 1924, Vol. V, p. 50. The points I mention were immediately convincing even without the case-material subsequently given. This kind of work should go some way in solving the problem of the giving of patients' material, a subject not without its difficulties, and one on which my own ideas are not yet ready to be tabulated.

<sup>16</sup> I remember hearing Ada Müller Braunschweig in 1923 give some statistical evidence of the greater frequency with which girls put their tongues out than do boys.



uncovering are essential. The girl's natural tendency is to greater reserve and secrecy along these lines all through her sexual life, with less flippancy.

Melanie Klein<sup>17</sup> has brought to our knowledge the little girl's greater fears of internal damage, connected with her attitude to her mother's body. In addition, it becomes clear in the analysis of every little girl and of every woman that if the 'you-can't-catch-me' attitude fails, she feels the risk of revengeful and exasperated punishment attacking still more vital parts than the boy's external genital, for example, lungs or heart. But if the little girl can have the fuller value of her future internal creative and feeding possibilities, she has less fear of internal illness than the boy, greater interest in the home, greater tenderness and also greater reliance on intuition as compared with the boy's more objective attitude to concrete and non-domestic affairs.<sup>18</sup> In particular, she can develop that readiness to retain and to give out which Sylvia Payne<sup>19</sup> points out as one of the distinguishing qualities of femininity. Also the investigation of the boy's genital is a simple and definite matter as compared with the investigation of the girl's, which grows more hidden and uglier the further she looks, until investigation of the inner organs becomes not only impossible but fearful. It has seemed to me in many analyses that this fact had a discouraging effect on the girl, helping to bring the feeling 'things may get worse and worse the further you go', discouraging curiosity and hindering reliance on her feminine powers of intuition. This is true chiefly when the girl has tried to find in the investigation of her genitals an excitement which will relieve her from depression.

We may connect the fact of the more definite separation between penis and anus, urine and fæces, urination and defæcation in the boy as compared with the girl, emphasized by change of position, with his greater clarity and sense of form in thought. His sensation and emotion are less fused than the girl's. She is more concerned about dirtiness than is the boy, and her urine has a more fæcal quality.

The boy's contempt of 'silliness' and special development of the sense of the comic has one component from his attitude to his flaccid penis, its dignity, as I have said depending upon its function. This was not only very marked but predominant in the apparently defective boy Eben, who waddled and waggled paper almost perpetually. A

<sup>17</sup> *The Psycho-analysis of Children*. International Psycho-Analytical Library, 1932, p. 269.

<sup>18, 19</sup> Klein. *Loc. cit.* See also Stern. *Op. cit.*, p. 318.



little girl, on the other hand, has more compact possession of the essentials for function, although in envy and anxiety she may have bitter complaints to make of erotic organs which cannot be made more acceptable to her ego by their function, and for which she has in general no name.

A little girl of six one day announced to me with bitter decision as she sat down on the couch that she was going to give a little girl friend a dead dog on her birthday. Immediately afterwards she turned up her legs and shewed all the under part of her knickers. Her own birthday was approaching, with stimulated emotions on the subject of her brother's birth as well as of her own. The reproach to her mother that she had given her useless or fæcal genitals, and her desire for a dead brother, were quite clear, as well as her masturbatory efforts to retrieve the position; for she immediately tried falling off the couch and saving herself with her hand. This was all correct enough in itself, as we could later discover, but as a matter of fact it was not her more immediate concern. For it turned out that once more a treat promised her by her mother for her birthday was more productive of anxiety than of pleasure—this time the arrival of a grandmother whose husband was dead, as earlier the arrival of the baby brother.

If the girl is at all 'good' in sitting in the required attitude in the required place for urination, she has to make a very distinct effort to make a mess. It is in this respect hard for her to be naughty. The boy, on the contrary, standing in the required attitude in the required place, still finds it very easy to make a mess. These facts help to foster the ideas that it is easier for girls to be good than it is for boys, that to be naughty is to be a boy, to be good to be a girl,<sup>20</sup> and that while a boy may be partly good and partly bad, a girl in the matter of dirtiness tends to be very bad if she is not very good.

I have referred to physical and psychical differences between boys and girls and to the relation between the two without positing which has the more important or primary influence on the other. They undoubtedly interact. Whatever the results of the transplantation of the sex-gonads in animals, beings in whom abstract thought cannot develop, these results are not directly transferable to humans. I do not believe that physical differences which form one part only of the wider differences of masculinity and femininity, and which Freud

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<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Sex and Personality*, p. 458, on overestimation of the masculinity of delinquent girls.



rejected as definitive for the latter, have in general a greater or primary influence on the psyche as compared with psychical tendencies which, I submit, already exist before the former come into their own due importance. One might as well as say that because life itself is abstract, intangible, and apart from its activities not demonstrable to the senses, while the body is, that the body has a greater effect on life than life on the body.

These, then, are the particular points I would emphasize in this paper : (1) A plea that we should not be too stereotyped on the early importance of sexual differences, the age at which the penis becomes important or on the possible varieties of reaction to it, and that (2) we should take into consideration children's difficulties in the way of abstract conceptions of boyhood and girlhood, masculinity and femininity, and the consequent over-determination of physical differences. (3) There are many details of sex differences between boys and girls, interacting with psychical differences, to which we might give more attention.



CONCERNING THE PSYCHOGENESIS OF SOMATIC DISEASE :  
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND NEUROLOGICAL CORRELATIONS  
WITH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

BY  
LEO STONE  
NEW YORK

The validity of the concept implied in the title of this paper must eventually be established or destroyed by the patient accumulation of clinical facts, painstakingly correlated with deep psychological data, and carefully controlled by the study of normal subjects. It is, however, justified, and, we think, valuable, to scrutinize the material already available at this time, and to try to construct from it a consistent theoretical basis for such a concept. We are in this brief essay not so much interested in the part of personality in the total disease reaction<sup>1</sup> or the struggle of the personality with disease, concepts which receive increasing and merited recognition, but with the possible rôle of psychic disorder as a major ætiological agent. Such an effort, though it be brief and sketchy of necessity, requires a high degree of freedom in establishing psychical and physiological correlations, and a considerable freedom in interpretation of the scientific work of others, upon which it is almost entirely based. It is, furthermore, inevitable that such an effort include some constructive speculation. Nor is such an effort novel. In recent works on psychopathology,<sup>2, 3</sup> one may find summaries of the opinions of many early and distinguished theorists from which the following paragraphs may not always differ in gross essentials. The neurological approach to the psyche has recently received detailed attention in the work of Smith and Campion.<sup>4</sup> The general problem of the psyche, the vegetative nervous system, and somatic disease has recently received abundant thought and

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<sup>1</sup> Draper, G. : 'Disease, A Psychosomatic Reaction', *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1928, Vol. 90, pp. 1281-1285.

<sup>2</sup> Dunbar, H. F. : *Emotions and Bodily Changes*. (Columbia University Press. New York, 1935.)

<sup>3</sup> Nicole, J. E. : *Psychopathology*. (Baillière, Tindall and Cox. London, 1934.)

<sup>4</sup> Campion, C. G., and Smith, G. E. : *The Neural Basis of Thought*. Harcourt, Brace and Co. New York, 1934.)



attention from certain internists.<sup>5 6 7</sup> In clinical neurology and psychiatry, the names of Schilder and of Jelliffe in this country are outstanding in the struggle to abolish the rigid distinction between psyche and soma, between organic and psychogenic disease. Among psycho-analysts, the systematic studies of the Chicago group in relation to gastro-intestinal disease are worthy of special remark.<sup>8</sup> The chief reason for presentation of the following ideas lies in the fact that they represent a single consistent and inclusive point of view and that they include an effort to deal with the mental and emotional factors in medicine without departure from a biological attitude.

The fundamental contributions of Cannon,<sup>9</sup> and his own inferences regarding the relationship of inhibited emotional states to disease, are by this time well known. They have recently been summarized by Cannon himself,<sup>10</sup> but it is well to repeat a few findings of special importance at this point. It has been clearly demonstrated that with emotional states, of which rage is the most suitable paradigm, profound alterations occur in the blood chemistry (notably sugar), in endocrine activity (the adrenals for instance), and in the autonomic balance, and reflecting some of these changes, profound disturbances in the respiratory and circulatory systems, and gastro-intestinal tract. One must notice the utterly involuntary, unconscious, and stereotyped nature of these physiological reactions, and their undoubted important purposefulness to a primitive organism in a primitive milieu. These visceral and humoral reactions one may now regard as having their chief central origin in the hypothalamus, which is in intimate relation

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<sup>5</sup> Sprunt, T. P.: 'The Relationship of the Autonomic Nervous System to General Medicine'. *Annals of Internal Medicine*, 1933, Vol. 7, pp. 257-265.

<sup>6</sup> Moschcowitz, E.: 'The Psychogenic Origin of Organic Disease'. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 1935, Vol. 212, pp. 603-611.

<sup>7</sup> Draper, G.: 'The Common Denominator of Disease'. *American Journal of the Medical Sciences*, 1935, Vol. 190, pp. 545-558.

<sup>8</sup> Alexander, F., Bacon, C., Wilson, G. W., Levey, H. B., and Levine, M.: 'The Influence of Psychologic Factors upon Gastro-Intestinal Disturbances'. A Symposium. Reprinted from the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1934, Vol. 3, pp. 501-588.

<sup>9</sup> Cannon, W. B.: *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage*. (D. Appleton-Century Co. London, 1929.)

<sup>10</sup> Cannon, W. B.: 'Significance of the Emotional Level'. *Scientific Monthly*. February, 1934.



with the pituitary body (via the tuber cinereum and infundibulum) and, of course, with the optic thalamus, whose function as the nuclear terminus of the sensory tracts and as the organ of origin of crude affect or emotion is now universally accepted. Cannon calls this combined system the 'emotional level'. From the optic thalamus the emotional event radiates downward through the hypothalamus, endocrine, and autonomic nervous systems, and upward via the thalamo-cortical fibres to the cerebral cortex, thus to consciousness (causing subjective 'emotion'), and thus to possible stimulation of the voluntary cortico-spinal nervous system. The cortico-spinal nervous system, however, may not respond automatically. It is governed by the Will, the Ego (one might say), a function of the cerebral cortex, especially the frontal and prefrontal area, an organ of complex adaptive function, whose adequate stimuli for motor response and whose endlessly variable responses may differ greatly from those of the neural levels from which it is derived. Thus violent movement, speech, even facial expression, may be inhibited, but the terrific upset of the internal milieu, over which the complex organism has no voluntary control, goes on without physiologic outlet, and evanescent disease arises. Chronic disease (hyperglycemia, hyperadrenemia, hypertension), we may assume, arises if a chronic dissociation of this type occurs. As examples of the persistence, sometimes the exaggeration, of involuntary emotional activity when freed from higher neural levels, one need only mention the thalamic syndrome (in which primitive extrapyramidal movements often accompany primitive hyperaffectivity), the clinical dissociations between volitional and emotional facial innervation, the exaggerated laughter and crying of pseudo-bulbar palsy or nitrous oxide anæsthesia, and the ranges of experimentally decorticated cats. Since it is hardly likely that suppression of emotional energy by an intact cortex actually decreases its quantity, it is probable that the cortex, when intact, either absorbs and utilizes part of the energy, directly or indirectly, or, alternatively, diverts a greater portion of it into visceral or humoral channels than is necessary when cortical inhibition is removed.

We may at this point ascribe to the thalamic level the greater part of the pleasure-pain consciousness and motor reactions of the infant, especially if we include the corpus striatum (really telencephalic), and suggest that this level corresponds to the psycho-analytic Id of the adult, and that it is the mainspring of the adult unconscious. At this time, also, we may state our intention to employ the word 'emotion' to designate the subjective aspect of instinctual activity or impulse in



a complex organism, this usage coinciding or nearly coinciding with that of McDougall. Into the controversies regarding the precise number of primitive preformed behaviour patterns which may be called instincts we shall not enter.

Although there may be ready acceptance of the idea that the blocking of powerful instinctual impulses can cause profound physiological disturbance, it is more difficult to shew that these impulses are directly connected with the experiential and symbolic material with which the clinical psychologist or psycho-analyst deals, for instinctual impulses are, to be sure, only rarely encountered in pristine form in non-psychotic patients. We must attempt, further, to establish some basis for the idea of persistence of emotional states and their derivatives in the unconscious.

It should be recalled that the functions which the psycho-analysts have ascribed to the Ego develop after those of the Id for the purpose of effective adaptation of the infant's cravings to the demands and restrictions of external reality, and that the Ego rapidly attains an apparent ascendancy over the Id, subjectively and objectively. Certainly overt instinctual behaviour plays but a small and restricted rôle in normal adult life. And yet the average human being, through many complex manoeuvres, lives out the fundamental instinctual patterns in one form or another. So does the entire cerebral cortex grow from a small part of the telencephalon until it almost hides the brain stem and diencephalon from view in the undisturbed anatomic specimen; yet it never displaces the latter in their indispensability to life or in their determination of fundamental life patterns. The cortex and the thalamus remain anatomically bound by the thalamo-cortical and cortico-thalamic fibre tracts, permitting a constant interplay of influence between them. While the apparent inhibitory influence of the cortical level is widely accepted, the constant flow of neural impulses from thalamus to cortex, the 'thalamo-cortical circulation'<sup>11</sup> may easily be overlooked. Surely memory is essential to the development of abstract thought, and it is precisely this fundamental function which is most obviously influenced by the thalamic level. While one cannot deny the puzzling importance of superficial temporal, spatial, or sensory attributes in the development of memory associations, and thus in the development of symbolic thought, it remains true that the

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<sup>11</sup> Champion, G. G., and Smith, G. E.: *The Neural Basis of Thought*. (Harcourt, Brace and Co. New York, 1934.)



instinctual or emotional importance of an object or attribute determines the fate of the entire symbolic system which develops from it. Of the myriad faces and events encountered in childhood, only those are remembered that have or are associated with objects or persons who have instinctual importance to the infant. It is known that the feeling tone of experiences determines their tenacity in the psyche even under the stress of actual structural injury to the brain, as evidenced in the remarkable remote memory of the senile psychotic or the retention of words, even languages, of strong affective tone in severe aphasias. Furthermore, with the exception of smell, the constant flood of sensory impulses that stimulate and enrich cortical activity must all pass through the thalamus and receive an appropriate emotional investment before relay to the cortex. The conditioned reflex principle, for which both instinctual and cortical levels plus experience are essential, enters largely into the progressive complication of motor, intellectual and affective reactions throughout life, and it is probably through this principle that the remarkable phenomena of productive education and neurosis alike eventuate.

One must, of course, remain aware of the deep biologic trend that runs through the stages of psychological development, even perhaps through the apparent accidents of human experience, especially those dependent on the behaviour of other human beings. The Babinski sign of the human infant, its athetoid wriggling (so often persistent in the feeble-minded), and its "pseudo-bulbar" laughter and crying, testify to the inadequacy of his organic motor Ego. These, however, will more certainly disappear, barring anatomic disease, than other trends less definitely structuralized. That the inhibition even of certain specific-instinctual interests may have at last a degree of anatomic rigidity in the cortex is suggested by the release of anal expulsiveness and extreme oral craving in apes, in the pre-motor extirpation experiments of Fulton and Watts.<sup>12</sup> However, granting the important limitations placed on function by structure we cannot avoid the commonplace observation that sheer individual experience may influence profoundly the psychic potentialities of a given cerebral cortex. We have thus a continuous chain of neural influence, from experience through the thalamic-hypothalamic level (and thus the viscera and body fluids) to the

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<sup>12</sup> Fulton, J. F. : ' Some Functions of the Cerebral Cortex '. Beaumont Foundation Lectures. *Journal of the Michigan Medical Society*, April 1934, Vol. 33, pp. 175-182 ; May 1934, Vol. 33, pp. 235-243.



complex associative activities of the cortex in both centrifugal and centripetal directions. The psycho-analyst in dealing with cortical expression (in thought and speech) does cope with physiologic problems. In one sense every idea, every memory offered him by the patient is, if not a representative, at least a derivative, of primitive affect, and certainly every definite wish, i.e. every frustrated motor impulse, is an expression of instinctual tension, however disguised the expression or object may be.

The concept of a dynamic unconscious mind is not at variance with the facts of organic biology. The human nervous system displays unequivocally its derivation from lower forms, yet human musculo-skeletal behaviour differs more obviously from that of other species than any other human functions. However, the thalamic syndrome, the extrapyramidal motor syndromes, the epileptic fit, major hysteria, and the motor phenomena of schizophrenia indicate clearly that the primitive neural systems are not only alive, but capable of dominating the adult individual's behaviour. In the normal state they are either suppressed entirely or fused with the activity of other levels to produce normal motor function. Surely the Parkinsonian tremor, the writing of athetosis, and the *Flügel schlagen* of pseudo-sclerosis have their striking prototypes in phylogeny. We may think, therefore, of a structuralized phylogenetic unconscious. In the normal human adult, balancing, a grave problem to the baby or alcoholic, is automatic, and the neural control of the viscera surely troubles him little. In deep functional psychoses, even at times in hysteria, and in severe organic disease of the brain, we may frequently observe the emergence of the individual unconscious, the human infant in his nakedness, and occasionally observe the complete reversal of this phenomenon.

In the individual adult unconscious, however, we must include a host of individual memories and individually conditioned strivings, incapable of stimulating directly the cortico-spinal nervous system. These complexes, while physiologically blocked from higher levels, retain connection with the thalamic-hypothalamic level, and their specific energy, if cut off entirely even from indirect cortical conveyance (i.e. sublimation), must be turned with heightened intensity and in hopeless chronicity on the viscera and body fluids.

Lest we have sinned too deeply already we shall not try to schematize the anatomy of repression and the unconscious. We do know that the cortico-thalamic and thalamo-cortical pathways, and the myriad cerebral association fibres, from the most minute to the giant corpus



callosum are subject to anatomic and physiologic block. It is possible that the endogenous reversible block, occurring in repression, which we must call 'psychical', is but a foreshadowing of gradual structural inhibition in accordance with the trend of evolution. What is now a 'taboo' may some day be an anatomic impossibility in a healthy organism, and the author must here subscribe to the point of view that in the predetermination of such universal trends, the internal direction of the organism is of greater importance than the environment.

We may turn now to examine certain broad nosologic concepts deriving from the material already presented; first neurosis and organic disease. As the most clear cut example of psycho neurosis we may take conversion hysteria. In this condition, anatomical changes germane to its psychopathology are rarely demonstrated (i.e. omitting secondary ankyloses and similar phenomena). Those changes which do occur are usually mild vasomotor disturbances, easily reversible with the subsidence of the symptom, although it is, of course, possible that a low-grade physiological disturbance sustained over a long period may eventuate in anatomic damage. It must be recalled that the hysteric symptom has a definitely demonstrable symbolic significance, and that the hysterogenic conflict is preponderantly on a genital level. We may thus conceive of the entire pathological tension as occurring on a cortical level, or near it, barely excluded from admission into consciousness, and thus barely excluded from possible stimulation of the cortico-spinal (i.e. voluntary) nervous system. The type of conflict which occurs in hysteria may be closely approximated by conflicts in actual adult emotional life, where both alternatives may be entirely acceptable to consciousness but equally powerful and totally incompatible. In such instances, too, the clinical pathology is superficial and eminently reversible. In place of either complete repression or full expression in hysteria, a literal compromise is struck in a directly or symbolically involved portion of the body, in a distortion of the will (paralysis) or of perception (pain or anæsthesia). The conversion symptom may be objectified in vasomotor changes, which may be due to cortical-hypothalamic connections, or to autonomic representation in the cerebral cortex itself.<sup>13</sup>

In a crude schema of this type, it would be satisfactory to assign

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<sup>13</sup> Fulton, J. F.: 'Some Functions of the Cerebral Cortex'. *Journal of the Michigan Medical Society*, April 1934, Vol. 33, pp. 175-182; 1934, Vol. 33, pp. 235-243.



as much of the hysteric pathology to the cortical or near cortical level as possible. One must be struck by the frequent resemblance between the sensory and motor disturbances of small cortical lesions and the 'non-anatomic' disturbances of conversion hysteria. It is interesting, too, that these disturbances exhibit a similar relative accessibility to their respective therapies, surgical and psychotherapeutic, compared to the relative inaccessibility of surgical or psychologic disorders of the deeper levels of the brain.

In considering the distinction between somatic or visceral conversion symptoms and psychogenic organic disease, we must recognize that psychical abnormalities range from profound disorders of the primary instincts themselves, congenital or acquired, through innumerable gradations, until they reach the relatively superficial problem of erotic object choice seen in hysteria, which is greatly removed from the problem, let us say, of whether to devour or suck every person in view or to learn to love them in adult fashion. The availability of cortical expression to primitive impulse, whether in motor behaviour, speech, or thought, varies inversely with the degree of frank instinctual admixture in a given impulse and the depth of its instinctual component, because of anticipated external risk. On the other hand, its intimacy of connection with the hypothalamic-pituitary system depends directly on the depth and richness of the instinctual component. The less adaptable is the impulse to centrifugal expression of any type, the more completely is its neural energy confined to the endocrine and vegetative nervous systems. Thus the earlier, the more profound the psychic disturbance in an individual (whether endogenous or experiential), the more liable it is to cause chronic disturbances of growth, of sugar metabolism, of vascular tension, of cardiac rate and rhythm, and kindred fundamental pathologic changes whose possible number and variety<sup>14</sup> increase steadily with the accumulation of laboratory and clinical data about diencephalic function. In these instances, the instinctual levels presumably discharge through entire neural and endocrine systems, with a relative absence of symbolic localization, and it is in them that we may assume the materializations or the Anlagen of profound organic disease.

We may suggest the equation of organic disease and psychosis from

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<sup>14</sup> Penfield, W.: 'The Influence of the Diencephalon and Hypophysis upon General Autonomic Function'. *Canadian Medical Journal*, 1934, Vol. 30, pp. 589-598.



the psychodynamic point of view, since both represent alternative expressions of profound instinctual and vegetative disorder rather than the relatively superficial disturbances seen in neurosis. In the psychosis, through a process analogous to summation of stimuli, thalamo-cortical blocks are overcome, and the voluntary (Ego) nervous system becomes, to varying degrees, the direct instrument of the instinctual levels. Thus, through an election based on determinants which we cannot now understand, the viscera are spared the full impact of pathologic autonomic activity and the internal threat to the life of the organism is replaced by a grave threat from the outer world. If we seek to understand why a psychosis or an equivalent organic disease erupts at a given time, we must give weight to the instinctual tension that accumulates with time, or to the overwhelming stimulation or irritation of instinctual mechanisms that may arise suddenly from specific new environmental stimuli. We are all familiar with the fulminating psychotic episodes that may occur in individuals with strong unconscious homosexuality when they are thrown into intimate relationship with an attractive person of the same sex.

It is reasonable to attempt to carry the same equation further and to include with the psychosis overt hostile object relationships (crime) and that awe-inspiring polar phenomenon, total personal suicide. In both of the latter instances, the voluntary nervous system becomes subjugated to the instinctual demands of the organisms completely, in at least one phase of its activity. In the psychosis, on the other hand, one observes a profusion of defensive mechanisms (especially delusions and hallucinations) invoked against the complete triumph of the instincts (regression), and it is their rich variety which furnishes the materials for the classifications of descriptive psychiatry and the interpretations of psycho-analytical psychiatry.

The prodromal periods of severe psychoses are often distinguished by a profusion of somatic complaints, usually regarded as conversion or hypochondriacal phenomena, with the full implication of organic benignness usually accompanying these designations. However, it is possible that these symptoms, whether they take the form of vertigo, pallor, anæmia, loss of weight, or precordial pain, do constitute threats against life, which are averted only by the eruption of manifest psychosis, whereafter they often disappear.

From a broad physiological point of view it is difficult to assume a great difference between the morbid organ tensions which may result from the forced internalization of strong erotic and aggressive



tendencies. We can only vaguely speculate on the probability that destructive or aggressive impulses are more dangerous to human viscera than erotic impulses, comparable to their respective effects on external objects. If we must establish physiological correlates for these tendencies, it is likely that the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system is the principal anatomic vehicle of aggressive impulses and the parasympathetic the vehicle of the erotic impulses. We must also accept the observations of the psycho-analysts to the effect that genuinely erotic impulses are more liable to attain to some type of cortical conveyance, regardless of their 'abnormal' nature, than deeply destructive impulses; that is, they are at least susceptible to sublimation or relatively benign conversion, and they are, therefore, less liable to be forced into persistent and exclusive autonomic channels.

In the clinical course of schizophrenia, especially in catatonia (where the attempt at repression is violent), one may occasionally observe severe vegetative disturbances, which may indicate the inadequacy of the psychosis for the conveyance of instinctual energy. More striking are the occasional epileptic seizures of schizophrenia, which may represent attempts at more direct instinctual expression than the psychosis affords. In the epileptic psychosis, most strikingly in the transitory epileptic equivalent, the reverse may be true. Again, we are in no position even to speculate on the cause of these variations in expression.

We have seen often in clinical psychiatry a long history of mysterious precordial pain displaced by a psychosis. In one instance, in a male of the involutional period, several attacks of angina pectoris of sufficient gravity to be considered indicative of coronary artery disease culminated in a paranoid psychosis with considerable coincident physical improvement. In another instance a profound psychotic depression ensued without physical complaints, attaining an ultimate climax in suicide. We are fully aware of the fact that these commonplace prodromal phenomena, if not considered conversion symptoms, may be attributed to the organic disease which later causes the psychosis. There is no doubt that this is often true. It is difficult, however, to explain on such a basis an incident recently observed in this Clinic, in which an aged female, suffering from a depressed and agitated senile psychosis with paranoid trends, exhibited dramatic psychiatric improvement immediately following a clinical accident which exhibited all of the characteristics of a large artery coronary occlusion. Were her psychosis due entirely to senile cortical atrophy and the coronary



occlusion merely accidental one would expect, if anything, a severe exacerbation of the psychosis due to cerebral ischemia.

Such a phenomenon the psycho-analyst would no doubt regard as a striking instance of the satisfaction of a 'need for punishment'. There is, of course, no incompatibility between such verbalized subject correlates of instinctual tensions, which might also include the concepts of guilt, anxiety and a score of others, and the less varied objective biological mechanisms.

We may now give brief attention to the organic significance of thought and speech, the preponderant clinical material of the psychologist. We must acquiesce to the opinion of Sherrington<sup>15</sup> that 'mind' is but an adjunct to motor behaviour, essentially subserving an inhibitory function. Speech, since it provides some degree of externalization of energy, may be regarded as standing between musculo-skeletal behaviour (i.e. action) and thought, and is also a manifestation of partial motor inhibition. The degree of availability of these modes of cortical expression to the instinctual levels is in direct proportion to the degree of motor inhibition, because of diminishing external risk, yet the degree of relief of instinctual tension depends on the degree of sheer motor component in the expression. Thus action gives the greatest relief, thought or fantasy the least. But instinctual action carries with it the gravest external threat and thought the least grave. Speech stands midway between them with regard to both considerations, and is thus a singularly happy medium of expression. The symbols, the fantasies, with which the patient occupies himself represent a constant effort to translate the physiologic energies of instinct into a form adequate for cortico-spinal expression, or at least into the dissipation of pure thought. In speaking aloud, under the remarkable substitution sanction afforded by transference, the patient accomplishes a double purpose, that of heightened externalization of instinctual energy and of communication to the analyst of the verbalized subjective correlates of instinctual forces, whether they be primary (diencephalic) or secondary (cortical) instincts.<sup>16</sup>

With no intention of belittling the precious human significance of Speech and Mind or the hope that the cerebral cortex may some day

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<sup>15</sup> Sherrington, C. S. : 'The Brain and Its Mechanism'. Rede Lecture delivered before the University of Cambridge, December 5, 1933.

<sup>16</sup> Brun, R. : *Biologische Parallelen zu Freud's Triebtheorie*. (Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. 1926.)



literally control the vegetative levels, we must notice that even proverbial wisdom recognizes the secondary rôle of Speech. 'Actions speak louder than words', and were it not for inhibition because of external danger, we might possibly never speak at all. From the observation of human psychopathology, one gains the impression that this improvement in external adaptation has been attained, perhaps too often, at the expense of an ever increasing threat to life from the dynamics of the organism itself. Even now, while medicine copes with exogenous diseases with increasing success, the death rate from degenerative diseases increases steadily, and their etiologic mystery diminishes imperceptibly. It is, on the other hand, true that physiological death (i.e. death implicit in the fact of life) is most difficult to demonstrate in those forms of life whose responses to stimuli are almost inevitable physico-chemical reactions, but whose life is gravely threatened by the slightest significant change in the external milieu.

It is possible that emotion arose as soon as dissociation between instinctual and volitional skeletal activity appeared, and that the thought 'I wish' is a correlate of the tension arising when an impulse does not attain to automatic complete fruition. In this connection it is interesting to refer to the theory of behaviour conflict developed by Coghill<sup>17</sup> after years of objective biologic research in the laboratory. On the wish and its varied derivatives and destinies, is based the entire psycho-analytic pathology, and the infinite variety of its expression in fantasy and speech defies any present effort at physiologic classification.

While the 'wish' remains 'father to the thought' both anatomically and psychologically, it is probable that somewhere in phylogeny, and certainly in human ontogeny, a crucial phenomenon occurs which is perhaps more the subject of the metaphysician than the biologist. The Ego with consciousness and the subjective Will appear, and at this point the organism becomes capable of turning on itself, at least to the extent of inhibiting overt instinctual behaviour, and of dissociating musculo-skeletal behaviour from vegetative reactions, usually directing behaviour according to the complex self-preservative criteria of the cortex, but adding to these, quite often, even less clearly organic purposes, such as the benefit of the race or species, and even pure abstractions. In the normal individual, there is a balance and co-operation between old and new neural levels at least sufficient for

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<sup>17</sup> Coghill, G. E.: 'The Biologic Basis of Conflict in Behaviour'. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1933, Vol. 20, pp. 1-4.



an average life span. Perhaps even a primary death instinct in some way gradually finds expression in the inhibitory functions of the cortex, for even the ideally normal individual must also die.

Since this is a theoretical discussion, it is left to the internist and the psycho-analyst to produce ultimate clinical evidence for the soundness of the concept of psychogenesis of somatic disease. There is indeed abundant literature on the subject. (See, for instance, the remarkable recent compilation in H. F. Dunbar's book.<sup>18</sup>) We have merely tried to show that the autonomic nervous system and its central origins, whose rôle in visceral disease receives ever-increasing recognition, is importantly related to the Psyche, even in the most attenuated psychic phenomena. We have, in addition, attempted to exalt the etiologic potentialities of vegetative disorder, through the concept of the unconscious, and of the extreme chronicity of certain deep emotional states. Diseases such as bronchial asthma, exophthalmic goitre, and peptic ulcer have long challenged psychologic attention, because of certain obvious suggestions in their clinical histories. We must not, however, overlook the fact that people who are least 'neurotic' in their behaviour, and who present unmistakable signs of severe organic disease, may at times be suffering the late effects of deeply buried and chronic instinctual conflict. From the point of view of the author, the most challenging problems are the great group of endogenous diseases, or, at least, diseases of unknown origin, among them 'essential' hypertension, atherosclerosis and derivative diseases, diabetes mellitus, and neoplasia. In the case of early constitutional and endocrine disease, it is possible that the organs which perhaps determine the original character of the instincts or libido more than any others, are conversely vulnerable to instinctual distortions due to early experience, and that profound alterations in physique and body chemistry (including immunity)<sup>19</sup> may be deeply psychogenic. Whether these profound psycho-physiological disorders are within the scope of psychologic therapy, after anatomic change has occurred, is open to considerable question. Certainly we do not suggest the hasty displacement of digitalis, insulin, or surgery by psychotherapy.

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<sup>18</sup> Dunbar, H. F. : *Emotions and Bodily Changes*. (Columbia University Press. New York, 1935.)

<sup>19</sup> Wittkower, E. : 'Studies on the Influence of Emotions on the Functions of the Organs'. *Journal of Mental Science*, 1935, Vol. 81, pp. 533-682.



Whether the profound neural imbalances or conflicts that occasion them can even be verbalized is not known and cannot be known until thorough trials have been made. There can be no doubt, however, of the deep scientific justification for research along these lines in so far as it does not in any way conflict with the rational empirical therapy of the times.



## EGO DEVELOPMENT AND THE COMIC<sup>1</sup>

BY

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The subject of my paper to-night does not form part of the series of exchange lectures between British and Viennese Societies—lectures which are devoted to clearing up controversial points in our methods and theories—and which to my mind are an institution which has already proved its importance. What I have to say is to a certain extent a survey of old and proved facts and theories of Psycho-Analysis, but I hope it will help on the good cause of strengthening a connexion to which we attach great importance in Vienna.

The psychology of the comic is certainly a field of knowledge which has been thoroughly covered, although when Freud first approached it he had at his disposal only the few basic principles of psycho-analysis, namely dynamic and topographical considerations. The whole wealth of psycho-analytical experience and the system which developed out of it has been used but seldom in this field, and then only for special problems, for instance by *Freud* himself when giving the metapsychological outline of humour, or by *Reik* when dealing with different kinds of wit.

The brevity of this *exposé* does not allow me to discuss his opinions, and the opinions of others who have contributed to the subject, and I shall have to leave out acknowledgments due to these authors. It would certainly be useful to complete our general conceptions of the comic by considering them in the light of metapsychology, but any serious attempt in this direction has led to new and somewhat unexpected difficulties. This paper is intended as an introduction to this greater task, but it remains in itself incomplete and is purposely one-sided. I shall confine it to the sphere of Ego-Psychology, but at the same time I shall keep genetic problems in mind.

Life gives us many different aspects of the comic, and it is linked up with various kinds of human activity. We may begin our classification by introducing a simple distinction. The comic which we find in life can clearly be distinguished from the comic which men deliberately call into being. The first, the perception of the comic, requires the

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<sup>1</sup> Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, May 24, 1937.



activity of two people, one to observe and one to be observed. It is a well-established fact that wherever the comic occurs in connexion with non-human beings, this effect is due to an analogy with some human form of activity. The comic which we invent or call into being, in a word the comic which we act, is usually based on three persons, the spectator, the actor and a passive agent against whom the jest is directed. It is thus a process in which the social character predominates. To complete this rapid summary we may mention an analogous problem connected with humour. Humour can be completely expressed in one person: The play can be acted between the Ego and the Super-Ego.

Naturally enough the connexion between the phenomena which we can assign to these groups is only a slender one. The sight of a clumsy waiter, who lets fall a pile of plates, the effect upon us when somebody makes a tendentious joke, or the monologue of Falstaff on the nature of honour resemble each other neither in kind nor in value. Freud has taught us to draw a sharp distinction between the characteristics which are common to these phenomena and those in which they differ. May I remind you of the well-known formulæ: 'The pleasure of wit originates from an economy of expenditure in inhibition, that of the comic from an economy of expenditure in thought and that of humour from an economy of expenditure in emotion.'

For the present we can neglect these differentiations, as well as the fact that in his formula Freud uses the term 'comic' in a limited sense, that of the comic which we find in others. We shall use the term in a more general sense (Freud also uses it thus) to designate the various peculiarities and characteristics which are common to phenomena generally characterized in speech as 'comic.' And now we shall try and see how far the understanding of the 'economy' of psychic expenditure in the comic can lead us.

Evidently it does not adequately specify pleasure at the comic. We may say—quoting a later statement of Freud's—that we cannot refer to 'pleasure' and 'pain' merely as a quantitative increase or decrease in what we call stimulus-tension, although they have a great deal to do with this factor. They appear to depend not only on this quantitative factor, but also upon a characteristic which we can only describe as qualitative.

In our search for such a qualitative element in the economy of the comic, we might easily be led to confine our attention to the importance of time, or rather of the tempo in the saving of psychic expenditure, or



more generally the speed at which tension is relieved. One might suggest that the element of suddenness in this economic process is responsible for the nature of comic pleasure.

We know what happens if sudden relief occurs : The energy held in check by the inhibition suddenly becomes superfluous and is ready to be discharged in laughter. But the comic and the laughable are not identical. Much laughter has nothing to do with the comic. The laughter of children at play, the laughter of flirtation or the laughter of intoxication may each be considered as due to some saving in psychic energy, but they are not always caused by the perception of the comic. On the other hand, the comic includes more than laughter. We often express our pleasure at humour not in laughter but in a quiet smile.

We may remark in passing that the specific quality of humour seems to be bound up with the fact that time plays no part in the psychic economy ; thus its achievement is more lasting.

But Freud did not confine the essence of the comic to its economic function. He recognized another of its properties in what he calls the relation to the infantile, to the pleasures and pains of childhood, to childhood itself. Now Freud simply indicated this relation without developing it any further, and later writers have only touched upon it occasionally. So I want to give it special attention in this survey.

If we consider its frequency in psychic life, the most important or rather the clearest relation of the comic to childhood is what we might call the regressive character of the comic. Under the influence of the comic, we return to the happiness of childhood. We can throw off the fetters of logical thought and revel in a long forgotten freedom. The perfect example of this type of behaviour is pleasure in talking nonsense ; here we handle words as we did when children.

But this behaviour is not characteristic of the comic only. It occurs if the Ego has renounced some of its functions and does not exercise its full power. In dreaming, in neurosis and finally in psychosis the ego has been overwhelmed by the primary process. Logical thought is invalidated by elementary forces.

The way in which the primary process directs word-pleasure in the comic is evidently very different. We are actually in search of this pleasure and the primary process works creatively. This becomes especially clear when we study the pun. We all know, of course, Freud's explanation ; A preconscious thought is committed for a moment to unconscious elaboration or, as Freud also put it, the *pre*-conscious thought is submerged for a moment in the *un*conscious.



Both expressions seem to me to contain the idea that in this case the ego dominates the primary process. We may say: The primary process remains in the service of the ego. Thus there seems to be a wide and well-established difference between this case and those mentioned above in which the ego is overpowered by the primary process and loses at least in part its synthetic function. To make my meaning clear I should like to add one remark: There is no contradiction between this statement and the fact that although we 'make a joke,' wit has the character of involuntary inspiration, of a sudden 'flash of thought.' Making a joke belongs to the automatic, not to the conscious activities of the ego.

But we must not overestimate the importance of our statement for the psychology of the comic, for we have discussed something that is not confined to it alone. The primary process controlled by the ego covers a vast and imposing range of mental activities, it extends for example to the vast domain of æsthetic expression in general and, in its application to the sphere of symbol-building, permeates the whole of human life.

Pleasure over words—to come back to our original example—which is the basis of our understanding for wit, develops out of a complicated process. For the sake of brevity, I shall leave out the teaching of the history of human language on the phylogenetic part of this problem and refer only to a few well-known facts in the ontogenetic process. The child acquires its understanding of wit or pun only when it has mastered speech.

According to Kenderdine's observations the earliest case of a child laughing at a pun is between the age of three and five. If before this a child seems to find pleasure in talking nonsense, it must be a different kind of pleasure from that experienced by adults, and it is easy to see where the difference lies. For a child nonsense talk need not be a product of voluntary regression to an earlier stage of mental development, it is simply the actual handling of words at this early stage, the stage of playful experimentation with words. The child tries to understand words and their meaning, and it is an arduous process. Children are not at home in the world of words, yet words are indispensable for they serve to establish contact. The child's first belief in the omnipotence of thought disappears once it becomes conscious of an objective and alterable reality, and in normal cases the process of acquiring words begins at the end of the first year of its life. We know a few of the attendant phenomena of this process, some of which seem



to have an especial importance for analytical problems ; for example, the child's anxiety when he comes across a new word, his attempts and experiments until he has really learnt to deal with it correctly. Or again the child's exasperation if he cannot find words for what he thinks, if his speech does not give his meaning, or if grown-ups do not understand.

I certainly shall not try to describe these phenomena. I only want to point out that we can follow not only the dramatic prelude of this process, but its triumphant conclusion, the child's delight when using newly acquired words, its repetition of them in a sort of rhythmical chant, its happy experiments with sound and meaning before the difference between them is finally grasped.

The child's joy at playing with the language it has just mastered lives on in the pleasure which adults find in words and is a pleasure which wit justifies before the Super-ego. Moreover the sovereignty of the ego over the primary process is pleasurable in this case because something is desired which would otherwise happen against the will of the ego and a passive experience is reproduced actively.

We will leave the problem of regression in the comic represented schematically in nonsense talk (we could equally well have chosen the language of comic gesture or expressions of the comic in plastic art) and, instead of the man-made comic we enjoy when we indulge in or listen to jokes and nonsense, let us take an example from the comic we find in others.

I should like to suggest three different examples and try, with a slight deviation from Freud's formula, to discover a common characteristic underlying the dissimilar circumstances. If we laugh at *naïveté*—that is to say at the unintentional comic of the child, or at a person who makes a clumsy movement, the waiter, for instance, when he drops a pile of plates, or at a display of stupidity on the part of someone—common to all these cases is an insufficient or unsuccessful adjustment to reality. Now from the very beginning psychology has suggested that our reaction to such experiences is connected with a feeling of superiority which takes hold of us at the sight of another's failure.

Classical antiquity taught this. Quintilian wrote : ' Non procul a derisu est risus.' Thomas Hobbes, one of the founders of psychology in modern times, reformulated this idea with greater precision in the middle of the seventeenth century—even before Descartes : ' The passion of laughter is nothing but sudden glory arising in ourselves



from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves by comparison with the inferiority of others *or with our own formerly.*' Hobbes, in my opinion, is more akin to Freud than any later psychologist, although Freud takes economy in expenditure not superiority to be the decisive element in comic comparison. To discuss this theory I shall employ a well-tried method in which the crucial point is not our reactions to the comic but those cases in which we fail to react, in which the comic effect is disturbed. Our preoccupation with something else, the fact that our attention is diverted can be taken as the usual cause of this failure. The disturbance lies in an ego which has lost interest in the very basis of the comic, the comparison between successful and unsuccessful adjustments to reality. To take an example used by Freud: the dancing master who points out the mistakes of a bad dancer will not find his pupil's clumsy steps funny. The preconscious automatic activity of the ego is disturbed by the conscious activity of attention. Here then we are justified in saying that the comic effect is absent, but there are other cases in which just the opposite effect is produced, and it is these cases which we can expect to throw light upon our problem. I choose the case of a patient who is a successful teacher and shows a marked degree of psychological insight when dealing with her pupils. She is incapable of experiencing the comic pleasure which is usually aroused in adults by the *naïveté* of a child. She is incapable of 'laughing at the child.' Here, as in the case of the dancing master, we might think that it is a question of the typical attitude of the teacher, and so consider the case normal, yet what appears as praiseworthy pedagogic restraint is in fact the expression of a far-reaching disturbance. The restraint is not voluntary but compulsory. The teacher simply cannot enjoy the comic. The disturbance itself is connected with a particular dramatic situation in her childhood. As a child she had the misfortune to be laughed at and now in cases where an adult would normally experience comic pleasure, she unconsciously identifies herself with the child who is laughed at. Once we have learnt to recognize this disturbance (we might well describe it as 'identification with the person laughed at') we find it repeatedly, even regularly. It is not simply pathological; in fact, we can hardly consider it apart from normal human activity, for we do not laugh at every slip made by another person nor does our social code permit us to laugh in all such cases. I do not intend to go into further detail and should like to try instead, in a schematic survey, to pick out the factor common to those cases in which identification with



the person laughed at prevents the comic effect from being experienced and often causes a disagreeable sensation. I believe that in all these cases it is a question of our inability to dissociate ourselves fully from the experience, and such a dissociation (*Distanzierung*) or in other words, such a relative detachment is certainly a preliminary condition for comic enjoyment. But we can find a better and more general definition for this condition and one which will be more useful for the development of our *exposé* when we say that enjoyment of the comic entails a feeling of complete security from danger.

Let us turn once more to the genetic standpoint and ask ourselves when in fact does a child find an experience funny? The answer is borne out by a wealth of observation. A preliminary condition is complete control over that function in question. An absurd movement on the part of another person will seem funny to a child *only* when it has itself mastered the movement. At a later stage of development it will laugh at a mistake in thinking, only when its own powers of thought are firmly established. Here one may ask whether the comparison between the other person's irrational expenditure (of energy) and one's own always releases a feeling of superiority, if this laughter, in Hobbes' words, 'points out some eminency of our own.' Laughter may denote superiority, but it denotes something else as well. No so much '*I can do it better*' as '*I can do it*.' If we could see it as a slow motion picture we should realize that our sense of the comic is preceded by an experience which can be compared to a kind of examination, to a resistance test if you like. We do not necessarily re-live the entire former situation in our infantile development; a fear signal, however faint, may take its place. A feeling of anxiety over our own powers of mastery, or more accurately, the memory of an averted, superfluous anxiety, seems to accompany the comic.

At first sight this appears paradoxical. How can the increase in and search for pleasure which find their expression in the comic originate beyond the pleasure principle? Yet this is the logical result of a generation of psycho-analytic research leading us to supplement Freud's original statements.

The immediate point of contact lies in our conception of children's play. This conception as a whole need not be considered here: I do not wish to refer to that domination of symbolism in play which gives a unique insight into the mind of the small child; nor to the manner in which the pleasurable character of play is dominated by fantasies which set it in motion. (I refer here, for instance, to Mrs. Klein's and



especially to Miss Searl's work.) No, my intention is to pick out some points connected with the psychic achievement of the child at play, without referring to anything pathological and dealing exclusively with the normal.

In the first phase of a child's development, play serves to master the plaything—and at the same time or even earlier, to master the body. In a later phase the active repetition of passive experience dominates play, and permits—in the words of Mrs. Isaacs—the active dramatization of the inner world of imagination as a means of maintaining psychic equilibrium. In both cases we are justified in saying that play serves to overcome the outer world and anxiety.

But now, if we watch the child himself at play one observation is forced upon us: He carries on with the game until every difficulty is overcome, all apparent fear mastered.

We might, of course, imagine that the defence is continued because all trace of pressure has not completely disappeared, but this is contradicted by the impression of pleasure, of enjoyment given by a child at play. It seems to me to be a question of something else. When a small boy who has been to the dentist, plays at being a dentist for days on end, he does so not only because he is still afraid but because the pleasure he finds in dominating his fear is a real enjoyment. And yet it need not necessarily be the activity of the dentist which appeals to him; naturally this can be an additional factor, but to my mind it is accessory, for the pleasure of repetition is genetically older. We need only to remember how even a small child will play a game of hide and seek over and over again. I do not want to discuss pleasure in repetition, but merely to draw your attention to one element: Repetition means a return and a rediscovery. Its permanent pleasure content seems to me to be decisively influenced by a permanent delight at the harmlessness of what has once been dangerous; here too pleasure springs from economy, an increase in pleasure from a difference in expenditure. However, this gain in pleasure has nothing to do with the comic, but forms—as I am inclined to assume—the foundation for an attitude which some psychologists take to be an ultimate biological condition in the psychic life of man. I refer of course to *functional pleasure*, which has gained considerable prestige and wide application in modern literature, following the initiative of William James and Karl Gross. I do not doubt that this problem has been observed correctly, and it is quite possible that one of its roots can be traced back to biological conditions, nevertheless observation of the



child seems to me to *shew* definitely that the *functional pleasure itself* is to a great extent the pleasure we have just described—pleasure arising from a sense of mastery.

Functional pleasure as a phenomenon is clearly distinguishable from comic pleasure. If I attempt to suggest a line of demarcation, I do not wish to compare the extent of each phenomenon but merely to point out the one decisive difference, which lies in their relation to time. Pleasure in mastery *plays itself out in the present*, and is experienced as such. Comic pleasure, according to this hypothesis, refers to a past achievement of the ego which has required long practice to bring it about. We experience not only the success of the achievement itself but the whole process by which we gradually attained this mastery.

Freud recognized children's play as the forerunner of the comic; to my mind it is the starting point for the comic we see in others, for the realization of the comic impression.

In childhood we pass through another preliminary phase of the comic, namely fun, and a child begins to understand the nature of fun at a very early age. It is a great moment in the life of a child when for the first time it understands a joke made by an adult, or when it makes its own first joke. Illusion takes the place of reality—and in this world of make-believe forbidden things are suddenly permitted. Freud admitted as much and we can now add that all fun is directed towards a second person. Play can be solitary, fun is sociable. By its play the child tries to dominate the outer world, and in fun it is looking aggressively or libidinally for a companion. In fun the child is trying to seduce the surrounding world, fun is the frame within which this instinctual drive is indulged. Now just as our childish experiences live on as an undercurrent to the pleasure we find in a comic object, so the tendentious joke of the adult has its roots in the child's notion of fun. Fun is founded on the approval of those in authority and this is true of tendentious jokes as well. As we shall see later a situation in which an audience does not laugh at a daring joke, in which instead of general amusement (the pleasurable experience aimed at) a painful silence follows, this situation preserves some definite features of childhood: the unfortunate who told the joke feels very like a child whose parents express their displeasure at its rowdiness or exhibitionism, who has been told 'That's going too far.'

And now perhaps we are ready to discuss a thesis of Freud which has been the subject of much criticism. He maintains that the experience of the comic is unknown to the child, with more reason to



the small child. We are inclined to supplement this statement by actual observations of children and so far as such observations are available, they seem to confirm our hypothesis.

In 1929 two pupils of Karl Bühler published the results of experiments they had made to test children's understanding for fun and the comic. The results are impressive when they refer to the 'comic' productions of children in their early years of latency. When we examine the contents of children's drawings which are intended to express something 'funny,' we gain the impression that what the child represents are objects of the surrounding world which it has just learnt to comprehend and to master. Graber's psycho-analytic observation in a similar case seems to reveal that the deepest problems in the child's life—in Graber's case the repressed fear of castration—may come to be expressed in what the child calls 'funny.'

This theory is not confined to the child's comic productions. It is also true of cases in which the child learns to appreciate the comic. Various protocols show that a child of one or two years only gradually becomes aware of the comic impression created by the jerky movements of a puppet or a cat. The child's reactions seem to pass from fear to interest and only very slowly from interest to pleasure, which is the last phase of this triple process. To be sure, it is impossible to gain more accurate and detailed information from this study—to my knowledge the only one dealing with this particular subject—but then we must remember that it is carried out by observers who make no effort to understand the dynamic character of man's mental life who are even trained to ignore it. For this reason their observations are only of limited value for our discussion. On this basis, I should like to attach a more general problem in the psychology of the comic one which to my mind has been insufficiently appreciated: It concerns the part played by the comic in overcoming emotion, especially when this is roused by strange and terrifying things. Here I think the following formula suggests itself: The comic alone cannot overcome emotion for it pre-supposes a certain control over anxiety before it can become effective. Once it has come into being, however, it combines a sense of mastery with a feeling of pleasure. The German Jean Paul (Richter), one of the greatest of poet psychologists, had this psychic fact in mind when he said: Wit brings freedom, and freedom wit. All branches of psychology help to confirm this thesis and some examples already discussed could be used as further proof, but I only want to add one or two other examples which refer to historical problems.



We are all familiar with the great company of comic figures which are to be found in the art and literature of all civilized peoples. We can often discover their genealogy and trace it right back to the antique satyr play, or even further. It is a fact that as a general rule, we can perceive behind them another more sinister shape once feared or dreaded. Satyrs who at first were goat-demons, the pulcinella of South-Italian comedy, descendants of the cock dancers, the comic devils of the mystery plays, even the lovable Mephisto in Goethe's *Faust*, are the best-known examples of such *ci-devant* demons now travestied as fools.

Although the grinning gargoyles on Gothic cathedrals are intended to turn away evil, they look terrifying enough perched high up among the gables and gutters. Their development is interesting. In the thirteenth century these figures of an apotropaic magic are still terrifying. In the fourteenth, they tend to become mere comic masks; by the fifteenth century the process is complete and, instead of threatening, they are only intended to amuse. This observation is not inconsistent with older psycho-analytical knowledge. The mechanism which determines this functional change of the object is a general one, and for obvious reasons I do not wish to go into its origin. Jekels attempted to explain the secret of comedy as a displacement of the tragic guilt from son to father, and we may add the aphorism: When we laugh at the fool, we never forget that in his comic fancy dress, with bladder and cap, he still carries crown and sceptre, symbols of kingship. And is it not possible that the freedom exploited by the fool is a direct inheritance from the omnipotence of his demonic predecessor? If we look at the peculiarity of comic experience from this angle we may say that what was feared yesterday is fated to appear funny when seen to-day. The intermediate position of the comic between pleasure and the warding off of emotion especially fear even finds expression in our speech. The French word '*drôle*' has undergone a transformation in meaning from the uncanny to the comic. The word '*komisch*' in German, as well as the French word '*drôle*', can be used even to-day to denote anger or surprise, for example, when we say '*C'est drôle*' or '*das ist komisch*'; and I believe the English word '*funny*' can be used in a similar way. But such examples are hardly necessary to prove the intermediate position of the comic, a character which seems to be common to all comic phenomena.

I cannot avoid referring here to suggestions which I have already



made elsewhere. I suggested calling this peculiarity of the comic the double-edged character of comic phenomena (*der Kippcharakter komischer Phänomene*). By this is meant the characteristic fact that these phenomena under certain conditions can cause displeasure or even pain instead of pleasure.

The cases we mentioned of unsuccessful dissociation can be considered from this point of view. If we identify ourselves with the person laughed at we feel discomfort instead of pleasure. We do not receive a comic, but a painful impression. Sometimes it is as if our old fear, the mastering of which is a necessary precondition of the comic, were suddenly strong enough to overwhelm our actual experience.

As the clearest example of such cases I may allude to the technique familiar to all those who know anything about certain American films. In some of these pictures—I refrain from giving examples—the mechanism latent in all comic is openly exploited. Relief is achieved by a previous increase in tension. However, this technique is dangerous, for all are not equally suitable subjects for this species of psychic manipulation, we might almost say, quackery. Some people get no further than the preliminary tension and are unable to forget their fear in the pleasurable release which follows.

However, a deeper psychological interpretation of this technique belongs to the psychology of the grotesque rather than to that of the comic; it is largely based on the sudden and surprising relief from anxiety which leads to laughter.

What is true of the comic we find in others holds good for 'manufactured' comic as well. The double-edged character of the comic is apparent when, for instance, an audience listening to a joke rejects the implication and does not respond to the appeal for common aggression or common regression. In identifying ourselves with the audience, we hear the severe voice of our own conscience. The pleasurable experience which should have arisen from a compromise between the tendencies of the Id and the Super-ego remains unrealized. A similar process takes place in the listener. He accepts the proffered invitation tentatively, feels for an instant the aggressive impulse which the joke ought to satisfy; but the joke is only successful in removing existing inhibitions and fails to prevent a new cathexis from which springs an unpleasurable and painful impression.

I am afraid some confusion has crept into our survey. Let us therefore summarize the results: Our starting point was Freud's idea of the economic and genetic conditions in the comic. We thought it



necessary to point out an additional element, the fact that most comic phenomena seem to be bound up with past conflicts of the ego, that they help it to repeat its victory and in doing so once more to overcome half assimilated fear. From this essential peculiarity of the comic experience arises its double-edged character, the ease with which it passes from pleasurable success to unpleasurable failure. Certainly we have treated the comic unfairly in concentrating on comic phenomena as a compromise in psychic life and neglecting the pleasure produced by these phenomena, but this is due to the intentional one-sidedness of this paper. And you must allow me to carry my point of view through to the bitter end!

The compromise achieved by the comic is the foundation of a phenomenon well-known to all psycho-analysis: The comic as a mechanism of defence. We know it from clinical experience: Here it can appear in various guises to master and ward off emotions, above all anxiety. Let me quote an observation which I was able to make recently.

At the beginning of an analysis a patient spoke about a sexual habit which played an important part in her life. She was unable to control her laughter; which had to camouflage her repressed fear of permanent damage through masturbation. In such a transitory form the comic as a method of defence is completely normal but we also come across it as a permanent state which stigmatizes the whole personality. I should like to describe this clinical picture as that of 'the typical clown.'

So far as I can see the strongest incentive to playing the fool is exhibitionism. The connection between exhibitionism and comic pleasure is now well-known to all of us and was noticed as early as 1912 by Ernest Jones. I was able to follow the fate of this character type in a young man, a scopophilic, and an exhibitionist, who had early been outrivalled by his brother, and thereafter saw himself condemned to be the humorist, the clown. When in some political argument the others were absorbed in a fierce discussion, he, the buffoon, had to be content with an occasional joke. His wit could be spiteful and aggressive; it served as a defence against a passive oral fantasy, it took the place of his desire, to seduce with words. For a time his post as contributor to a comic paper gave him a certain balance. But the distortions which he inflicted on his personality by his perpetual joking were due to his desire to avoid competition with a stronger rival.



Psycho-analysis teaches us the outcome of such an attitude. The clown will not remove his cap and bells until he has conquered his anxiety.

The intimate connexion between the comic on the one hand, anxiety and instinct on the other, helps us to understand the limits of its influence. It cannot approach sacred things without appearing blasphemous—a form of double-edged effect. It cannot bring permanent relief for, as in mania which is to some extent the pathological enlargement of the comic, the victory of the ego is transitory, the pleasure-gain of short duration. But this is not necessarily the case; in a particular form the comic relief is permanent, for here it is not an often repeated attempt of the ego to find a solution, but a permanent transformation of the ego. We begin to realize the value of the humorist's achievement, for he banishes man's greatest fear, the eternal fear, acquired in childhood, of the loss of love. The precious gift of humour makes men wise; they are sublime and safe, remote from all conflict. According to Freud's outline of the libidinal types, humour can be most readily conceived as a composite type, in which elements of narcissism are prominent; but how few people possess humour in the Freudian sense!

Humour too has a counterpart; there is also a double-edged phenomenon of humour. Freud's criminal as he is led to the gallows on a Monday morning remarks: 'Dear me, this week's beginning well!' It seems to me that Freud's interpretation is doubtful: This is called, and rightly, 'grim humour,' and I think we are justified here in recognizing a particular form of rebellion against fate: *Self-irony*, a form of the comic which is related to cynicism and sarcasm and bears the stamp of aggression. This difficulty in drawing the boundary between humour and self-irony reminds us again how imperfect is any happiness which the comic can offer us. We see man as an eternal pleasure-seeker walking on a narrow ledge above an abyss of fear.



## SHORT COMMUNICATIONS

### A NOTE ON IDEALIZATION <sup>1</sup>

In recent years we have been compelled to recast our ideas about early stages of mental development. Already the discovery of the early onset of the œdipus complex has brought about recognition of an early form of super-ego. The effect of these clinical discoveries on psycho-analytical theories is far reaching. As I have pointed out on several occasions, an early super-ego based on relations of the infant with so-called part-objects completely alters our views on narcissism, to say nothing of more dynamic concepts such as 'autoerotism' and 'polymorphous-perverse' impulses. These terms are not well adapted to express the relations of 'objects within the primitive ego.' Once this recasting process is set in motion there seems no reason to limit its activities to the structure of the ego or the stages of instinct modification. Logically we must apply it to the nature of mental mechanisms. In particular we must enquire whether most unconscious mechanisms do not begin to function much earlier than has hitherto been supposed.

During the observation of sexual perversions occurring in certain psychotic types, I have been struck with the fact that despite the early origin of the symptoms in question most of these patients made constant use of the process of idealization. Now according to accepted views idealization is a process which commences in late childhood and adolescence. It seemed difficult to reconcile this view with the fact that all these cases showed evident signs of regression of both ego and libido to very early stages of development.

Before considering this problem further we may summarize briefly what the accepted views are. Discussing the effect of repression on the sexual impulses of the five-year-old child, Freud points out <sup>2</sup> that the child afterwards remains tied to the parents by aim-inhibited impulses, his emotions towards love objects being characterized as 'tender.' At puberty these tender feelings may in unfavourable cases remain separate from the sensual current. A striking feature of being in love is presented by the phenomenon of over-estimation. If the sensual tendencies are set aside 'the *illusion* (writer's italics) is pro-

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<sup>1</sup> Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, Wednesday, November 1, 1933.

<sup>2</sup> 'Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.' Hogarth Press.



duced that the object has come to be sensually loved on account of its spiritual merits.' 'The tendency which falsifies judgment in this respect is that of *idealization*.' The object is being treated like the ego: it has attracted a considerable amount of narcissistic libido, and so functions as a substitute for some unattained ego-ideal. If this process increases the object may become more and more precious until it 'has, so to speak, consumed the ego.' This devotion of the ego to the object 'is no longer to be distinguished from a sublimated devotion to an abstract idea.' Re-emphasising the fact that tender feelings are derived from earlier infantile sensual feelings Freud points out that these diverted or aim-inhibited instincts always preserve a few of their original sexual aims and adds, 'If we choose we may recognise in this diversion of aims a beginning of the *sublimation* of the sexual instincts.' Further, 'the inhibited instincts are capable of any degree of admixture with the uninhibited, they can be transformed back into them just as they arose out of them.' Although purposeless in aim they provide 'a much frequented pathway to sexual object-choice.' Finally they arise as a consequence of 'repression during the period of latency.'

It is clear from the above that there is a close relation between the concepts of aim-inhibition, idealization and sublimation, a fact which present-day observations fully confirm. Secondly, it is implied that aim-inhibition occurs in the latency period, idealization not earlier than the pubertal phase. This no longer seems to tally with clinical experience. On the contrary I would maintain that all these processes take effect in the pre-latency period, indeed that the process of idealization is more active in the pre-latency period than in any other. This does not affect the view that idealization depends on the nature of super-ego conflict and the degree to which psychic relations with objects can resolve conflict. On the other hand explanation of idealization solely in terms of repression of infantile sensual components seems incomplete. Freud's own remark on the element of *illusion* in idealization itself suggests different probabilities, viz. that the rôle of repression is a secondary one, that idealization is in principle closely related to the *delusional* defences of the psychoses and that it is bound up with the operation of projection and introjection defences. This would suggest that as the ego as a result of introjection and projection phantasies invests parts of the self (objects in the ego) and true external objects with anxiety it is compelled to idealize (libidinize) them in order to reduce this anxiety. Further, it seems probable that



the regression to sensual origins that can sometimes be observed in aim inhibition, in idealization and in sublimation is determined not simply by the break through of inadequately repressed sensual elements, but by the fact that regression permits a more extensive libidinization of pathogenic anxieties.

Clinical evidence in support of these contentions can be gathered from a number of fields, in particular from the study of early infancy, of sexual perversions in the adult and of those borderline psychoses in which a degree of perversion-formation occurs.

In the case of infants up to the ages of eighteen months or two years it is of course difficult to check the inferences (or interpretations) made on the strength of observations. Yet although it is never difficult to establish the existence of sensual currents during that early stage, it seems that we are inclined to neglect the existence of tender currents. Yet at the very least there are obvious indications of sexual over-estimation in the attitude or behaviour of infants towards accessible parts of their own bodies. This is perhaps easiest to observe in the case of hands and arms. The child can be observed in lengthy contemplation of these organs which are doubtless conceived of as objects. And although the pleasure is no doubt in the main sensual in nature it suggests a degree of wonderment and adoration which is a constant feature of adult sexual over-estimation and which is closely combined with tenderness towards the object. The same reaction can be observed in relation to many inanimate external objects, e.g. dangling pieces of coloured glass. These inferences are confirmed when through increasing age and the development of speech we are informed by the growing child what exactly is its attitude to parts of its own body and to real external objects animate and inanimate. Characteristically these attitudes are more fully expressed in the case of inanimate substitute objects (toys, etc.) than in the case of actual part-objects (parents, etc.). An attitude is adopted towards favourite toys which can scarcely be distinguished from the idealization of the object. The same attitude can sometimes be detected in the child's word-play, an activity which is extremely pronounced in adult idealization. Studying these early manifestations one is compelled to reassess the relation of repression to idealization systems. One can say, of course, that since repression itself occurs earlier than has hitherto been supposed the relation of idealization to repression as originally described by Freud is still valid. But there is no reason to suppose that the original tender current towards object does not



exist in a primitive and rudimentary form which is at the same time or perhaps later reinforced as the result of repression.

Evidence from study of the perversions is even more striking. Apart from marked sexual overestimation of part-objects and their immediate substitutes, many cases exhibit an attitude of extreme idealization of these objects however primitive these may be. With this almost sexual variety of idealization goes a general tendency to idealize not adult objects but more remote abstract objects and interests. These are indistinguishable from sublimatory idealizations. Yet the language used is identical with that used for the most primitive sexual objects. This is a common characteristic of the sexual pervert. However devoid of idealization of adult relations he may be his geese are usually regarded by him as swans. The sexual part-objects treated with this combination of sexual over-estimation and idealization vary with the individual, but my experience seems to indicate that these reactions are more common in the case of objects of anal and urethral sexuality. Next to these come those fetichistic idealizations behind which lies a good deal of sadistic interest. In a typical case the anal ring was phantasied as a kind of halo suspended in the sky. It was then contemplated, adored and idealized. The qualities attributed to it were mystical and the whole attitude of the patient was religious in type. A fetichist arranged his extensive collection of women's shoes in a bookcase in such a manner that the soles of the shoes looked like the backs of books. Of these, one pair with high-pointed heels was singled out for special reverence and idealized as if it were a highly superior being. As the analysis progressed the sadistic attributes of this special pair of shoes came to the surface, and incidentally as the construction loosened the patient altered his previous policy of illiteracy, became an extensive reader and collector of books.

Although the first case quoted might appear to belong to a schizoid group such manifestations are not uncommon in people who both clinically and as tested by after history are not psychotic. In schizoid types the process is naturally more obvious. Sexual over-estimation and idealization extends to every variety of part-object, food, fæces, urine, sexual zones, etc. They have attributed to them every variety of concrete and abstract virtue. At the same time these patients tend to excessive idealization of their natural surroundings, the sun or sunshine, woods, flower gardens, cliffs, valleys, the sea. In their relations with adult objects however, idealization is rare. Depressive cases in



my experience do not shew the same forms of sexual over-estimation of part-objects but they do tend to idealization of certain natural surroundings obviously selected in accordance with a 'good and bad' system. The best example is also the commonest, viz. idealization of sunlit as opposed to shady spaces or streets. The one is associated with goodness, safety, life and God, the other with badness, danger, death and evil. Still other cases reverse this valuation, idealizing dark places and fearing or avoiding the almost persecutory glare of open sunlight.

It might be argued that none of this evidence is valid ; that however primitive the unconscious content may be, nevertheless idealizations need not be of the same date. They might well be pubertal deviations of sexual impulse which act as late anticathexes reinforcing the repression of primitive drives. Study of psychotic types seems to me to dispose of this argument quite effectively. In the analysis of such cases one is in a position to observe regression during which the developmental relation of idealization systems to unconscious content becomes quite clear. During their more stable phases many schizoids and mild depressives complain of the shallow nature of their contact with adult objects. Even if they don't complain, it is easy to see that in those relations (either sexual or social) there is very little idealization of the adult object. It is all the more significant therefore that when they go through a phase of regression culminating in an outbreak of perverse phantasy or behaviour the most extreme forms of idealization are exhibited. These however show no sign of being deviated towards adult objects but are directly concerned with primitive objects or with natural surroundings which symbolize them.

Still more interesting is the fact that during this phase of idealization of natural surroundings, the patient alternates rapidly between a sense of being in security and an apprehension of great danger together with a feeling of isolation which may develop into a sense of alienation. This suggests that one of the aims of the regression is to seek for and secure the comforts of an idealized relation with primitive objects. The fact that this aim is not achieved or achieved only in part and at the cost of still greater anxieties does not invalidate this conclusion. It is characteristic of symptom formation that on the balance it does not succeed in its aim of securing peace of mind.

Summing up these impressions I would suggest that the pubertal idealizations we encounter are contributed from two sources. They can be traced indirectly through the paths of aim-inhibition back to



the repression of infantile sensual components. This is the commonly accepted view. All we need to add to it is that repression operates in the earliest years when the impulses are directed mainly towards part-objects, and that true idealizations occur already in that early phase. The second component is derived from a primitive form of idealization, a tender attitude to part-objects which is not directly incited by repression but is gradually modified in expression as object relations develop. These primitive idealizations have in my opinion a specially close relation to anal-sadism, a relation which renders them subject to part repression. If early relations with objects are on the balance unsatisfactory these early idealizations may be completely repressed, so that when they re-appear later (? latency or puberty) they give the impression of being primary rather than derived. Finally, these early idealizations have a considerable reassurance value and can take part in the process of 'libidinizing' anxiety objects. It is this last factor which puts an additional premium on regression when later on in life the patient is faced with some fresh instinctual stress, and in consequence is threatened with breakdown.

Edward Glover,

(London).



## A CASE OF NUMBER PHOBIA

One of the most persistent academic criticisms of the psycho-analytical theory of symbols has been, and still is, that the Freudian school 'arbitrarily' imputes to certain symbols (in dreams, e.g. snakes, stairs, tight openings, etc.) an underlying sexual significance which has no association basis in the everyday life of the patient.

While lack of clinical acquaintance with cases is the essential reason for this academic inability to penetrate the 'façon de penser' of the unconscious other factors also determine this insistence on experiential association as the determining element in the stream of thought. Chief among these is the average academic psychologist's acquaintance with tests of free and controlled association and only a superficial type of psychopathology. From these he can, e.g. see how adult phobias may be based on some childhood experience which might be forgotten while the effects of the emotional trauma persist, spreading an aura, as it were, which surrounds the core of the 'complex.' His experience being limited to rather obvious cases of this sort he is opposed to 'far-fetched' theories.

It was in connection with this emphasis on experiential association as opposed to a 'language of the unconscious,' which by homology figures in folklore and superstition, that the writer's interest was aroused by Jeffreys' note <sup>1</sup> on the unconscious significance of numbers. He states that 'the interest in odd numbers and especially in primes, is originally phallic, while even numbers and especially those with a large number of factors are associated with ambivalent attitudes to the mother.'

In the case of a patient, H. K., this was exactly what was to be found except that the sensitiveness to numbers seemed manifoldly determined, some having rather the consciously recallable experiential basis stressed by academic psychologists while the others were founded on an unconscious type of reasoning which with extreme difficulty was brought to the surface.

H. K., an obsessional neurotic, exhibited, among other symptoms, a great fear of even numbers. When walking on the street, he always managed to be on that side where the house numbers were odd. He

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<sup>1</sup> Harold Jeffreys, 'The Unconscious Significance of Numbers,' JOURNAL, 1936, Vol. XVII, pp. 217-223.



confessed that if I had lived in an even-numbered house he would have had an enormous resistance to overcome before he could muster courage enough to enter it. Of the even numbers, 2, 14, and 18 were for him especially pregnant with terror; 18 perhaps not so much, but whenever he passed a number 2 or a number 14 house, he had to use a certain special magical verbal formula to overcome his fear. Towards odd numbers, on the other hand, he was quite indifferent, except two of them, 21 and 23, which produced the same effect as even numbers—an uncontrollable fear that something would happen to him. Analysis revealed that the patient's genital life, completely repressed since infancy was traumatically brought to his consciousness when one day at the age of 18, in the company of another couple, he indulged in a quasi-wrestling match in a park with a girl. Struggling with her he achieved an erection and then suddenly, for the first time in his life, he had a conscious orgasm. The rise of his symptoms all goes back to this experience. Previous to this he had never masturbated and had regarded his penis as something dirty which he held very delicately with his two fingers when he urinated. His fear of '18' did not manifest itself previously in any special way until, during the analysis, the full significance of this trauma at the age of 18 (he was 27 at the time of the analysis) was brought to his consciousness. It was not till then that he began reporting that besides 2, 14 and 21 he also had suddenly begun to fear 18 and 23. The 18 was obviously associated with his experience at the age of 18 but the 23 for a long while remained unaccounted for while the other numbers were explained. It was discovered that 2 represented for him the union of man and woman, a relationship of his mother and (dead) father whose place he had unconsciously wanted to take in childhood. His dreams very obviously and directly showed his repressed sexual attitude towards his mother, an attitude which mirrored itself in his childhood behaviour when at the age of three, whenever sleeping in bed with her, he always faced the wall, his back to his mother, because he felt that there was something 'warm about the centre of her body' that he 'shouldn't come close to.'

When at the age of 18, his father dead already several years, he had the traumatic experience reported above, his fear of numbers commenced. The number he first began to fear was 2. If in his compulsive behaviour he repeated a certain act a second time he always made sure that he repeated it a third time, because 'twice is unlucky.' His unconscious realized that in the park experience he had manifested his repressed sex urge towards his mother, that every woman was for him



his mother with whom sex relations were forbidden. To be a couple, '2,' meant then, giving vent to his œdipus impulses. This he could not admit to himself and all the affect associated with his castration anxiety was unloaded on '2.' Very soon, 21 and 14, besides all even numbers, became invested with a special fear; 21 represented himself with his mother, with his dead father who tried to castrate him in his dreams, being the 'I' in 21. It represented a vengeful father whom he had betrayed by having relations with his mother. The 14, difficult to resolve at first, proved later to have an interesting double determination. In an attempt to get at possible associations with this number a series of words was given the patient so as to make his association with 14 quite a spontaneous one; the word he associated with 14 was 'father.' The number had also another determining factor. Just as in 21 the '2' was a woman (his mother) and himself, while the 'I' was his vengeful father, so also was it discovered that 14 represented his vengeful father on one side and the two couples (4 persons) in the park, on the other. In one of his dreams, his father meets him in a park and throws a knife at him. In his fear of 23, the same motif is reflected except that here the other couple become the representative of organized society and together with his father '3,' turn against him and his mother. This also was first found in his dreams, where, as in one, he sits on a park bench talking to a strange woman when suddenly a couple resembling the one he was in the park with comes with a policeman and points him out as some sort of culprit. The policeman arrests him and as he does so the patient suddenly realizes that the law officer is none other than his own father.

From these instances one can see how the fear of numbers in this case is manifoldly determined, being mediated not only by the special kind of reasoning characteristics of the unconscious but being also determined by more obvious associative factors. If, like the academic psychologists one wished to adhere to a strictly associative basis very little could have been done with the material at hand.

Henry J. Wegrocki,  
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## ABSTRACTS

### GENERAL

Paul Schilder. 'Psychoanalysis and Conditioned Reflexes.' *Psycho-analytic Review*, 1937, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, pp. 1-17.

This paper is an attempt to come to a psychological understanding of conditioned reflexes and Pavlov's work. According to Pavlov, unconditioned reflexes have to do with fundamental instincts as feeling and defence. Conditioned reflexes can be formed in connection with these basic instincts. They can also sometimes be formed in connection with less vital functions. In the conditioned reflexes a total situation of a typical character has a tendency to reinstate itself when only part of the situation is present. Pavlov's reflexes are really complicated total reactions of the personality. Psycho-analysis deals with identical phenomena with different technique.

In creating his conditioned reflexes there first occurs an irradiation of stimuli, then later a concentration. This can be described psychologically thus—a situation is first perceived in general terms and, as learning progresses, one becomes able to distinguish a specific thing in a general group. The writer therefore questions whether Pavlov's processes are immediate expressions of physiological processes. The change from irradiation to specificity is similar to the change from symbolic thinking to thinking dealing with concrete facts.

Pavlov finds that if the conditioned stimulus is given several times without fulfilment it fails and in its place all other related points become conditioned. This is similar to the situation found in analysis when a related condition, i.e. cover memory, gains the position of the original.

Pavlov speaks of external and internal inhibitions. External ones are damaging influences which weaken the conditioned reflex. Internal inhibitions are more important. They may act in five ways—(1) extinction, (2) delay, (3) trace inhibition, (4) conditioned inhibition, and (5) inhibition by differentiation. Extinction occurs when the stimulus is given several times and not followed by the reward (food). Inhibition by differentiation (5) is closely related. In it the general conditioning is changed to a more specific one; e.g. the original reflex may be a response to sounds. This may be differentiated to a response only to a certain number of sounds.

These phenomena can be explained psychologically. Because the animals live in reality a type of reaction is given up when it does not produce results. Analysis ascribes this to the ego system.

In types (2) and (3) the animal also reacts to the total situation. The writer objects to Pavlov's conception that there is an enormous mosaic in the cerebrum of exciting and inhibiting points.



Type (4) adds a new factor to the conditioning and omits the reward. The result is that the new factor becomes the inhibitor.

If we compare Pavlov's inhibitions to psycho-analytic thinking, it is not a question whether they correspond to repression, but what does the whole thing mean psychologically. It means we are dealing with behaviour problems, habits, etc., and not with reflexes in the physiological sense. Pavlov's dogs lost their conditioning during the flood. It returned with the presence of the experimenter in the room. Later the conditioning would again be lost if a stream of water came into the room and it could be restored by the dogs smelling the experimenter's clothing.

Pavlov found three types of dogs : (1) those who form reflexes easily, (2) those who form inhibitions against reflexes easily, and (3) a type not showing either extreme.

The term reflex is a bad name, for the facts concern a different level of the animals' psyche. It is important that physiological understanding and psychological should agree. Pavlov's data is valuable but his physiology is pseudo-physiology. To accept it one must give up the idea of the personality as a whole and configurations.

Analysts are mistaken in feeling the need of corroboration of their work from Pavlov's field. His animal experimentation, on the other hand, does not need corroboration from the psychological side, but, in invading the field of higher nervous activity, his work cannot be valid when it contradicts acknowledged results in that field.

Clara Thompson.

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Saul Rosenzweig. 'The Experimental Study of Psychoanalytic Concepts.' *Character and Personality*, 1937, Vol. VI, No. 1, pp. 61-71.

On the grounds that psycho-analysis deals essentially with the same human problems as does religion the writer keeps referring to what he calls its religious origin and animadverting against its 'cultist' attitude. He pleads strongly for a rapprochement between it and experimental psychology and enumerates a number of attempts that have already been made in this direction, particularly in the United States.

E. J.

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René Spitz. 'Wiederholung, Rhythmus, Langeweile.' *Imago*, 1937, Bd. XXIII, S. 171-196.

The weakness of the ego of the infant makes it more liable to traumatic experiences than is the older child or the adult. Therefore if anything it does proves to be safe it likes to repeat it over and over again.

Bodily pleasure can also be derived from rhythmic movements such as thumb sucking and masturbation. Such pleasures become involved in the dangers connected with the Œdipus situation, and are repressed at the



same time as the Œdipus complex. Pleasure in rhythm and repetition are revived in adult sexual activities, but are otherwise only acceptable when given artistic form.

A complete subservience to repetition phenomena is found in schizophrenics.

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I. F. Grant Duff.

J. Drever. 'The Vagaries of an Emancipated Psychology.' *British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 243-249.

Psychology, being freed from the domination of philosophy and theology, is exposed now to fresh influences dangerous to its status and progress. Workers in the fields of applied psychology, often lacking philosophical or even strict scientific training, tend to be led astray by the fascination of theories to the neglect of good observation and the logic of science.

It has been among the merits of psycho-analysts to draw attention to the domination of thought by affect; but they themselves remain open to this domination, which is enhanced perhaps by their preoccupation with the affect-determined thinking of their patients. Moreover, in therapeutic practice there is an advantage in belief, irrespective of the truth of what is believed. These are among the explanations suggested for lack of scientific soundness in psycho-analytic theories.

A theory rests upon observations and inference. The observations of the psycho-analyst are not recorded as they are made and are open to the distortions of subsequent recollection. They are made upon people in an abnormal state, and cannot be verified by repetition, since identical situations are not to be reproduced. Too often the so-called facts upon which theories are built are themselves interpretations of the facts, the actual observations not being forthcoming. If guessing, under the guise of interpretation and phantasy, is to be substituted for patient observation, careful analysis and rigorous logical procedure, then there is danger of producing theories differing little from the myths, superstitions and animistic realities, which do not make appeal to logic or recognize the demand for objective proof.

The theories of psycho-analysis may be valued justly when regarded 'as merely descriptive, rather than explanatory or interpretative in a scientific sense—as picturesque myths, many of them ugly enough, but all of them interesting, myths which represent symbolically what appears to take place in the affective and impulsive life of the human being. . . . When such a description professes to be, not merely an exact and literal description, but even a scientific explanation and interpretation, objection may quite rightly be taken to it. "Projection" and "introjection" and "ambivalence" and a host of similar descriptive terms, useful though



they may be, add nothing to our understanding of the phenomena ; they merely give them names.' There is no other reference in the article to specific psycho-analytic theories or concepts.

The vagaries of present-day psychology are not confined to developments in psycho-analytic theory. 'Extreme behaviourist development . . . notably in the shape given it by Pavlov and his followers, illustrates the same kind of vagary, though in a somewhat different way, both with respect to the observation of phenomena, and with respect to the formulation of theories.' Conditions of laboratory study rather than clinical study, and again the fascination of a theory, are held to account for the vagaries.

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#### CHILDREN

Margaret E. Fries. 'Play Technique in the Analysis of Young Children.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1937, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, pp. 233-245.

The paper reports in detail the two and a half months' analysis of a four-year-old child by Anna Freud's procedure. The important point is the evidence that so young a child can recall and reproduce one of his traumatic scenes producing a result similar to the results in adult analyses.

Clara Thompson.

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Emma Berner. 'Eine Einschlafstörung aus Todesangst.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*. 1937, Bd. XI, S. 44-53.

Like the above, an account of the way in which a psycho-analytically orientated teacher, careful not to risk the disturbance on class-work of an analytical relationship, was able to make use of analytical knowledge to help an acutely disturbed child—in this case, one who became terrified of death and dared not go to sleep. The author points out the favourable circumstances—a good measure of mental stability, readiness to come to her for help, a helpful mother—which gave her special opportunities for intervention.

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Nina Searl.

Th. Bergmann. 'Versuch der Behebung einer Erziehungsschwierigkeit.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 1937, Bd. XI, S. 29-43.

The author, called in to assist a neurotic little girl of nearly ten to take an entrance examination apparently far beyond her powers, shews the extent of the help she was able to give the child both directly and indirectly, the latter chiefly in improving the mother's relation to the child and in gaining every possible advantage from the child's strong identification with the mother. The author was careful not to carry her analytical



pædagogy into analysis proper, and does not claim that the good results would remain in unfavourable circumstances.

Nina Searl.

★

Martin Grotjahn. 'Kinderanalyse und Erziehung im Rahmen der psycho-analytisch orientierten Schule.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 1937, Bd. XI, S. 20-28.

A denial that analysis of children can be carried out except when they live in an analytical environment, and an account of some observations made on children reacting to the birth of a baby in the Southard School of the Menninger Clinic.

Nina Searl.

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Marie H. Briehl. 'Die Rolle des Märchens in der Kleinkindererziehung.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 1937, Bd. XI, S. 5-19.

A recognition of the varying effects of the same fairy-tale on different children, chiefly in terms of the stage of the Œdipus situation, and a suggestion for grouping and selection of fairy-tales according to the effect on the super-ego, the Œdipus and genital castration positions, and the pregenital ones.

Nina Searl.

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Hans Zulliger. 'Über eine Lücke in der psychoanalytischen Pädagogik.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytischen Pädagogik*, 1936, Bd. X., S. 337-359.

Since the application of psycho-analytical therapeutics to classwork between teacher and pupils is not possible, the transference situation being unmanageable, the author asks for more work on the application of Freudian group psychology to the problems of this situation, and himself gives some instances.

Nina Searl.

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Alice Landau. 'Angsterlebnisse eines Dreijährigen.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytischen Pädagogik*, 1936, Bd. X, S. 366-378.

An account of reassuring measures taken at home and at school to deal with a three-year-old boy's acute anxieties—refusal to eat and to do anything but paint, aggression to other children, inhibition in handling soap and in holding his penis to urinate, etc. The author is careful not to claim more success than a removal of inhibitions making progress in school life possible as long as the child remained in the kindergarten.

Nina Searl.

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## APPLIED

J. A. Passmore. 'Psycho-Analysis and Æsthetics.' *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*, June, 1936, Vol. XIV, No. 2, pp. 127-144.

This paper seeks to show how much coincidence there is between the fields of interest of psycho-analysis and æsthetics. If it is maintained that æsthetic characters are qualities of mental processes, then this is not difficult. The author, however, does not agree with Freud's characterization of the artist (*Introductory Lectures*, p. 315), which he takes to mean that æsthetics is particularly concerned with the equipment of the artist, as a means of getting from phantasy to reality.

If, on the other hand, there is such a thing as a 'positive realist æsthetics,' the connection is not so clear, and psycho-analysis cannot be said to provide a satisfactory account of æsthetic characters. A case is made out for this view by denying the universality of symbolism in art, and by distinguishing a fundamental true art from its associated phantasy. It is shown that the true artist reveals things as they are and is thus really 'Brother to the Psycho-Analyst.' Examples are given to demonstrate how psycho-analysis can assist the criticism of art by stripping it of its associated phantasy. A resulting picture of life as it really is, without inconsistencies, constitutes true art.

R. A. Macdonald.

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Harold D. Lasswell. 'Certain Prognostic Changes During Trial (Psychoanalytic) Interviews.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1936, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, pp. 241-247.

In an attempt to objectify observations made in initial interviews, certain 'prognostic indicators' are recorded. These are: (1) electrical skin conductivity, (2) pulse frequency, (3) word frequency, and (4) visible movements. Four types of reaction are found:

- (1) When absence of trend is found in all four indicators, this means there is little free energy for the work, and analysis will be either very long or unsuccessful.
- (2) When there is a trend to inactivity in the indicators, this points to a need for dependence on the interviewer, and the problem is to deal with the over dependence.
- (3) When there is a trend to lowered skin resistance associated with diminishing activity, the patient will seek to escape, but will make progress if he can be retained.
- (4) When the trend to increasing skin resistance is associated with increasing activity, the situation is ideal—the affects are mobile and can be used.

These conclusions bear on the connection between unconscious tension



to conscious affect. Rising skin resistance indicates diminishing unconscious tension.

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Clara Thompson.

Wilhelm Nicolini. 'Verbrechen aus Heimweh und ihre psychoanalytische Erklärung.' *Imago*, 1936, Bd. XXII, S. 91.

Crimes arising out of homesickness are usually committed by adolescent girls. One case is fully discussed.

Eva, the daughter of a shoemaker, had nine brothers and sisters between four and twenty-four years of age. At the age of thirteen and a half she was sent away to look after Dr. L.'s little daughter, Lore, aged one year nine months. Dr. L. lived in a town a few hours away from her home village. He also had two sons. During the first few weeks Eva worked satisfactorily and she appeared fairly contented. But when she went home on a visit she did not want to return to work, giving various reasons for her refusal. She only gave way when her mother promised to take her home shortly, but this promise was not kept as Mrs. L. insisted on her fulfilling her one year's contract. Two weeks later little Lore was found with a cord round her neck, tied to the bed post. As the child was unharmed and there were no signs of force, no suspicion arose, and the tying was regarded as having been done by the child herself while playing. About four weeks after this Eva pretended to be ill one morning and lay groaning in bed when her mistress came to bring her a cup of coffee. While talking to her she heard her little daughter crying in the room next door and she found the child with a bluish face in her cot. The doctor noticed a strangulation mark round her neck. Eva first denied the charge, but later confessed to having tried to choke the child. A psychiatric investigation was ordered by the judge on the ground of which the girl was finally acquitted.

Although this case was not investigated on psycho-analytical lines the author found sufficient material in the detailed description by Wilmans to attempt a psycho-analytical interpretation. The central part is the Oedipus situation which was responsible for the overwhelming homesickness. The enforced separation from home, i.e. father, by her mother and her mistress acted as a trauma and produced a regression. This led Eva to take possession of the father in a symbolic way by stealing numerous little articles such as pencils, two pairs of scissors, handkerchiefs, etc., and strengthened her hostile attitude toward Mrs. L. as the mother figure and to little Lore as the substitute for her own little brothers and sisters. The escape from Dr. L.'s house appears as a simple way out of the quandary, but the idea did not occur to Eva because her S.E. would not have allowed a direct gratification of incestuous impulses which she would have achieved by an escape. What she needed and actually performed,



was a substitute action, a compromise between drive and resistance: she took possession of the 'father' and removed the little 'sister' who was the obstacle to her reunion with the father. Eva could not have free volition at the time of the deed and the acquittal is perfectly justified.

This interpretation also explains striking lack of remorse in the girl. The crime as a substitute gratification of a strong libidinal drive and a discharge of her unconscious death wishes must have given her a sensation of satisfaction and relief. The pre-existing sense of guilt which was necessarily connected with these impulses had been reduced and it was only natural that there was no room for remorse. But this lack may have had an additional task, i.e. to increase the expected penalty. This would also meet her desire of punishment.

The paper also deals in general with the application of psycho-analysis to crime.

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H. A. Thorner.

Harold Jeffreys. 'The Problem of Inference.' *Mind*, Vol. XLV, N.S., No. 179.

This paper discusses an interesting connection between inductive logic and psycho-analysis, between the theory of probability as developed by mathematical logic and the early generalizations made by children—these being based on the facts brought to light in Mrs. Melanie Klein's *Psycho-Analysis of Children*.

The theme is that not only science but much human behaviour depends upon inductive reasoning; that, although inductive inference cannot have a solely *logical* basis, it is *rational* to base conduct upon induction; that inductive inferences can be *valid*, when set in a logic of probability instead of a logic of certainty; that they can be valid *and* false; that adults have more relevant data at their disposal for assessing probabilities than children; that childhood phantasies may be found to contain valid inferences from the scanty data available; that a knowledge of the proportion of true to false generalizations in children's phantasies would have an important bearing on the prior probability assignable to a new scientific hypothesis.

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J. O. Wisdom.

Ben Karpman in collaboration with several students at Howard University (coloured). 'Imitation of Life.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1936, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, pp. 149-172.

This paper is a collection of psycho-analytic observations on Fannie Hurst's novel, *Imitation of Life*. The novel deals with the lives of two families—one white and one coloured—each consisting of a widow and her only child, a daughter. The novel presents an intuitive study of two psycho-analytic problems: (1) frigidity and the capacity of woman to



sublimate, and (2) the psychology of biracial relations. This paper chiefly concerns itself with the second problem and is a study of the relationship of the negro mother Delilah and her near white daughter, Peola. In the mother is found the ambivalent attitude of teaching her child from earliest years the duty of humility and inferiority which belongs to the coloured race in America, while at the same time her unconscious attitude teaches the child that she, the child, is superior to the race because she has a light skin. The mother's life work has really been the production of a child superior to herself, but she is unable to make the renunciation necessary for the child's success. The child has only one aim—doubtless fostered originally by the mother's unconscious attitude—to pass for white, and she finally achieves her goal in marriage to a white man. Her hatred of her black blood is tied up with her hatred of her mother whose colour stands between her and freedom. In her relations with her mother she adopts the attitude of superiority characteristic of the white towards the negro. Although this attitude crushes the mother, and the final break of the child from her race (and her mother) is instrumental in hastening Delilah's death ; nevertheless it is also the fulfilment of Delilah's life ambition that one of her own blood should become white.

Clara Thompson.



## BOOK REVIEWS

*Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety.* By Sigmund Freud. (Hogarth Press, London, 1936. Pp. 172. Price 6s.)

The appearance, after a lapse of ten years, of the first English translation of *Hemmung, Symptom u. Angst* affords a tempting opportunity to re-assess the significance of this remarkable book. For there is no question that the book is a remarkable one. It contains some of the most important of Freud's later contributions to psycho-analytical theory; it provides an outstanding illustration of his capacity to revise his own theory whenever he feels that the facts warrant revision; and it is without doubt the most disjointed presentation ever published by one who has so often proved himself a master of orderly exposition.

One of the circumstances contributing to this disorder is not so extenuating now as it seemed at the time. Two years before, one of Freud's favourite pupils had signalized his coming defection from psycho-analysis by publishing a book on the Trauma of Birth, the argument of which—if widely accepted—would have arrested the growth of that science. Interestingly enough, Rank's theory was, in fact, hastily swallowed by a number of analysts whose enthusiasm and sense of prestige had outrun their scientific discretion. [On the publication of *Hemmung* they surreptitiously disgorged the forbidden fruit.] Freud, more cautiously and temperately took the whole problem to avizandum, and produced a book which served the double purpose of refuting Rank's views and advancing a new theory of anxiety. We now know that the first of these aims was scarcely worth the trouble. In earlier times the defection of any important adherent was a serious matter, but by 1926 psycho-analysis had reached the stage when it could weather any defection. Indeed, it is interesting to reflect that had the Jung and Adler schisms occurred about the same time, the Zurich school would not have come to figure quite so prominently in the public eye as it does, and the Adlerian system would, in all probability, have been stillborn.

But even if Rank had never produced the birth-trauma theory it would have been necessary for Freud to write a book on anxiety. His earlier theories of anxiety had never been entirely satisfactory (Jones, in particular, had pointed this out), and they could be maintained only so long as simpler views of mental structure prevailed, e.g. the concept of an 'unconscious system' shut off from the ego by a 'repression' barrier. Having given himself more elbow room by his tripartite division of the psyche (Ego—Super-ego and Id), Freud was faced with the task of readjusting and amplifying his earlier and over simple metapsychology. It is this process of readjustment that Freud presents to us in a characteristic way. He thinks aloud. The orderliness of this thinking depends very much on the



nature of the problem and the degree to which he has already predigested the material. In most cases it is a method he has used with conspicuous success. In the case of *Hemmung* the issues were peculiarly involved, touching not only on the central problem of anxiety, but on ego structure, symptom formation, the nature of affects, and so forth. Almost inevitably the thinking-aloud method added to rather than reduced this complication. Faced with a number of weak places in the line of his theory, he had to keep moving back and forward, reinforcing at some points, reconstructing at others, and at others again staking a claim for future research. In short, the material Freud crammed into one short book would have justified a series of separate volumes. And it is a thousand pities he did not write them. For except in two particulars, viz. the early structure of the ego and the early content of the unconscious, the progress of analysis since 1926 has been extremely slow. Most of the hints and suggestions thrown out in this book have fallen on stony ground, no doubt waiting for someone of Freud's own calibre to develop them. So far that portent has not appeared in the psycho-analytical sky.

Despite the complex nature of the material, the book stands or falls on its theory of anxiety. And there can be no doubt that, in most essential respects, his revised theory has stood the test of time. The relations of anxiety to instinct, to ego-structure, to mental defence mechanisms and ultimately to symptom formation are soundly described. No better theory has been put forward in the intervening ten years, nor is it likely that one will appear in the next twenty. The dangers of excessive excitation, the existence of defence barriers, the traumatic situation arising when these barriers are broken down, the danger situation existing when trauma is threatened, the exploitation of doses of anxiety as a danger-signal system, and the displacement of signalling from the danger situation to the condition threatening danger, all this is still extremely plausible. On the other hand, the assessment of external and endopsychic factors in real and neurotic anxiety respectively, the correlation of different types of anxiety with different phases of development, and in particular the relation of phobia formation to super-ego development do not read with the same conviction as formerly. As I have indicated, these criticisms do not invalidate the theory but they do make one wonder why one part of the theory should have proved less firmly founded than the rest.

One reason for this patchiness is not difficult to detect. Reading the book afresh in translated form one cannot but be impressed with the old-fashioned nature of the clinical material from which Freud's thread of argument is drawn. It has always been his habit to extract the last ounce from his clinical material, and it is part of his genius to make an unusually big percentage of accurate generalizations from a single case or even from one aspect of a case. In its time the analysis of Little Hans



was a remarkable achievement and the story of the analysis constitutes one of the most valued records in psycho-analytical archives. Our concepts of phobia-formation, of the positive Oedipus complex, of ambivalence, castration anxiety, and repression, to mention but a few, were greatly reinforced and amplified as the result of this analysis. But it was scarcely exhaustive enough to provide the basis for far-reaching conclusions as to the nature of anxiety. In any case the pregenital stages still remained unexplored territory. What we knew of them was derived mostly from obsessional cases and some studies of melancholia. And that knowledge was somewhat confusing. Obsessional cases experienced unconscious conflict over pregenital interests, yet these neuroses were supposed to date after the appearance of infantile hysteria. Apparent contradictions of this sort might well have been avoided by a provisional confession of ignorance. Unfortunately, this course was not followed, and, for some time before *Hemmung* was published, views on pregenital stages, on the ætiology of hysteria and obsessional neurosis, and on symptom structure had come to be accepted without question. There is ample evidence in *Hemmung* that these old views were taken over without any modification. Discussing the primary phobias of infants Freud adopts an old-fashioned classification and jumps from these early stages to the symptomatic phobias of a five-year-old. Now the simplest behaviouristic observation of infants shows that by the time they can talk they exhibit a considerable number of phobias. During the second, third and fourth years these phobias go through elaborate development. Sometimes they disappear spontaneously. Sometimes they merge in fresh formations. Sometimes they become fixed and potentially symptomatic. Admittedly, observations of children were then very rudimentary [despite a great increase in the number of analytic observations of small children, child study is still one of the most backward branches of science]; they were not improved by the analyst's habit of selective examination, looking only for facts that would confirm conclusions already reached in the adult field. In short it may be said that Freud's analysis of anxiety situations was handicapped by lack of sufficient clinical observation of children and by bias in favour of those analytical conclusions derived from study of adults.

The second source of error is even more interesting. It was actually the neglect to employ systematically enough a form of approach which he himself had just won for psycho-analysis. The importance of repression and of the relation between repressed and unconscious had led to a formulation of mental structure which, as I have suggested earlier, was proving inelastic. Freud in this very book had swept the old system almost completely away. He described repression as one of a series of defence functions, gave a definite place to reaction-formation, regression, undoing,



and sought to associate these mechanisms with characteristic clinical pictures. [*A propos* of the mechanism of undoing, devotees to restitution-psychology, of whom there are not a few in this country, should note that Freud himself is the Father of Restitution-psychology. He places it along with other expiatory and ritualistic phenomena in the department of obsessional religiosity.] It is the more remarkable that in his analysis of anxiety formations Freud should have neglected the part played by projection and introjection. All the more remarkable since he was the first to describe and explain these very mechanisms. And although nowadays the elaborate phantasy content of projection and introjection systems has been more fully recorded we have not added to Freud's original description of their origin and function. It is now clear that for theoretical purposes phobia formations cannot be analysed solely in terms of reaction to castration anxiety. The balance of real and unreal anxiety must from the very first months of life be influenced by processes of introjection and projection. This does not mean that the clinical reading of a five-year-old phobia in terms of castration anxiety is inaccurate. Given reasonably efficient diagnosis and the exclusion of early psychotic tendencies it is in all probability extremely accurate. But one should not confuse the clinical assessment of a symptom with the analysis of its structure and development.

The third difficulty is of the same order as the second. Obviously if the super-ego dated from the passing of the Oedipus complex, it would be easy to describe a rapid transition from external to purely endopsychic sources of anxiety. But the time was already ripe to modify this view. So-called pre-Oedipus stages had always been treated by psycho-analysts with a lack of imagination almost as great as that exhibited by academic psychologists in their handling of adults. The work of Mrs. Klein on the content of the unconscious in small children showed that more primitive super-ego systems did exist. After all, if the passing of the genital Oedipus phase produced a strong introjection pattern there was no reason to suppose that the passing of earlier phases of libido did not produce characteristic introjection patterns in which the object, as conceived at each phase, would be set up in the Ego. But this would mean that endopsychic fear of the Super-ego would exist from early phases of development and would contribute a degree of unreality to more realistic estimations of external objects. Behaviouristic evidence was much in favour of this view, for despite a tendency to regard obsessional patterns as of comparatively late development, there are almost as many varieties of obsessional action in the second year of life as there are varieties of phobia in the first.

I have gone into these blemishes in some detail because the true estimate of a book such as this is the effect it produces on research. Within



the ten years following its publication the progress of analysis has not only been slow but uneven. Sharp divergences of opinion have appeared, which reflect accurately the mixture of old and new views present in the book. This can easily be tested by reading the journals of the period. Contributions from the more orthodox branches on the Continent have reached a high peak of monotony. In this country an early break away from tradition gave rise to a few fruitful years of research, but now threatens to defeat its own aims. Recent work shews some of the same rigidity of outlook which prevented advance along the more orthodox lines. Introjection and projection mechanisms are now treated with some of that fetichistic reverence formerly reserved for repression. Repression has quite unjustifiably lost caste and with this for a time, anyhow, went some depreciation of libidinal factors in neurogenesis. Fortunately, there is a pendulum swing in all such movements and whereas in Continental circles the most recent movement is in the direction of rediscovering the early super-ego, in this country in recent years the tendency has been to rediscover the early libido. It is indeed remarkable how much energy is spent in all psycho-analytical groups in rediscovery as distinct from restatement.

Some of these differences are, no doubt, due to inadequate study of the literature on both sides, but in any case they could have been reduced had more attention been paid to what is, after all, the main concern of this book, viz. the analysis of affect. It is an interesting fact that as far as the therapeutic results of analysis are recorded or can be studied directly, there is little to distinguish the results obtained by analysts holding different theoretical views. It is true that analysts now attempt more difficult cases than formerly, but this is due less to increased efficiency of analytical ideas than to decrease of timidity in handling pre-psychotic types. The moral is, of course, that therapeutic results are due less to length of analysis or level of interpretation than to the speed and success with which the patient's affective states (actual or potential) are ventilated and reduced. Granted that the importance of affect has been stressed from the very earliest 'cathartic' days, it is nevertheless a fact that analysis of affect has not kept pace with analysis of ego-structure, of unconscious content, or of defence-mechanisms. By comparison it has been woefully neglected. For this reason alone, *Hemmung* will always be one of the most important books of analytical reference. It contains not only a penetrating analysis of anxiety, but enters into the relation of anxiety to pain and grief. Freud's approach to this problem is one which might well have been applied to the problems of depression, jealousy, envy, to say nothing of more positive affects of the elation group. To a varying extent all scientists are suggestible creatures. Analysts are no exception to this rule. They incline to be seduced by the fashions of the moment. Long



ago the catchwords were 'anxiety' and 'libido'—later they changed to 'guilt' and 'sadism', and nowadays the choice lies between 'guilt' and 'bad objects', or 'restitution' and 'good objects'. But anxiety and guilt are not simply affective states: they are the father and mother of a large progeny of affects. That is to say: although anxiety and guilt can be experienced in a diluted form as current affects their greatest contribution to mental activity lies in instigating secondary affects which in their turn become attached to ideational systems. Guilt, as Freud said, is no doubt a special modification of anxiety, but its origins are so remote that it deserves the label of a primary affect. Even so, anxiety and guilt are not the only primary affects. To analyse depression solely in terms of guilt or of guilt-release is to ignore the multiplicity of affective sources existing from birth, to say nothing of the affect-fusions that occur later. We cannot expect to understand the use made of different mechanisms at different stages of development unless we know just what are the combinations or contrasts of affect with which the child's mind has to deal. Reviewing this book in some detail ten years ago<sup>1</sup> I pointed out that the mechanisms of introjection had to be regarded not only as a response to the anxiety-aspect of psychic loss of object occurring in infancy, but as a mechanism employed constantly to mitigate the reality of pain and grief. I went on to indicate, however, that behind all problems of the relation of mechanism to affect lay one major issue: what happens to excitations in the Id-system? Is it the case, as Freud has suggested, that the primary cathexis of unconscious constellations can become spontaneously reduced? At that time I wrote—'the answer to this one question will keep psycho-analysts busy for some considerable time to come'. The expectation was over sanguine. Nothing has been added to the tentative formulations set down by Freud. Yet until this problem is solved a number of controversial issues must remain unsettled—questions of ætiology, of analytical as distinct from clinical diagnosis, of prognosis—to say nothing of the theory of therapeutic results. I hesitate now to prophesy about the researches of the next ten years, but I have no hesitation in saying that this issue of Id-excitation has first claim on our attention.

Mrs. Strachey is to be congratulated on her translation. She has conveyed the meaning of the more difficult passages—of which there are many—with scrupulous fidelity. Whenever the exigencies of translation permit, she has been at pains to capture and render the expository style so characteristic of Freud's work.

Edward Glover.

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<sup>1</sup> Descriptive notice, *Hemmung, Symptom u. Angst*, *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, VI, 121, 1926.



A translation of this book by Henry Alden Bunker has also been published by the Psychoanalytic Quarterly Press and W. W. Norton & Co., New York. Price \$2.—EDITOR.

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*The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence.* By Anna Freud. (International Psycho-Analytical Library. Hogarth Press, London, 1937. Pp. 196. Price 9s.)

I

The content of this book will be presently considered by other writers, but I gladly avail myself of the opportunity to record briefly my general impressions of it. Let me mention three in particular.

First of all its astonishing and refreshing lucidity. Not merely that each sentence is quite free from ambiguity, but Anna Freud shares in common with her father the outstanding faculty of being able to light up the various themes she touches upon so as to make things really clear. Perhaps the most striking example of this is the second chapter where with a sure touch she classifies the several forms of analytic technique in relation to their suitability for investigating the ego. This forms an admirable introduction to the discussion which follows of the different types of defence. This lucidity gives the whole work its peculiar quality of 'illumination' and makes it particularly valuable as a textbook.

Another striking feature of the book is its moderation. There are many places where the author could have carried her arguments and analyses further than she has, but she has preferred not to pass beyond the sphere of what she considers definitely ascertainable knowledge. This, too, makes the work a reliable guide for students even if the experienced analyst will find many points at which Anna Freud breaks off her voyage of discovery into the depths where he could have wished for further enlightenment: thus, for instance, the important themes of projection and introjection are only very lightly touched upon. A more ambitious author would doubtless have proceeded lightheartedly to embark on classifications of the ten varieties of defence (p. 47) and would have become entangled in all manner of positive assertions regarding the chronological order of their appearance (pp. 56-57) and their inter-relationships. Anna Freud has clearly and wisely perceived the limitations affecting the present state of our knowledge and shown the factors and circumstances which must first be clarified before any such attempts can hope to achieve success. On the other hand, the present reviewer must admit that he finds certain statements which he would himself perhaps have worded more cautiously and of whose validity he is not so deeply convinced as Anna Freud appears to be. Thus when speaking of the three chief motives for defence in general—anxiety of the super-ego, the outside world and the strength of the instincts—she writes with reference to the second: 'the infantile ego fears



the instincts *because* it fears the outside world' (p. 61, reviewer's italics). I consider this a very questionable assumption and it is quite possible that the truth will ultimately be found to lie rather in the opposite direction. It is true that in the following section she goes on to speak of an inexplicable fear of the instincts *as such*, but it would have been interesting to find some indication of the possible connections between the two, i.e. between the second and third of the motives referred to above. Moreover, Anna Freud seems more inclined to regard the three defence-mechanisms of regression, reversal and turning against the self as innate, or at any rate as extremely primitive, than is warranted in my opinion by the available evidence (p. 56). And is it really so certain that all other forms of defence can be sharply differentiated from repression in that fresh accessions of instinctual energy are necessary before they can be brought into operation again? The concept of anti-cathexis in its nature certainly does not bear the stamp of permanence as we should have to infer if this were so. Lastly in declaring that the term 'depth-psychology' certainly does not still cover the whole field of psycho-analytical research I should at least have omitted the word 'certainly'. Naturally we are here concerned with a question of definition. Nevertheless our interest continues to attach itself primarily to the unconscious, i.e. deeper aspects of mental life—whether id, ego or super-ego. It makes not the slightest difference to the truth of this that we now concentrate more on the id than before.

A third salient characteristic of the book is the pleasing style in which it is written. It is delightful to meet with such a mastery of language where each sentence is clear and of a sure simplicity. One hardly knows whether to admire the author's style more in the exposition of difficult theoretical viewpoints or in the fascinating description of clinical material.

This book will indisputably rank among the classic works of psycho-analytical literature and prove a valuable addition to our short list of really sound textbooks.

E. J.

## II

The historical development of psycho-analysis determined that it should begin by dealing with the neuroses as an irruption of forces which were foreign to the ego and in contradistinction to the general integrity of the personality. For this reason its chief concern was with what is foreign to the ego—with the instincts which are warded off by the ego and yet reappear continually. It was only later that the interest in the instincts was supplemented by questions as to why and how the ego rejected these instincts. This task became more urgent as certain forms of neurosis appeared with ever greater frequency. In these types of neurosis it was not a question of this or that symptom irrupting into an otherwise integrated personality, but rather of the whole ego seeming to



be involved in the illness. Ego-psychology also gained in importance when psycho-analysis was expanded from being a psycho-pathology into being a psychology. As far as their unconscious instincts are concerned human beings appear to be more or less uniform. Even here there are of course, far-reaching constitutional differences as well as differences of instinctual structure arising from experiences, to which the attention of psycho-analysis has always been directed. On the whole, however, the more our investigations descend into the depths of the id and so approach the 'biological' in human beings, the more alike human beings are to one another. The differences between human beings and between groups of human beings are above all differences in character, in attitude, in modes of reaction and in the multiplicity of experience: in short they are differences in the ego and the chief task of descriptive psychology has been to delineate these things. It was only rather late in its history that psycho-analysis occupied itself with them. Now that it does concern itself with them it does so in a different way from other schools of psychology. It thinks *genetically* in this domain as in others, and explains upon dynamic and economic lines the origin and formation of its subject-matter as the effect of certain determining forces. These determining forces are, however, the instinctual energies of the individual and the influence of the environment which causes those energies to assume particular forms and orientations. Thus psycho-analytical ego-psychology, even when it investigates the so-called superficial layers, remains 'depth psychology', because it seeks to understand the way in which the surface and its characteristics have become differentiated from the 'depths'.

The greater part of present day psycho-analytical literature concerns itself with this ego-psychology, and the greater part of this again deals with the characteristics of the most primitive levels of the ego, as they reveal themselves in the first years of life and (regressively) in the psychoses. The views of the various authors and indeed the whole manner of thinking in which they approach their subject are widely divergent.

Anna Freud's new book is well calculated to bring order and clarity into the prevailing confusion. It does not deal in the first instance with these primitive ego phases, but chiefly with the defensive functions of the ego: that is, with those functions which above all others thrust themselves on the attention of the analyst as an immediate object of investigation with both normal and neurotic analysands. A thorough empirical study of these functions is a necessary preliminary for the understanding of the problem of how an endo-psychic representative of the external world comes into being at all, and also for grasping the characteristics of primitive perception and motility. In the first section of the book Anna Freud advances a *theory* of the defence-mechanisms—an empirically orientated theory. In the following sections she gives us



practical illustrations of this theory. The second section discusses the first measures taken by the ego to avoid 'pain'—the 'preliminary stages of defence'. The third section describes two new—that is, new as far as evaluation goes—types of defence; while the final section describes the defence-mechanisms peculiar to puberty.

It is only 'derivatives' of the id which can be observed—that is the feelings of tension in the ego which reveal an instinctual excitation. The super-ego can only be clearly distinguished when it is critical of the ego. The ego is, however, 'the proper field for our observation', and 'the medium through which we try to get a picture of the two other institutions'. The ego gives comparatively accurate information concerning the processes in the id, when it acts as a mediator: that is, when it provides the instinct with an outlet to action, doing nothing more perhaps than enforcing a delay in satisfaction. The impulses of the id are altered in the course of this 'passage through the ego' by being subjected to the secondary process; but these alterations become far more important when the defensive activity of the ego is set in motion. Then the picture observed by the analyst has to be split up into its id and ego (and perhaps super-ego) components. At such times the defensive actions of the ego are comparatively noiseless and invisible, and the most important insight regarding defence can only be obtained when it fails—for instance, in the case of reaction-formations, when they are in process of disintegration.

As long as only the id was being investigated, the defences of the ego appeared merely as interferences which had to be disposed of as quickly as possible. They were dealt with first of all by hypnosis and then by free association. Since 'analysing' means confronting the ego with its instinctual processes, short circuiting methods which dispose of the 'interfering' ego may provide the analyst with knowledge of the id, but will alter nothing in the dynamics of the conflict. Free association, however, does not really dispose of the dynamically decisive defences, and 'a complete docility in the patient' with regard to the fundamental rule is therefore 'in practice impossible'. The picture actually given by free association is an alternation between derivatives of the id and the defensive actions of the ego. The analyst has to guess the actions of the ego just as much as the actions of the id (indeed in principle he must guess them first) and include them in his interpretation. While, however, the impulses of the id strive towards consciousness and are allies of the analyst, 'the unconscious elements in the ego have no inclination to become conscious and derive no advantage from so doing'. The activities of the unconscious parts of the ego can only be discovered against their will, and it is not until the conscious ego has grasped them that it is gradually able to put them out of action. 'We see then that what concerns us is not simply the enforcement of the fundamental rule of analysis for its



own sake, but the conflict to which this gives rise.' In the same way the guessing of the dream-wish is not the only task of dream-interpretation ; the action of the censorship must also be reconstructed, from its effects on the dream-thoughts. The analysis of symbols, and of parapraxes too, may open up astonishing discoveries with regard to its id, but it cannot be used to make dynamic alterations in the defensive attitude of the ego.

Much more important is the analysis of the transference. The transference always contains an id-component and an ego-component which must be carefully distinguished from each other. Thus, if purely libidinal impulses are transferred, so that the patient directs feelings which originally applied to another object on to the analyst, these are irruptions of the id and promote mainly the understanding of the id. (It is, of course, true that, in so far as such feelings are torn from their connections, felt towards a wrong object and misunderstood as regards their meaning, they have also an ego-component which may turn them into a resistance, and which must receive attention from the analyst.) But patients transfer not only their instincts but also their specific methods of defence : firstly, in that they do not allow their id-impulses to appear as such, but ' in all those forms of distortion which took shape while they were still in infancy ' ; or secondly, in that they do not allow some particular libidinal impulse to emerge at all, but only the defence against it. In such cases it is not the business of the analyst ' to omit all the intermediate stages in the transformation which the instinct has undergone and endeavour at all costs to arrive directly at the primitive instinctual impulse against which the ego has set up its defence '. If, instead of this, the attention of the patient is turned first of all to his methods of defence, then the analyst enters into the dynamic struggle between the patient's mental forces at the point at which it is being carried on. And, by discovering why a patient's defences take one particular form and not another, ' we acquire information which completes and fills in the gaps in the history of his ego-development or, to put it another way, the history of the transformations through which his instincts have passed '.

This method seems to the reviewer to be not only, as Anna Freud says, ' more fruitful ', but the only analytically correct one. The difficulty here is, of course, that the patient ' does not feel this kind of transference-reaction to be a foreign body '. At such times <sup>2</sup> we have to set the self-observing conscious part of the ego in contrast with the part which experiences, we have to ' isolate ' the behaviour that is in question from the rest of the ego, in order to be able to proceed with the analysis.

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<sup>2</sup> Sterba has discussed the interpretation of transference resistance at length : ' Zur Dynamik der Bewältigung des Übertragungswiderstandes.' *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XV, 1929.



Finally, Anna Freud designates 'acting out' as 'a third form of transference', though it is presumably at bottom a particular form of the two other kinds of transference. 'Acting' has two advantages. It has an advantage in that it often gives an opportunity for a direct understanding of the content of the id and further 'in that the patient's psychic structure is thus automatically revealed in its natural proportions. Whenever we succeed in interpreting this "acting", we can divide the transference activities into their component parts and so discover the actual quantity of energy supplied at that particular moment by the different institutions'. At the same time it has great disadvantages. Anna Freud does not mention that when 'acting' takes place it is very difficult to 'isolate' the action from the rest of the ego. The rational part of the personality cannot be confronted with it and so the energy is lost instead of being employed for analysis. She rather puts the emphasis on another disadvantage—namely that in 'acting' the ego operates wholly in the service of the id and so becomes analytically unapproachable. She says: 'the bringing of the unconscious into consciousness and the exercise of therapeutic influence upon the relations between id, ego and super-ego clearly depend upon the analytic situation, which is artificially produced and still resembles hypnosis in that the activity of the ego-institutions is curtailed', and this state of affairs ceases when 'acting' occurs.

Analysis of the ego, which for practical purposes is analysis of the resistances, in no way interferes with analysis of the id, but is on the contrary indispensable to any dynamic alteration in the condition of the patient. If either id-analysis or ego-analysis is pursued one-sidedly, 'the result will inevitably be a distorted or at least an incomplete picture of the psychic personality'. Anyone who interprets symbols alone 'would naturally be inclined to neglect or at all events to attach less importance to' the unknown ego components. The reviewer would go further and would say there has been no interpretation at all in the proper sense of the word, for if the id-demands are put into words at the wrong time, however rightly their content may have been perceived, it is impossible for the patient to recognize them in himself. An analysis, on the other hand, that deals only with the ego and takes no notice of the content of the id and merely relies upon its spontaneous emergence, would similarly relinquish all 'depth and completeness' in the id-analysis. (Not only must the resistances be put into words but also the impulse to be warded-off, for they are often connected with each other, and if this is done at the right moment it is a good way of overcoming resistances.)

It is necessary, then, to analyse the ego and its defences as well as the id. Anna Freud writes that the analyst 'directs his attention equally and objectively to the unconscious elements in all three institutions. To put it in another way, when he sets about the work of enlightenment



he takes his stand at a point equidistant from the id, the ego and the super-ego'. These words are presumably to be understood in this sense: the ego-aspect of every phenomenon must necessarily be more superficial and therefore more easily observed by the patient, and so must form the way of approach to the id-aspect; the analyst only stands at a point equidistant from all three institutions in the sense that he sees all three aspects of psychic phenomena, and is neutral in regard to any conflicts between them. But his activity must inevitably 'begin with the ego', so that from this point of view one could say that he stands nearer to the ego than to the id. But the three institutions on their side behave differently with regard to the analyst. To the id, which wishes to become conscious, the analyst is a helper, to the resisting ego he is an enemy. Thus the ego stands in three relationships to the analyst: in so far as it can reason and observe itself it is an ally, in so far as it is the old institution which sets up the defences in the first instance it is an adversary, and finally it is the object of analysis. In so far as the ego is a defensive institution, the analyst necessarily feels it as resistance. 'We cannot say that every resistance is the result of a defensive measure on the part of the ego' (because there are also resistances based upon epinotic gain, as well as id and super-ego resistances), 'but every such defence against the id, if set up during analysis, can be detected only in the form of resistance.'

The ego wards off not only the 'instincts', that is their psychical representatives, but also the affects which are always connected with them, and in both cases the same defensive technique is used. Reich, in his book *Charakteranalyse*, lays special stress on certain peculiarities of body and mind which, he maintains, are to be understood as attitudes of defence which have become 'stereotyped' and operate in a chronic manner. These 'permanent' phenomena of defence form a special domain in the study of defence-mechanisms. Their analysis is particularly difficult (a difficulty due to 'isolation') and Anna Freud is of opinion that 'we are justified in placing them in the foreground only when we can detect no trace at all of a present conflict between ego, instinct and affect.' At the same time, it is certainly often important to make use of a present conflict in order to mobilize 'permanent' defensive attitudes and to shew them up as stereotyped precipitates of similar struggles; otherwise, one may leave important instinctual components of the conflict untouched.

The acknowledged fact that symptoms are compromises shews that they also provide material for the study of defence-mechanisms. We know that 'there is a regular connection between particular neurosis and special modes of defence'. Thus, hysteria is connected with repression, obsessional neurosis with isolation and undoing. One can therefore arrive at conclusions as to the character of the symptoms from the form



of the defence-mechanisms used. (Such expressions as 'hysterical' or 'obsessional character' arise out of this fact.)

The particular form of defence used in dealing with an affect in analysis is not always the actual 'transference' of a special situation belonging to the past; it is often only the typical manner in which certain disagreeable feelings are approached. (The relation of 'character-resistances', as such behaviour is sometimes rather incorrectly called, to transference-resistances is yet to be studied. Character resistances imply that the patient reacts in analysis in the same way as he does outside it, but they must also originate from certain historical experiences.)

The correct technique is to proceed from the analysis of the defence against affect to a demonstration of the transference-resistance. Only then is the time ripe for the analysis of the anxiety which brought about the defence and its previous history. Anna Freud gives a particular value to this analysis of the defences against affect in the technique of child-analysis. Seeing that 'the conflict over the observance of the fundamental rule' is absent in child-analysis, it gives an alternative method by which the dynamics of defence may be recognized—that is, if one is inclined to avoid Melanie Klein's play-technique from fear of a too one-sided use of the interpretation of symbols. Anna Freud illustrates this by examples: thus, a boy conceals his castration-anxiety behind war-like behaviour and a girl deals with her penis-envy by playing at magical omnipotence.

What is it, then, that decides which forms of defence-mechanism will be used by the ego? and how can the preference for special defence techniques by particular egos be explained? The various uses of particular mechanisms can best be observed in those cases in which different techniques of defence are used successively. A girl who was trying to deal with her envy and jealousy of her mother and brother began by displacing her hatred of her mother on to another person; 'her mother continued to be a love-object, but, from that time on, there was always in the girl's life a second important person of the female sex, whom she hated violently'. Next, she turned her hatred against herself. And, finally, she began to project, and felt herself slighted and persecuted. In this way, though she could not be counted as really ill, she yet put limitations upon her ego, though without being successful in her attempt to deal with her anxiety and guilt. She was able, it is true, to maintain the fiction of loving her mother, but every time she had occasion for envy she had once again to set all the above mechanisms in action. A hysterical girl would, instead of this, have repressed her hate and would perhaps have canalized the impulses in a conversion symptom and given them a somatic discharge, or her ego would have evaded all occasions for envy by phobic avoidances; an obsessional, perhaps, would have



surrounded her mother and other people with reactive care and would have protected the loved objects from her own aggression by obsessional symptoms and an exaggerated morality. In this way hysterical or obsessional patients lose control over a part of their emotional life and seem to be in a more pathological condition than patients suffering from a character neurosis, but their egos are more at peace. Often a really neurotic method of defence is combined with other forms, as when a patient with an unconscious desire to bite off the penis first developed a hysterical disturbance in eating which was followed by her developing a peculiar contentedness and unassumingness. Anna Freud holds that repression occupies a unique position among the various methods of defence. It is 'capable of mastering powerful instinctual impulses, in face of which the other defensive measures are quite ineffective'. The continual anti-cathexis which it maintains obviates constant and costly renewals of defence, but it is precisely this continual blocking of a special part of the energy by anti-cathexis which makes repression particularly dangerous. Its results, incidentally, for this reason operate outside the domain of the ego, while other methods lead to 'transformations, distortions and deformities of the ego'.

The problem of the choice of defence is, however, not solved by this. Anna Freud discusses other possibilities as follows: 'Perhaps repression is pre-eminently of value in combating sexual wishes, while other methods can more readily be employed against instinctual forces of a different kind'. (This is not supported by the experience that other methods of defence are used against sexual and above all against pregenital instincts. 'Or it may be that these other methods have only to complete what repression has left undone or to deal with such prohibited ideas as return to consciousness when repression fails.' (This is contradicted by the experience that other methods of defence are used before repression.) 'Or possibly each defence-mechanism is first evolved . . . in association with a particular phase of infantile development.' (This seems far more probable.) It is impossible to use repression before there has been a final separation of ego and id. In the same way one might hold that 'projection and introjection were methods which depended on the differentiation of the ego from the outside world'. (I should like to add, however, that this would happen before the separation was complete; projection and introjection might therefore correspond to a stage when this differentiation was beginning.) The defensive mechanisms which lead to sublimation are based on the super-ego and can therefore not be developed before it is in existence. Finally, there are the processes of defence which shew the least participation on the part of the ego, such as 'regression, reversal, or turning round upon the self'. These may be 'as old as the instincts themselves, or at least as old as the conflict between



instinctual impulses and any hindrance which they may encounter on their way to gratification'. This seems particularly true of regression where the activity of the ego seems to be minimal. (In unhappy circumstances one turns back in thought to times which were less unhappy.) Clinical experience, however, does not quite agree with this chronology. Symptoms due to repression appear very early. Masochism, which depends on turning round upon the self, appears late. The problems of 'chronology' are not yet solved and Anna Freud prefers to leave them in order to study more fully the details of the situations of defence.

Why does the ego defend itself at all? Because the instinct is regarded as a danger. The purpose of defence is thus to avoid the 'pain' which is thought to be connected with instinctual happenings. But how does this belief arise? In the neuroses of adults, defence appears mostly in obedience to the super-ego, which means that the danger to be avoided is the danger of a sense of guilt. The recognition of this leads people to look upon the super-ego as something very pathogenic and to wish to 'destroy' it. (The conclusion is often drawn from this belief that, in order to avoid a pathogenic super-ego, children should be brought up with all leniency. This is false, whatever may be the rôle played by the super-ego in the ætiology of the neuroses; for the severity of the super-ego does not depend only upon strictness of upbringing.) But the causation of defence by the super-ego is only the successor of other causations, as is shewn by the neuroses of children; the struggle between the ego and the super-ego only mirrors a struggle between the ego and the outer world before the super-ego had come into existence. Children ward off their impulses 'in order not to transgress their parents' prohibitions'. What is decisive, then, for a pathogenic defensive development is the anxiety of the ego, quite irrespective of what causes the fear. Is it possible therefore to attempt to avoid a neurosis by giving the impulses free outlet? Anna Freud is very sceptical about such a possibility. This is not because she regards it as impossible under the social conditions of present-day life to give children a greater liberty of instinctual life, but because she believes that behind this 'objective anxiety' she can demonstrate a third and yet older 'danger'—a danger which the ego believes to be bound up with any instinctual activity. 'The human ego by its very nature is never a promising soil for the unhampered gratification of instinct.' It comes into being in order to meet the demands of reality or, as the nature of the external world makes the 'unhampered gratification of instinct' impossible, in order to arrange for at least a *relatively* unhampered gratification in view of the circumstances. It is for this purpose that it has developed the reality principle, the secondary process, etc. Anna Freud thinks that this implies an eternal distrust of the instincts, for fear that their irruption in too great a quantity would again



destroy the organization of the ego. The reviewer thinks that she underestimates the intention of the ego, organized though it is, nevertheless to make instinctual gratifications possible. It is a different matter, of course, *before* the development of the apparatus which makes satisfaction possible; for where there is as yet insufficient capacity for discharge, the psyche is in danger of being overwhelmed by too great quantities or excitation. It is precisely in order to avoid such 'traumatic situations' that the ego develops its function judgement and its capacity to give the danger signal (that is to avoid a 'traumatic situation' by anticipating it in small doses). It is owing to this origin that every anxiety is partly 'anxiety of the traumatic situation', in other words anxiety of being overwhelmed by over-great quantities of instinctual excitation. The reviewer would assign a greater importance to *objective* danger. He holds that frequently, when anxiety regarding the quantity of instinctual excitations seems to appear in later life, this is, in fact, due to the prevention of complete satisfaction by external events.<sup>3</sup>

Side by side with the above reasons there are yet other motives for defence against instincts. After the development of the secondary process, the ego can no longer tolerate contradictions within itself. It develops defences against instincts which are not in agreement with other instincts. Alexander has maintained that neuroses may be caused by 'instinctual conflicts'—such as between homosexuality and heterosexuality, or activity and passivity—as distinguished from structural conflicts between the ego and the id. The reviewer would, however, point out that even here some intervention on the part of the ego is always responsible for the fact that the difference between the aims of the two instincts causes a conflict. The same position appears in all of Alexander's examples. In every case, one of the instinctual impulses concerned in the conflict stood nearer to the ego than the other—was, in fact, relatively a defence and not an instinct; so that fundamentally, in spite of appearances, there *was* a structural conflict.

Defence against affect has generally the same motives as defence against instinct. Affects are warded off when they are attached to instincts that are warded off. Besides this the ego *always* tries to protect itself against unpleasurable affects. (This is important in the warding off of anxiety; these phenomena are only significant because of the possibility that, owing to a damming-up of libido, the ego may fail to give a 'danger signal'.) On the other hand 'it may resist a prohibition somewhat longer in the case of positive affects, simply because they are pleasurable, or may sometimes be persuaded to

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Fenichel: 'Der Begriff "Trauma" in der heutigen psychoanalytischen Neurosenlehre', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XXIII, 1937.



tolerate them for a short time when they make a sudden irruption into consciousness'.

The various forms of anxiety may be studied in analytic practice. When a defence is removed which has been built up under pressure from the super-ego, a sense of guilt will be liberated. When the defence was imposed by the external world, anxiety will appear. When the defence was against painful affects, they will emerge if it is removed. Finally, if the defence was raised because of anxiety regarding the quantity of instinct, the suppressed derivatives of the id will invade the territory of the ego without hindrance. (But why should this be unpleasurable if there is no anxiety and where there is an adequately developed apparatus for satisfaction?)

Cases where the conflict is caused by the super-ego are favourable from the therapeutic point of view because the super-ego is modified when the identifications and the aggressions are analysed. Cases of objective anxiety may also be regarded hopefully owing to the circumstance that the anxiety belongs to the past, and for the most part to a past which was misunderstood because of an animistic way of thinking. This anxiety has only been maintained unaltered because of the defence and when the latter is dealt with the motive for maintaining the anxiety has disappeared. (In this connection the reviewer would attach considerable importance to the fact that, by the raising of the defence, the repressed portions of the instincts take their place in the personality as a whole. In this way their character is changed and they become capable of gratification; the occurrence of actual gratifications then removes the damming-up of libido.) If a tolerance of unpleasant affects is to be arrived at, pedagogy must also play a part: 'the child must learn to tolerate larger and larger quantities of "pain" without immediately having recourse to his defence-mechanisms'. (This is made essentially easier by the increased possibility of satisfaction in other directions.) 'The only pathological states which fail to react favourably to analysis are those based on a defence prompted by the patient's dread of the strength of his instincts'. The analyst promises that conscious instincts are less dangerous and more easily controlled than unconscious ones: 'The only situation in which this promise proves illusory is that in which the defence has been undertaken because the patient dreads the strength of his instincts'. The reviewer would seriously question this sentence. He is of opinion that the analyst can keep his promise if he succeeds in restoring the possibility of satisfaction. It is true that where a psychosis threatens to appear, the effect of a fight against the defences 'is to weaken the ego still further and to advance the pathological process'; but a psychosis is a special case which is more complicated than this. In it there is not simply an irruption of instincts into the ego in too great a volume, but



there is a special form of defence (regression to the period before there was an ego), which shows itself partly as an irruption of instincts, but more correctly as a dissolution of the ego.

The first of the sections of the book which illustrates the above theory deals with 'the preliminary stages of defence', that is, with the ways and means by which the ego tries in the first instance to avoid 'pain' arising from the external world. In doing this, it develops capacities which stand it in good stead when it begins to build up the actual methods of defence. The ego is still too weak to change the outer world to suit itself. Even after the cure of little Hans's neurosis his environment continually brought disagreeable circumstances to his notice. His father was bigger and stronger than he was (i.e. had a bigger penis) and his mother and sister had a common happiness in the care of the latter's body, in which he had no part. At the end of the analysis, therefore, little Hans related his phantasy of having a number of children whom he looked after in the W.C. and his phantasy of the plumber who unscrewed his buttocks and penis so as to bring him larger and finer ones. In doing this Hans was denying reality with the help of his phantasy. He was altering it for his own use and according to his own wishes and in this way he was able at last to tolerate it. Phantasies denying their own weakness are obviously universal means by which children learn to bear the mortification to their narcissism which that weakness brings with it. Another small boy had a phantasy of a friendly lion who used its strength in his service, so that it became a protection instead of a menace. (Obviously the existence of the hated individual who is stronger than oneself can only be tolerated at all, to begin with, if it is possible to deny one's own weakness by having a share—real or imaginary—in the strength of the stronger person. The ambivalence with regard to the totem is similar to this: unavailing hate of the mighty is evaded by the thought that one belongs to his tribe, that he possesses 'ego-quality'—that a part of his strength is one's own.) No wonder that this mechanism does not always succeed and that there are cases where the same animal appears sometimes as a protective deity and sometimes as a threatening monster, as in a case of Berta Bornstein's which is quoted by Anna Freud. The animal phantasy of another small patient was rather more complicated. The presentation of the father was split up, for alongside of the protecting animals there was a 'thief' who threatened the boy. This made it quite clear 'that the father's strength, embodied in the wild beasts, served as a protection against the father himself'. The phantasies take from the father the valuable attributes for which he is envied, and ascribe them to the boy who can now use them to threaten his father with. (An interesting train of thought might lead from this point to the psychology of 'trophies'.) This type of 'denial' merges easily into an 'identification with the aggressor'.



Their universal nature is shewn by the fact that they do not only appear in individuals, but have the power of creating myths. In this connection Anna Freud makes an analysis of Grimm's fairy-tale of 'The Two Huntsmen', and probably many magic rites and customs could be understood in a similar manner. Anna Freud discovers the same motif in children's books (*Little Lord Fauntleroy* and *The Little Colonel*). 'The child's ego refuses to become aware of some disagreeable reality. First of all it turns its back on it, denies it and in imagination reverses the unwelcome facts.' In certain psychotic confusional states the ego behaves to the outer world in exactly the same way. Why is it then that 'denial' can be so little used by healthy adults? Why is it that, whereas in early childhood the contradiction between phantasy and reality presents no hindrance to an economic effectiveness of phantasy, it later presents such a great hindrance? In healthy people the faculty for using phantasies as an escape from any considerable amount of unpleasant reality is quickly put out of action. The day-dream cannot deal with anything like so much disagreeable affect as can the games of imagination played by children. This is certainly connected with the fact that the function of reality-testing is objectively strengthened in adults. To this must be added the 'need for synthesis' of the adult ego, which always forbids the juxtaposition of what is incompatible. If adults cathect phantasy satisfaction to any serious extent, they enter upon a dangerous road which may lead to a psychosis.

In childhood this 'denial' is not limited to phantasy, but also finds expression in denial by word and act. It is one of the functions of children's play. (It certainly often coincides with the more general function of play about which Wälder<sup>4</sup> has written. He holds that the object of play is to master excitations aroused in situations in which the child played a passive part. This is done by an active repetition of the experience in the game. The mere turning of passivity into activity is in itself, to a certain extent, a 'denial' of the real facts. But the repetition, which attempts retrospectively to master an excitation, does not deviate only in this respect from the disagreeable, original experience; other points are modified as well.) Anna Freud points out very truly 'how ready adults are to make use of this very mechanism in their intercourse with children'; there are endless discussions too among educationalists upon 'how far it must be the task of education to induce children of even the tenderest years to devote all their efforts to assimilating reality and how far it is permissible to encourage them to turn away from reality and construct a world of phantasy'. At the same time the participation of

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<sup>4</sup> 'Die psychoanalytische Theorie des Spieles', *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, Bd. VI, 1932.



adults is always limited by strict conditions, and the child meets with opposition if he tries to shape his actual behaviour according to his phantasies. The use of a trophy is connected with 'denial', for the trophy protects its owner from anxiety by placing at his disposal a part of the strength of those who are stronger than he, and Anna Freud proceeds to illustrate this with case material. A small patient felt that he must always clutch his father's hat convulsively in his hand; later this was replaced by a peaked cap. (On one occasion when he needed both hands he pushed the cap through the flap of his breeches.) This conduct is different from a regular obsessional action, because the child is not defending himself against an instinctual desire of his own, but against a painful impression made by something in the external world, which spoils his instinctual pleasure. (The reviewer would like to point out that such behaviour may in a certain sense also be compared with a perversion; that is, if the theory is correct that a perverse act serves to deny the possibility of castration and so makes possible an indulgence in sexual gratification, which the fear of castration had made impossible.) In the course of development 'denial' in word and act loses its importance in the same way as 'denial' in phantasy. The 'talisman' of the obsessional seems to be an exception, for it protects, not only against inner instinctual desires, but against the dangers of the external world also. 'Denial' in word and act differs from 'denial' in phantasy owing to the fact that it takes place in the real outer world, and therefore demands co-operation from the environment. (In this way it is a return from phantasy to reality, a transition from 'denial' to a 'modification' of the real world, and an effort to tempt others to join in the phantasy. In this connection we should bear in mind the function of 'day-dreams in common' and many of the phenomena of pathological lying; for the liar is also trying to find a way back to reality through his lies.)

When 'a child is somewhat older, his greater freedom of physical movement and his increased powers of psychic activity enable his ego to evade painful stimuli' and so 'denial' can be superseded by 'avoidance of the occasions of "pain"'. Just as a person suffering from a phobia avoids situations in which he might be tempted to gratify impulses which he regards as dangerous, so children avoid activities which have involved them in 'painful' experiences, e.g. a sense of their own inferiority. Even otherwise pleasurable experiences may be avoided if they have entailed similar results. In consequence it often happens that children in kindergartens and schools refuse to take part in the regular activities there because, having failed, they at once conceive a permanent disinclination to repeat the attempt. Such inhibitions, which Anna Freud calls 'ego-restrictions', differ from genuine neurotic inhibitions in that their motive



is not a secret prohibited sexual significance of the activity avoided, but merely a disagreeable external impression attendant on it. For this reason they are more amenable to influence; it is only necessary to change the conditions under which the work is carried on. Avoidance is concerned not with the activity itself, but with the associated 'pain'. So long as these conditions of 'pain' subsist, avoidance may very well be complete, since the position is not the same here as with genuine inhibitions where an unconscious but ever active rejected impulse forms a constant source of temptation and conflict to the inhibiting ego, necessitating a constantly renewed expenditure of energy on anti-cathexis. (In practice 'ego-restrictions' merge into 'inhibitions' just as 'denial' overlaps with 'repression'; we cannot always clearly distinguish the processes of defence according to whether they operate against the instincts or the outside world, if only because instinctual excitation may be dreaded for the sake of the punishments expected from the outside world and the outside world because of the temptations to which the instincts may be exposed there.) Naturally the 'pain' ensuing on a realization of inferiority to others is not the only kind of 'pain' which leads to such 'restrictions of the ego'; a little patient of Anna Freud gave up playing football, the very activity in which he most excelled, because he feared to incur the envy of the bigger boys who did not play as well as he did. He turned away from sport and became interested in literature. We often find that the reaction to such restrictions of the ego is a hypercathexis of interests of an entirely opposite character by way of compensation. In adopting such measures to avoid anxiety the child 'undertakes a prophylaxis of neurosis at his own peril', which can be maintained at the expense of his achievements and potentialities so long as the circumstances of life remain favourable to these restrictions. If these necessary conditions of protection against anxiety are removed, then an outbreak of neurosis may result. To judge the extent of a neurotic child's illness one must first deprive him of his protection, in maintaining which his environment often gives him vigorous support.

The third section of the book describes two special types of defence, 'Identification with the Aggressor' and 'A Form of Altruism'. We have already come across the former in children's animal phantasies. It is bound up with the 'repetition in action of a passive experience' (which becomes the 'forestalling in action of the repetition of a passive experience'). An impressive example is that of the young boy who was brought by his teacher to the child guidance expert (Aichhorn) because of a habit of making faces. Aichhorn saw that the boy's grimaces were a caricature of the angry expression of the teacher. Impressive, too, is the case of the little girl who explains how she got over her anxiety of ghosts. 'There's no need to be afraid in the hall', she said, 'You just



have to pretend that you're the ghost who might meet you.'<sup>5</sup> Here is another angle from which to study the games of impersonation which children play. The 'identification with the aggressor' often relates not to his vocation but simply to his aggression or perhaps only to the attributes of his aggression (in the case of the animal-phantasies and also the talisman). As his critical faculties develop the child has recourse to a prophylactic identification with a person from whom he only *expects* aggression. The vehemence of his scolding—a prophylactic measure—then indicates the intensity of his anxiety. At this stage criticism has already been internalized, but not, as yet (as when a true super-ego has been established), transformed into self-criticism. The circumstance that the criticism introjected is then once more externalized explains why, as Anna Freud goes on to shew at length with the help of numerous examples, this kind of identification with the critic is often combined with projection of the tendencies criticized; an inquisitive boy upbraided his mother for her curiosity, an insincere girl reproached her analyst with being secretive, and so forth. When this combination of defences is at all accentuated, we see why it often happens that a person is most intolerant when he discovers in the outside world the tendencies which he is trying to suppress in himself. We have here an intermediate stage in the development of the super-ego at which a number of people remain arrested. But it also forms (because of the use of projection) an intermediate stage in the development of paranoid conditions, which, however, are further complicated by other factors such as the reversal of love into hate. When genuine unconscious aggressive impulses are made conscious in analysis they obtain relief through abreaction. But aggression which is simply a cover for anxiety in the sense described vanishes only when the anxiety has been resolved.

Anna Freud then describes under the heading 'A Form of Altruism' a second type of defence, which works with projection. In his paper, 'The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman',<sup>6</sup> Freud described the process of 'retiring in favour of someone else', which implies that a person renounces an impulse or interest which is abhorrent to him in favour of someone else and then obtains a vicarious enjoyment of it by way of identification. In 'Certain Neurotic Mechanisms in

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<sup>5</sup> The reviewer was very much impressed by a patient who used during the analytic session to imitate the throbbing sounds made by motor cars; it turned out that he was warding off his anxiety of the noisy cars in the street, which possessed for him the significance of monsters. Cf. Fenichel: 'Über respiratorische Introjektion', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XVII, 1931.

<sup>6</sup> *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, (1920).



Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality',<sup>7</sup> he amplified his ideas on the subject. Anna Freud now shews that this mechanism is not confined to homosexuality; it might be described as 'altruistic surrender of our own instinctual impulses in favour of other people'. A grasping and ambitious girl whose dearest wish was to have beautiful clothes and a number of children, was as an adult both childless and shabbily dressed. But she was very active in helping her friends to get married and to choose their clothes and in looking after other people's children. 'It looked as if her own life had been emptied of interests and wishes. . . . She lived in the lives of other people instead of having any experience of her own'. In the fact that it involves a projection of instinct this mechanism resembles 'identification with the aggressor'; but then instead of dissociation, an identification takes place with the person who has been chosen as a billet for the prohibited impulses. A series of examples illustrates this mechanism. To whom do we surrender our instinctual impulses? 'Possibly the perception of the prohibited impulse in another person is sufficient to suggest to the ego that here is an opportunity for projection (just as hysterical identification may select an otherwise indifferent object on the basis of a 'common ætiological claim'). But 'in most cases the substitute has once been the object of envy'. This was also the position in Freud's cases, in which the instinctual impulses were surrendered to brothers and sisters. Similarly, it is a very common occurrence for women to surrender their ambitions to their husbands. As the finest example of this mechanism Anna Freud analyses Rostand's *Cyrano de Bergerac*. This gives her the occasion to make a remarkable discovery: 'Anyone who has very largely projected his instinctual impulses on to other people knows nothing of the fear of death'. She observes, too—certainly with justice—that the pleasure which the 'altruist' still manages to secure is not exclusively a vicarious pleasure, but that the fulfilment of ideals implied in renunciation itself affords in a disguised form a measure of instinctual gratification. There are, besides, other (e.g. masochistic) types of altruism.

The last section of the book deals with the special processes of defence arising at puberty; Anna Freud regards these as an example of defence motivated by fear of the strength of the instincts. Psycho-analysis has hitherto shewn comparatively little interest in puberty, assuredly because, being aware of the facts of infantile sexuality, it could take a more relative view of its importance. It was more concerned with bringing out the similarities between it and the early infantile sexual period and the climacteric (quantitative increase in instinctual energies with a resulting alteration in the balance of conflicting forces) than the differences. It is true

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<sup>7</sup> *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, (1922).



that the id at these different 'instinctual periods' remains very much the same; but the ego shews considerable changes, so that the psychology of puberty, which seeks to study the specific features of this particular stage of development, is primarily an ego-psychology which enquires how the ego comes to terms with the quantitative increase in instinctual excitation occurring at this period. To clarify the problem Anna Freud first considers the ego-situation in the instinctual conflicts of early infancy, the feature of which is that the ego is only really formed during the process of the conflict. In the latency period the conflicts decline, the ego has leisure to devote itself to other tasks, and super-ego anxiety takes the place of objective anxiety. But then the pre-pubertal period sets in. The reinforcement of the instinctual impulses radically alters the terms of agreement between ego and id. The instincts, which have so far only undergone a *quantitative* increase, come into collision with an ego changed by the latency period and now more or less firmly consolidated, which 'employs indiscriminately all the methods of defence to which it has ever had recourse in infancy and during the latency period'. As puberty advances, a *qualitative* change takes place in the instincts in the direction of genitality. Children who had previously shewn a marked pregenital disposition all at once make a more favourable impression, those whose phallic tendencies had already predominated seem to change for the worse. The ego itself feels uneasy over the quantity of instinct. It is not the case that the absolute strength of the instincts decides whether the id or the ego shall secure a relative victory in this struggle, for any increase in instinctual demands stiffens the resistance of the ego, while if the instincts become less urgent, the ego relaxes its efforts at defence. More important for the outcome of the conflict than the absolute strength of the instincts (which in any case cannot be measured) are the ego's tolerance or intolerance of instinct, which depends on its previous experiences, and the nature and efficacy of the various defence-mechanisms at its command.

Two attitudes are particularly striking in adolescents: their tendency to asceticism and their intellectuality. The antagonism towards the instincts at puberty is distinguished in the first place by operating against all the instincts indiscriminately and again by the circumstance that instead of the instincts forcing their way to expression from time to time in substitutive gratifications and compromise-formations, they give rise to excesses alternating with periods of asceticism. (Clearly the normal prototype of the reactions of the 'instinct-ridden character' described by Reich <sup>8</sup>.) As regards the former point Anna Freud thinks that adoles-

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<sup>8</sup> 'Der Triebhafte Charakter', *Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag*, 1925.



cents seem to fear 'the quantity rather than the quality of instinct'. The present reviewer can see no difference in principle between this and neurotic tendencies to asceticism; for it is characteristic of the reaction-formations of the obsessional neurosis that they radiate out from a particular instinctual source until the whole personality succumbs in sympathy. Anna Freud herself cites neurotic parallels for the alteration between excess and asceticism, e.g. symptoms carried out in two moves. Nevertheless she still has the impression 'that a more primitive and less complex process is at work in the asceticism of adolescence than in repression proper'. This is 'the ego's primary antagonism to instinct', 'the fear of the quantity of the instincts' (criticized or rather considered above), the ego's fear lest its organization be invaded by the instincts and dissolved. 'If this is so, the asceticism of puberty must be interpreted not as a series of repressive activities, qualitatively conditioned, but simply as a manifestation of the innate hostility between the ego and the instincts, which is indiscriminate, primary and primitive'. (There can be no doubt that the account given of the phenomena of puberty is wholly valid. But we are bound to examine these phenomena as they appear under other cultural conditions than our own—which so greatly curtail the child's and the adolescent's possibilities of gratification—in order to ascertain whether this survival from a period in which the apparatus for making satisfaction possible was inadequate plays the same part there too.)

A convincing analysis of intellectualization at puberty shows that it too is an attempt by the adolescent to come to terms with the invasion of instinct. The remarkable thing about the speculations and discussions of adolescents is that they have so little influence on their actual life. They are not a preparation for life, but day-dreams which seem to be fulfilling a function of their own. This function consists in a bringing of the thoughts to bear upon instinct. The intellectual activity of adolescents 'is rather an indication of a tense alertness for the instinctual processes and the translation into abstract thought of that which they perceive'. Anna Freud reminds us that thinking generally is an 'experimental form of action', an attempt to secure the ego's control over motility by connecting the instinctual impulses with verbal presentations. (The demon, Rumpelstilzkin, loses his power when one utters his name.) Intellectualization at puberty is thus 'the exaggeration, under the peculiar conditions of a sudden accession of libido, of a general ego-attitude'. If mental activity declines in the latency period, this need not have simply been due to thought-taboos; it may be a case of lack of incentive resulting from a reduction in the quantity of instinct to be mastered. The object-relations of puberty are in a remarkable degree dominated by identifications. The adolescent's defences against his incestuous objects lead him to estrange himself from the world and even from his own super-ego.



His object-relations that are so largely identifications are designed to counteract this isolation. Owing to his hostility to his instincts and incestuous objects the adolescent is 'in danger of withdrawing his libido from those around him and concentrating it upon himself'. He escapes this danger by convulsive efforts to make contact once more with external objects, even if it can only be by way of his narcissism; that is, through a series of identifications.

The passionate object-relations of adolescence would, according to this view, represent attempts at recovery; in this, again, they resemble the state of psychotic patients whose disease is about to take one of its turns for the worse. This explanation of the causes underlying the manifestations of intellectuality and the peculiarities of object-relations at puberty is convincing, and is justified irrespective of the hesitation we feel in accepting an 'anxiety of the quantity of instinct'.

A concluding chapter focusses our attention on the principal tasks awaiting the 'psychology of defence'; these are to determine more closely the connection between specific anxiety-situations and different mechanisms of defence and to decide on a chronological classification of these. What do emerge clearly are the parallels between the ego's defensive measures against external and against internal danger (which indeed constantly overlap); repression and denial—reaction-formation and reversal in phantasy—inhibition and ego-restriction—intellectualization and alertness of the ego towards dangers from without. We cannot say whether the concentration of attention on the outside world or on the instincts first gives the defence-mechanisms their form. (To the reviewer it seems that the defences against the outside world must be the 'more primary', in so far as ideas concerning the nature of this—if we disregard the early traumatic situations arising from inadequacy in the apparatus for discharge—first impose the necessity for taking measures against the instincts.) How far are the defences against instinct shaped by the character of the instincts themselves and how far does the ego follow its own laws? The various measures of defence are by no means entirely the work of the ego, any more than distortion in dreams. There would be no sublimation without the libido's capacity for displacement, and no reaction-formation without reversal of instinct. Nevertheless, in spite of frequent failure, as in the case of neurotic symptoms, the ego's achievement remains a considerable one. 'The ego is victorious when its defensive measures effect their purpose, i.e. when they enable it to restrict the development of anxiety and "pain" and so to transform the instincts that, even in difficult circumstances, some measure of gratification is secured, thereby establishing the most harmonious relations possible between the id, the super-ego and the forces of the outside world'. To be sure, if the ego is to 'secure gratification', its 'victorious defensive



measures' must, so it seems to us, confine themselves to preventing untimely and undesirable forms of gratification, and should so take effect as to avoid large quantities of instinctual energy being deprived of an outlet: a vicious circle exists because this check on the instincts forces them to make untimely appearances and assume undesirable forms which in turn call for further measures of defence.

The importance of this book in our view consists in its giving to the reader a clear and comprehensive picture of obscure and complicated relations. It presents (in a way that suggests comparison with the classical works of Freud) empirical discoveries capable of being verified by psychoanalysts in such an original manner that the 'theory of the mechanisms of defence' simply emerges as a summary of actual facts, the relations between which had not previously been understood, a summary which will help to clarify and render comprehensible other actual facts, and more especially the genesis of all of these defensive mechanisms.

O. Fenichel.

### III

In attempting in this final review to determine the significance of Anna Freud's book as a contribution to psycho-analytical psychology, to treat of its bearing on questions of theory apart from its technical and clinical aspects, I cannot hope to do more than consider a few problems selected at random from the whole. For the close interdependence of technical and theoretical problems is peculiarly a feature of this book; it determines in part the scope of its enquiry and composes its essential character.

Historically speaking problems of technique and their relation to psycho-analytical theory have obviously provided the author with her starting-point. Indeed, the 'pre-history' of this work seems to reach back as far as her book<sup>9</sup> on the technique of child-analysis. There we are shewn how in the analysis of children, where we are compelled to a large extent to forego the benefits of the free association method, analysis of the child's behaviour is thrust into the foreground, with a view to helping the neurotic child to acquire insight into his illness and to observe the fundamental conditions of analytic treatment. Here, on the other hand, the general problems of ego-psychology provide the setting for a discussion of the possibilities of an analogous procedure carried out in particular cases within the framework of the classical technique and of the extent to which such a procedure opens the way for analysis of the 'unknown elements of the ego, its activities in the past'. Discussing Melanie Klein's play technique in 1927, the author raised the question how far we may carry the symbolical interpretation of children's play;

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<sup>9</sup> *Technik der Kinderanalyse*, 1927.



now she asks in general terms how we should prepare the ground for the interpretation of id-content, which our knowledge of dream-symbolism may have helped us to understand, and how we should steer the course which is to lead us *viâ* the patient's defensive positions and the unconscious parts of his ego to his instinctual life and early childhood phantasies.

Some of the other principal ideas in the book derive from papers read by the author at Oxford, Wiesbaden and Lucerne, but never published.

In 1929 she described how the very elements which can ordinarily be shewn to enter into the composition of an infantile animal-phobia contributed to the formation of an animal-phantasy, the mechanism of which was also to be observed in dreams, fairy-tales and children's stories.<sup>10</sup> What was then described with reference to a specific type of infantile phantasy as an achievement subserving the pleasure-principle—the dreaded animal of the phobia elevated to the rôle of protector—reappears in the sixth chapter of the present book as a stage in the developmental history of the ego. 'Denial in phantasy' is described as one of the methods employed by the ego in its struggle with anxiety—a method which naturally loses its usefulness after the earliest period of childhood and comes into conflict with the need for synthesis pertaining to a more mature ego adapted to reality. Cases in which this conflict is minimized or has never really arisen lie on the pathological border-line. 'The neurotic mechanisms under the influence of education' formed the subject of Anna Freud's paper in 1932, when she gave examples of the interaction between the internal and external world in the development of infantile neurosis. These are now discussed in Chapters VI and VII.<sup>11</sup> Children who behave like adults are practising denial in word and act. 'Like a grown-up', says the adult to the child; and this becomes for a time the guiding motive of the child's behaviour and that of his environment. If the child in playing this game oversteps the line which divides phantasy from action he inevitably comes into conflict with the outside world. But the fate of this phantasy-activity does not depend solely on whether it meets with indulgence or disapproval. Encountering opposition from one quarter it will readily find a displaced outlet in harmless forms of behaviour; it would seem to lie at the root of much that passes in life for eccentricity. 'Ego-restriction' which the author introduced into psycho-analysis in the same Congress paper, illustrating her theme with examples of sudden changes of interest and masked reactions of flight in children during the latency period, offers as a contrast to these actions of *denial* the case of *avoidance*. Just as denial may be distinguished from repression,

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. This JOURNAL, Vol. X, 1929, p. 499 (Congress Report). I am familiar with the paper because it was read again in the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. This JOURNAL, Vol. XIV, 1933, p. 148 (Congress Report).



so avoidance has a more serious counterpart in inhibition. Denial and avoidance form a united front against the dangers of the outside world. The chapters of the book devoted to these forms of reaction are subsumed under the general heading of 'examples of the avoidance of objective "pain" and objective danger'.<sup>12</sup> They thus take their proper place in the general scheme of the book, in which the opening theoretical part ('Theory of the Mechanisms of Defence') is followed by three sections<sup>13</sup> corresponding to the threefold dependence of the ego on the external world, the super-ego and the instincts. This disposition alone suggests the point in the development of psycho-analysis from which the book departs, the 'fresh direction taken by Freud's writings', which, beginning with *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 'have freed the study of the ego from the odium of analytical unorthodoxy'. But Anna Freud extends this new departure along quite definite lines. Thus whereas other workers have sought to throw light on the early stages of ego-development, on the origin and structure of the ego itself—I refer to the line of investigation which has for some years been associated with the names of Melanie Klein, Ernest Jones, Edward Glover and others—or to study specific types of primitive ego-reaction, this book seems to take up the problem of the way in which the mature ego functions at the point where *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* left it in 1926. One of the basic problems of that book arose out of the freshly assumed obligation to shew precisely how the forces of the ego interact with those of the id. This line of enquiry gave birth to the new theory of anxiety, but also to other doctrines of fundamental importance, such as that dealing with the varieties of resistance.<sup>14</sup> It also forms the background of Anna Freud's book. Its derivation from *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* also determines the point at which her exposition starts. Freud there reverts to the old concept of defence and describes repression as one form of defence. Anna Freud expands these arguments and reviews the state of our previous knowledge concerning the mechanisms of defence as revealed

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<sup>12</sup> The contents of the third preliminary paper 'in which the parallels between the instinctual constellations of earliest childhood and puberty are further developed and discussed' (cf. this JOURNAL, Vol. XV, 1934, p. 509 (Congress Report)) are elaborated in the eleventh and twelfth chapters of the present book, which are devoted to the instinctual conflicts of adolescents. This Congress paper contained much of the substance of the corresponding sections of the book.

<sup>13</sup> 'Examples of the Avoidance of Objective "Pain" and Objective Danger (Preliminary Stages of Defence).' 'Examples of Two Types of Defence.' 'Defence Motivated by Fear of the Strength of the Instincts (Illustrated by the Phenomena of Puberty).'

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Wälder's review of *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*, this JOURNAL, Vol. X, 1929, pp. 103 ff.



in psycho-analytical literature. She explores the various possibilities of classifying them, historically, according to the time of their appearance, or systematically, according to the nature of their achievement, but maintains with evident justice that the time is not yet ripe for fulfilling this task. She discards it in favour of another which is approached in the book with penetrating insight; the nature and extent of the ego's achievements are examined with a precision and lucidity which have seldom been attained in psycho-analysis before and which, compared with most of the earlier efforts in this direction, constitute something entirely new, not only in point of form, but in the penetration of the material.

Here a word of explanation seems called for. We must be clear as to the position of new discoveries in psycho-analysis at the present day. By that I do not mean to ask whether it is possible to better Freud's achievement or to suggest that the greatness of that achievement excludes all possibility of further discovery. It would be an absurd standpoint to adopt, bearing in mind what has been accomplished by the generation who have been Freud's followers since the first decade of this century, absurd, too, if we think of the developments undergone by psycho-analysis in the later works of Freud himself. The problem I have in mind is of a different kind. A now no longer insignificant number of scientists living in different parts of the world under different conditions are at work on the same material for observation under the relatively constant conditions of observation determined by the technical requirements of analysis. New developments in psycho-analysis—leaving aside Freud's original great discoveries—are often due to changes in the material to be observed. I need hardly recall here the vital stimulus psycho-analysis derived and still derives from its preoccupation with the psychoses or that a change in the actual forms of neurosis would seem to have cleared the way for the problem of character-analysis, or again that interest in the child, both in its earliest years and in the latency period, has opened up fresh vistas: for even the present book seems to owe its first inspiration to a similar experience. But what this book has accomplished has not been brought about by any alteration in the material for observation, but by a silent change in the second constant factor, in the method of observation. Such changes are generally received by analytical circles with a proper scepticism. For the history of psycho-analysis has shewn that the great misunderstandings dictated by resistance often proceed from efforts to modify its technique. But no one will claim that that danger exists here. Decidedly not. I am much more inclined to think that in the case of this book the opposite danger exists: the change in the mode of observation might pass unnoticed. Up to a point the views sustained by Anna Freud are common to all analysts, her fundamental position is theirs. But this is not equivalent to saying that the account she has given here really



tallies completely with the position generally upheld till now. The points of divergence may appear trifling—and yet they are important enough.

Anna Freud's book proclaims a method of observation which—putting it quite generally—is, above all, more detailed and exhaustive than has hitherto been usual; it sets to work more from the surface. Let me illustrate this. 'Identification with the aggressor' and 'altruistic surrender' are phenomena which we can easily verify from our clinical experience (once we have been made familiar with their features). They can be traced back to two of the great defence-mechanisms, introjection and projection. But these two mechanisms and the relations between them do not cover the whole of the psychical event: this can be traced to them but it remains a distinct condition with its own peculiar structure. Again, the dependence on instinctual life is transparent, the relation to aggression and masochism—but this, too, only holds for a part of the phenomenon. There is no need to insist what an advance it represents if we follow Anna Freud's lead in the technique of interpretation, first revealing the whole extent of a type of behaviour, the activity of the ego, and only then penetrating into the deeper layers. This method promises to bring us decisively nearer our therapeutic goal, the modification and liberation of the patient's personality, but—and I say this simply to prevent misunderstanding—it is only *one* step in interpretation which will remain unavailing unless it is reinforced by the others which have long been familiar to us. But it was desirable to emphasize what insight acquired in this way must mean for the *theory* of psycho-analysis, for *psycho-analysis as psychology*: the superficial layers of the mind, those functions of the psychic apparatus that are bound up with the ego, have for long remained beyond the reach of psycho-analytical psychology. Necessarily and inevitably so. Psycho-analysis is the natural science of the mind; it is not, and in its nature cannot be, a descriptive method. It cannot enter into competition either with those psychologists who have made it their object to describe mental phenomena with the help of empathy—I may mention Max Scheler as their most distinguished representative in recent times—or with the poets who perform the same task with a higher and more unimpeachable authority. Psycho-analysis, indeed, has been repeatedly criticized for the schematic nature of its formulations and conceptions. It has been reminded of its undisputed claim to be considered *the* psychology of the innermost mental processes, of man in conflict—and some measure of satisfaction has been admitted from Freud's case-histories alone. Sometimes it has been added that the intuitive genius of this one psychologist combined with his mastery of style have alone helped to overcome the inadequacies of the method of approach. We shall have no difficulty in recognizing the resistance, or



perhaps we had better say the misunderstanding, which has inspired this argument. For this criticism does but emphasize what was a necessary, almost unavoidable consequence of the historical development of our science. Psycho-analysis originated with the study of the unconscious, its interest was primarily for the id and its contents, for those strata of the mind which lay closest to man's biological nature and in which the individual comes nearest to being merged in the species. Moreover, in the interests of historical accuracy we must repeatedly insist in the plainest possible terms that Freud's concept of psycho-analysis has from the very first, ever since the *Studies in Hysteria*, embraced the ego as well, the forces of defence as well as those they oppose, whether they appeared as the censorship or under some other name, without thereby sacrificing in any way its fundamental position as a depth-psychology. But the study of the ego, as Freud himself has insisted, formed a second step after the first. Freud himself has specified the problems which this second step involves; the present book represents a decisive advance towards their solution. This advance leads us back in the first instance to the phenomena themselves, it leads back to observation.

A *Gestalt* psychologist, Koffka, once illustrated his point very simply by saying that if one wants to describe a machine one must first *understand* its structure and function. *Mutatis mutandis* this holds good for psycho-analysis too. It is this which gives it its special position in psychology. The exposition of the mechanisms of defence contained in this book is based on an understanding of the way in which the mental apparatus works. One has only to read one of the passages describing some piece of behaviour, for example that of the little boy after visiting the dentist (p. 120), to see how the explanation, the insight into the process of 'identification with the aggressor', embraces every aspect of the behaviour in question. Let us see how this conception differs from the ordinary psycho-analytical version of the same process; the latter—for the sake of illustration I am presenting it in a crudely schematic form and am even caricaturing it—would perhaps fasten on that element in the boy's conduct which is mentioned at the end of Anna Freud's account, his cutting string and breaking off the points of pencils. Recognition of the symbolical meaning of these actions, of the effect which the assumption of activity typical of play has in resolving castration-anxiety, has never been wanting. But to have seen that here we have a specific defence governed by identification, forming one of the ego's *general* mechanisms of defence and not confined to the individual case,<sup>15</sup> to have grasped its

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<sup>15</sup> Perhaps we can also illustrate Anna Freud's standpoint by fastening on a terminological coincidence. Ferenczi, in his paper read at the Wiesbaden Congress ('Sprachverwirrung zwischen den Erwachsenen und dem Kind',



range and nature, is an achievement for the new standpoint. An explanation such as this presupposes the most careful observation in an attempt to see the psychical situation as part of a connected whole, in a wider setting. Its advantage is that it draws closer to the concrete psychical events in its simultaneous grasp of the surface and the depths of mental life. The author believes that it will surely become possible to discover a number of other typical measures employed by the ego, beyond those mentioned in her book. They will only become accessible to us through this new method of observation; before they can be described or recognized we shall require fresh insight into mental life as a whole and, more especially, further information concerning the unconscious activities of the ego.

But let us approach the problem from another angle, and ask in what respects this book differs from other attempts to study the 'ego's' mode of operation in the domain of the psyche on the basis of certain assumptions concerning its essential nature. We find one such attempt in Adler's *Individual Psychology*. (I have no doubt that many well-known critics of psycho-analysis and perhaps others who have failed to grasp the situation clearly will now discover that psycho-analysis is 'becoming Adlerian'.) In my view the gulf between psycho-analysis and *Individual Psychology* was never wider or more radical than at this point where there is a partial overlapping of the field of enquiry: partial, because we cannot speak of a strict correspondence when the two systems differ in what they include under the heading of ego-function. Psycho-analysis runs counter to the theory of *Individual Psychology* in holding that the ego develops out of the id and bears the imprint of the process which gave it birth.<sup>16</sup> Anna Freud constantly alludes to the processes by which the ego has been formed, revealing the *precise* instinctual situation from which a defensive attitude has been acquired, its essence and its ramifications. The little girl who practised magic, so that she might take over the rôle of the ghost she was afraid to meet in the hall, was working over by means of this identification a definite experience, the effects of her penis-envy. The patient who had the feeling that people were keeping some secret from her

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*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XIX, 1933) had already spoken of an 'identification with the aggressor' or 'threatener'. But Ferenczi was describing something entirely different, namely the child's reaction to a specific traumatic situation. The child's 'still immature personality' reacts to the 'sudden "pain"' induced by the provocative attitude of the adult not by 'defending himself, but by an anxious identification' with the aggressor to whose will he submits.

<sup>16</sup> A unified conception of the actual details of this process does not yet exist, although a number of valuable contributions to the problem have already appeared. It is one of the problems which psycho-analysis will in the near future no doubt have occasion to consider in its many aspects.



and in a certain phase of the transference became aggressive towards her analyst had herself kept her childhood masturbation a secret ; the criticism with which she identified herself represented the criticism which her masturbation might call forth in her analyst. Thus the form of defence must be interpreted in the light of the patient's whole history. This idea is not sustained throughout the book, for it was not the author's intention that it should be given undue prominence ; but, from hints scattered here and there, we may conjecture that she has been following a course of investigation initiated by her as long ago as 1922,<sup>17</sup> perhaps without realizing where it would lead, in her first psycho-analytical publication. There she used the phantasies of a young girl patient to shew how a certain infantile sexual phantasy (of the type represented by 'A child is being beaten') in spite of all the resistance and elaboration to which it was exposed was endlessly repeated in the intricate network of phantasy fashioned by her day-dreams. The reflections which in that earlier paper were prompted by the study of a patient's day-dreams may also be applied to the genesis of certain methods adopted by the ego, and thus help us to understand the regularity or monotony of certain forms of defence.<sup>18</sup> I should accordingly like to define what I consider the crowning achievement of the book by saying that it inspires us to a further study of the ego and its activities, offers a method for approaching that study and so opens up fresh prospects for psycho-analytical exploration.

How significant this achievement is we discover in the last two sections of the book, which in spite of their modest title give us the essentials of a psychology of puberty. This survey, to my mind the most finished part of the book, takes as its starting-point the instinctual conflicts of adolescence and the ways in which they are worked over in asceticism, in the tendency to identification, and in idealization.

Her account of the instinctual conflicts of puberty gives Anna Freud the opportunity of urging a particular point of view, which she calls that of 'the ego's primary antagonism to instinct'. Under the peculiar conditions of puberty this primary attitude of the ego becomes an active defence-mechanism which according to the author expresses the ego's specific fear of the quantity of instinct. This idea, already foreshadowed in Freud's *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, represents a hypothesis of a kind that

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<sup>17</sup> 'The Relation of Beating-Phantasies to a Day-Dream', this JOURNAL, Vol. IV, 1923.

<sup>18</sup> In the discussions of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society, Anna Freud has amplified the views expressed in her book, and intimated that we find a uniformity in the methods to which the ego has recourse in dealing with the demands of instinct and affect, super-ego and outside world, and which it applies to them all indiscriminately.



has so often in psycho-analysis proved its neuristic worth.<sup>19</sup> Accordingly, whether we accept or reject it we cannot justify our decision by pointing to definite mental phenomena, any more than we can *perceive* a death instinct or a primary masochism when we study the processes of the mind itself—and yet many of us would not willingly dispense with these assumptions. For that a dread of the strength of the instincts does exist is not disputed even by those who reject a primary antagonism of the ego to instinct. Although familiar with the arguments to the contrary, I have not become convinced that there is anything in our clinical material or in the fundamental conceptions of psycho-analysis which militates against Anna Freud's hypothesis; rather I have a growing impression that the assumption of a primary antagonism to instinct on the part of the ego (specifically, on the part of the higher ego-functions) resolves difficulties and contradictions. For the idea which lies at the root of Freud's views concerning the ego—its differentiation from the id—already presupposes a certain degree of repudiation of instinct. By the way of defining the nature of the problem I would add: if the ego makes contact with the instincts and seeks to carry through its wishes, the instincts must be prepared to make concessions, must modify their aim under the ego's influence, must postpone satisfaction perhaps, in order to comply with the demands of reality.<sup>20</sup> To be sure, we are not entitled to rely on the processes heralding the onset of a schizophrenic illness or on the parallel or related processes occurring at puberty—which indeed are occasionally treated in non-analytical literature as a normal counterpart to the clinical picture in schizophrenia (Homburger)—as *proof* of the ego's primary antagonism to instinct: and yet these phenomena are so convincing that the onus of finding an alternative explanation will fall on those who oppose the conception defended by Anna Freud. The author supposes this anxiety to have been acquired very early in the development of the individual, 'in the period during which an ego is being gradually isolated out of the undifferentiated id'. Phylogenetically, it is to be regarded 'as a kind of deposit accumulated from acts of repression practised by many generations and merely continued, not initiated, by individuals'. This is the point at which we come within range of Freud's idea of organic repression, the anthropological basis of the psycho-analytical psychology of the ego. It acquires an enhanced significance from the account given by Anna Freud.

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<sup>19</sup> The ego's primary antagonism to instinct—its dread of the strength of the instincts as we have called it—is not much more than a *theoretical concept*. (Reviewer's italics.)

<sup>20</sup> Here we should have to discuss the (gradual) differentiation of genital from pregenital and aggressive impulses.



I cannot attempt to enumerate here all or even the most important ideas contained in this book, or to develop the many suggestive remarks thrown out here and there almost in passing. Thus in a few words the author outlines the whole problem of psycho-analytical pedagogy. Or a chance sentence contains the solution of a remarkable and much debated problem: analysts are perhaps worse judges of human nature than one might expect, because the ego they see in their analyses of patients is an ego restricted by the analytical situation. Or in connection with the problems surrounding the ego's antagonism to instinct she formulates afresh the problem of the indications for psycho-analytic treatment. I should just like to mention two other examples. One bears on the relation between affective and intellectual development in the child, a problem alluded to in several places. Evidently we have hitherto been too one-sided in our readiness to concentrate exclusively on intellectual inhibitions and thought-taboos and to attribute their presence to the operation of the castration-complex. Anna Freud refers on the one hand to the factor of ego-restriction which can seriously impair the child's intellectual development and aptitude for learning, and on the other to the intimate connection between the trend of intellectual development and the problems of instinctual defence. The simple statement that 'instinctual danger makes human beings intelligent', that 'in periods of calm in the instinctual life, when there is no danger, the individual can permit himself a certain degree of stupidity' (p. 179), that in the latency period children have no need to indulge in abstract thought (instead of the assumption that they *dare* not do so), suggests a complete programme of research. It is inevitable, if we are to carry this out, that we should establish contact with academic psychology. In these relations it can *only* really be a matter of borrowing trustworthy information and results, not of electing to work along the same lines. I venture to predict that the result is more likely to be that the old gulf will re-appear—only elsewhere. But psycho-analysis is in a position to claim the mental life of the child with its puzzles and problems as part of its own territory. We should find ourselves in the same situation if we followed up the suggestions offered in several places to explain a particular type of game which children play, namely games of impersonation. Here too we can draw on material gathered in the field of academic psychology—Anna Freud has no hesitation in doing so—but, if I am not mistaken, the task confronting psycho-analysis here once again leads in a different direction. For psycho-analysis alone may hope to enquire into the genesis of these games of impersonation and the conditions under which they can persist either to trouble normality or to enhance it in many fields of artistic expression.

Thus we have glimpses again and again in the pages of this book of the problems and developments that await us. All alike are characterized



by breadth of vision, embracing systematically the whole range of mental life from the pathological to the normal and vigorously exploring the nature of normality itself. The prospect of a psycho-analytical psychology of the total personality takes shape, and I think that the stimulating effect of the book will be felt not only in clinical psycho-analysis but in all its applied branches as well.<sup>21</sup>

No one can foresee, looking at the developments inspired by Freud's writings on the psychology of the ego, whether more will be gained by pursuing the line of enquiry favoured by Anna Freud (as I prefer to think) or by following along the path that others have chosen to tread. For the most widely divergent efforts have but a common purpose, to study the genesis and functions of the ego and so to advance the fulfilment of a task which has confronted psycho-analysis for almost twenty years. But within the sphere of these efforts this book represents a position to which science has at all times adhered. It approaches mental phenomena in a spirit of fresh enquiry, travels the path which leads from observation to theory and teaches us to strike an even balance between experience and reflection.

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E. Kris.

*The Human Mind.* By Karl A. Menninger. (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1937. Pp. 504. Price \$5.00.)

After seven years, a second, or rather a revised edition has appeared of Dr. Menninger's book which was first published in 1930 and enjoyed an extraordinary circulation. In many respects it is a new book, for much of the matter in the previous edition has been judiciously pared and perhaps 100 pages of new material added. Among the latter are interesting considerations of mass paranoia as the author defines the situation in Germany, schizophrenia, schizophrenic personalities, suicide and partial suicide. The last two chapters on treatments and the applications of treatment have been almost entirely rewritten to great advantage.

Dr. Menninger, with a strong predilection for the dramatic, has culled from his wide readings dozens of fascinating illustrations from the daily press and from authors, classical and modern, to illustrate well-known psycho-analytical mechanisms. As one would expect from Dr. Menninger's

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<sup>21</sup> I feel I must mention an attempt that I myself have made in this direction during one of the training courses in the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society under the immediate stimulus of reading Anna Freud's book. Starting from Jones's paper on Hamlet, one of the most valuable, indeed in my view an altogether perfect example of an essay in applied psycho-analysis, I endeavoured to expand his study (first published in 1910) in the light of Anna Freud's ideas. The response which greeted my effort, schematic as it was, has left me with the impression that we have here a promising field of research.



more complete conversion to psycho-analysis since the appearance of the previous edition, the present book is more strongly psycho-analytic than its predecessor in both its interpretative and therapeutic approaches.

The bibliography, which is up to the minute, makes the book a veritable encyclopædia of psychiatric and psycho-analytical reference. Thus its value as a reference book has been immeasurably increased, but at the same time popular appeal has been retained with great dexterity.

C. P. O.

This is a second and enlarged edition of the book previously reviewed in the JOURNAL (Vol. XII, 1931, p. 238). The author has expanded especially the sections dealing with treatment and educational methods and has also inserted a brief section on the religious applications of psychiatry. He has added further an extensive and carefully classified bibliography. The book is discursive rather than closely reasoned, but is very interestingly written. It does not consider psycho-pathological problems seriously enough to be of much value to clinical psychologists, but the book should be of value in stimulating interest among the general medical profession.

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E. J.

*Encyclopædia of Sexual Knowledge.* By A. Costler, A. Willy and others, under the general editorship of Norman Haire. (Francis Aldor, London, 1937. Third Edition. Pp. 647. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book, translated from the French, will no doubt prove a useful addition to the numerous ones already disseminating knowledge in the field of sexology. The different chapters are distinctly uneven in quality. The one on 'Sexuality in Children' states that until recently it was thought that children had no sexual life, but that now we all know that they do, the author, however, does not mention that this important change in medical knowledge was brought about by one man—Freud. The words 'incest' and 'Œdipus complex' do not occur in the chapter, but some account is given of pregenital functioning. One chapter is headed 'Love is no longer a Mystery', the explanation being given that the choice of mate is determined in the unconscious: those more familiar with the unconscious mind cannot hardly assert that the process is thereby deprived of mystery. The book contains a full Index and some vivid pictures of the genital apparatus in both sexes, which should leave the reader in no doubt at least about the anatomical aspects of the problem.

E. J.

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*Analysis of Marriages.* An attempt at a theory of choice in love. By L. Szondi. (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1937. Pp. 80.)

The neglect which the subject of romantic love has encountered from



psychologists is only paralleled by the unique attention devoted to it by novelists and poets. Every year sees the appearance of thousands of works of fiction dealing mainly or entirely with this theme, which is represented in *Psychological Abstracts* by at most some half-dozen titles. All the more, therefore, should we be grateful to those psychologists who, in however small degree, endeavour to redress the balance.

It is true that the method of approach of the present author is, strictly speaking, biological rather than psychological, but his work was published in a psychological journal and its value consists partly in the way in which it points to a possible relationship between biological and psychological factors. Briefly his thesis is that our choice of love object (like our choice of career, our liability to particular diseases and the manner of our deaths—matters which are to be treated in future communications) is determined by recessive hereditary factors. These factors, baffled in their attempt to manifest themselves in the anatomy or physiology of the individual, find indirect expression in guiding the direction of his loves and preferences in a manner that is, of course, totally unrecognized by the subject himself. There is thus a striking parallelism between the behaviour of the recessive genes in our hereditary make-up and the repressed elements of the mind. In fact, it would appear that the whole psycho-analytical conception of conflict could be applied with very little change to the biological sphere: and the author maintains that this dynamic view of the interaction of hereditary factors is in accordance with the general trend of recent genealogical thought.

If this is true, it is obvious that we have here a principle of the greatest importance. It seems that Mendel would have had as much justification as Freud for quoting 'Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo', and that the forms of interaction revealed by the originator of psycho-analysis can be applied to the vast and hitherto quite distinct territory opened up to us by the founder of modern genetics—with the prospect of enormously increased understanding such as the discovery of important common principles usually brings in its train.

The suggestion is exciting, but how far are we justified at present in regarding it as anything more than an attractive hypothesis? Dr Szondi is aware that he has so far given us no convincing proof, and he himself indicates the lines on which statistically satisfactory proof could be obtained—for since we cannot actually observe the working of the biological factors (as we can, in a sense, observe psychological factors, when they ultimately reveal themselves as introspectible motives), the proof must be statistical. Entirely satisfactory evidence of the kind required will not be easy to obtain, but does not seem to be impossible.

Meanwhile the evidence on which the author comes to his provisional conclusions is based on a genealogical study of 27 'cases' (some of them,



however, dealing with more than one individual). Of these, 2 are examples of married couples with the same hereditary disease; 9 illustrate the tendency of healthy persons with recessive tendencies to disease to fall in love with persons in whom the same disease is manifest; 8 shew the attraction between two healthy persons both possessing the same disease tendencies in recessive form; 4 are studies of similar hidden sources of attraction leading to successive marriages with the same type of partner; while the last 4 cases deal with incestuous object choice. Incest is, indeed, according to the author, the most natural form of love, since similarity of recessive genes will, of course, most easily be found among close blood relatives; and the restrictions against incest, including the more extended taboos associated with totemic systems, are directed against the very essence of love. So the forbidden tendency finds the second best solution. 'The civilized man is denied the marriage with his sister or mother, the civilized woman cannot mate with her father or brother. But they do not want to be entirely deprived of incest. *So they are instinctively attracted to those who are gene-related with their mother and sister, respectively with their father and brother. In civilized society blood-incest is substituted by gene-incest.* [Italics in original.] The solution is a sort of compromise. Carrying out this compromise with or without success will decide the fate of the individual' (p. 71).

In general it would seem that there are at least four difficulties to be overcome before the author's thesis can be satisfactorily proved. In the first place, we have (except in cases of incest and of love between persons in whom the disease tendencies are dominant and therefore manifest) to demonstrate the presence of the recessive genes in question. This entails genealogical research into the family histories of the persons concerned, together with a knowledge of the laws governing the inheritance of the particular traits that are operative. It is to this problem that the present work is mainly devoted, and Dr. Szondi may perhaps be considered to have made out as good a case in this respect as the limited nature of his material permits.

In the second place, the presence of the recessive genes having been demonstrated, we have to shew that they are really operative in the way suggested. It would appear that this can only be done by the use of control groups, which would enable us to shew, for instance, that persons possessing the genes of deafness in recessive form are more often attracted to persons of similar constitution than are individuals free from such genes. Dr. Szondi has no data of his own, but quotes some figures from other sources which might seem to be in favour of his view so far as manifest conditions are concerned—a very important limitation. Thus he tells us that 'in the average population 1 out of a 100 marriages is such between blood relatives. The frequency of blood relationship among the parents of deaf and dumb is 6 per cent., among those of persons with retinitis



pigmentosa 25 per cent., among those of persons suffering from the disease called xerodema pigmentosa 12 per cent.'

In the third place we have to consider the question of opportunity. In our love relationships we are necessarily limited to the individuals whom we meet and to those among such individuals who respond to our overtures. Relatively frequent intermarriage among blood relatives is to be expected by chance in small and isolated communities, whether this isolation is due to geographical or social causes: and, as regards the latter, it is clear that a person suffering from some condition which is generally considered undesirable (e.g. deafness or feeble-mindedness) is less likely than is the average individual to find a healthy mate, though this does not prove that he does not desire one. Marriage between two individuals similarly afflicted might thus be due to lack of opportunity in other directions as well as to mutual sympathy.

This leads us to the last difficulty, which is concerned with the relative importance of biological and psychological factors. Though Dr. Szondi is clearly sympathetic to psycho-analysis and appears to consider that his own conclusions are in harmony with those of psycho-analysts, it is a remarkable fact that he nowhere in this monograph considers the possible influence of the *psychological* mechanisms of fixation and displacement. In dealing with many of his cases he shews clearly that the characteristics of the person loved were also present in the lover's father, mother, brother, sister or other important relative. Now since psycho-analysis has shewn that our choice of love-object is so often determined by a displacement of an earlier incestuous attraction, it is surely incumbent upon us to eliminate this psychological (or if we like to call it so, this environmental) factor before we fall back upon the obscurer explanation in terms of heredity. It may, of course, be true that we love our relatives, not because they surrounded us, protected us and nourished us in our early years, but because they have hereditary constitutions that are much the same as ours: but it is difficult or impossible to prove the latter, except in cases where the lover has grown up apart from his relatives, since otherwise the biological factor (if present) is masked by the psychological one. If Szondi is right, Freud was wrong in saying that there are two types of object love, anacletic and narcissistic: the hereditary factor works only on the narcissistic pattern, making like seek like. But though no psycho-analyst would deny the importance of narcissistic factors in object choice, even here we are not justified in ignoring psychological influences: as Freud has shewn us, the lover very often finds in his beloved that which he is, was, or would like to be. And this last category of what we would like to be or feel we ought to be, may cause us to select love-objects who possess characteristics the opposite of those that we ourselves possess. This fact appears at first sight to fit in better with a psychological



view than with the biological theory as Szondi here presents it. For not only do we sometimes fall in love with persons who are opposite or complementary to ourselves, but also with persons who are obtrusively different from our parents, and in such cases the psycho-analyst may detect something that can only be described as a flight from incest, which, if it can be explained biologically at all, requires a more complicated explanation than the simple biological Narcissism with which Szondi seems to be contented.

Our verdict, therefore, must surely be: Not proven, but intensely fascinating. It is to be hoped that psychologists and biologists will soon co-operate in further study of this most interesting field.

The monograph has a number of minor literary blemishes, apparently due to unskilful translation. More serious in a work of this character is the almost complete lack of detailed references—in the form either of footnotes or of bibliography—to the works of the numerous authorities quoted by name or to the other sources upon which the author has drawn. This is particularly regrettable in a work which, as we are told, is intended to interest both the psychologist and the genealogist, neither of whom can be expected to be fully conversant with the literature in the other's field.

J. C. F.

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*What Man has Made of Man : A Study of the Consequences of Platonism and Positivism in Psychology.* By Mortimer J. Adler. (Longmans, New York and Toronto, 1937. Pp. 246. Price \$3.50.)

The book opens with an Introduction by Dr. Franz Alexander, who explains that in the course of teaching psycho-analysis to students he 'came to the conviction that in this field as in others where students are using a highly standardized technical procedure and are mainly absorbed in minute observation of facts—briefly in all pre-eminently empirical fields—the students are apt to lose perspective towards their own work'. Dr. Alexander therefore deemed it desirable that the students and the members of the staff of the Psychoanalytic Institute of Chicago should be given a lecture course dealing with epistemology. To this end Professor Adler gave four lectures on philosophy, which were followed by discussions. These were: 'The Conception of Science in the Modern World', 'The Position of Psychology: in Philosophy and Among the Natural Sciences', 'The History of Psychology' and 'Psycho-Analysis as Psychology'. These are printed in the present volume as originally prepared; i.e. they appear as headings and summaries rather than as continuous prose and continuous discussion. As the author himself says, they are more like an index than an argument. 'For those who know the full substance of the arguments, an outline can serve excellently. . . . But for those who do



not know intimately what these arguments are, an outline must necessarily seem dogmatic, almost simple-minded in its brevity.' In view of the purpose of the outline and of Professor Adler's admission of the defect in its form, it would be invidious to criticize it. He hoped, however, to make his position clear by a set of notes, equal in bulk to the lectures, that amplify or explain the trend of his argument. Unfortunately they fail to do so successfully. Dr. Alexander's brief Introduction of a mere eight pages is in part a psycho-analyst's reply to the standpoint of the philosopher. We thus have, what is in principle valuable, the two sides of a debate printed together. It remains to add that the volume is beautifully got up and printed.

But what is to be made of the discussion? We must consider (1) Professor Adler's philosophic standpoint, (2) that of psycho-analysis, (3) whether the former, or speculative philosophy in general, justifies its existence, and (4) whether Dr. Alexander was right in supposing that a course in philosophy would enable students of science, and in particular of psycho-analysis, to develop a broader standpoint than they otherwise would, if they always restricted themselves to the facts of their own particular technique.

(1) Professor Adler upholds what he believes would be the philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas if they were alive to-day. This is modified, however, by his opinion that their philosophical discoveries were true *sub specie æternitatis*—independent of fashion, scientific discovery, or the state of development of mankind—which amounts to the fact that their philosophies would be permanently unchanged. 'When a philosophical work is well done, it is finished. . . . We should not hope for the same sort of progress in philosophy that we expect in science; in fact, we can do very little to improve upon ancient wisdom. . . .' (p. 133). Again we meet the surprising statement that 'scientific work will be misled by the failure to recognize that the basic questions in psychology are philosophical and cannot be answered by research. This is the root of error in psycho-analysis' (p. 192). What the author means is that these thinkers brought their great principles to bear upon the problems before them, and that they would do the same to-day if confronted with psycho-analysis—the content of their thought would be different, the form the same. A special point of interest is that the philosophy of ultimate truth of which Professor Adler speaks would be capable of exercising an influence upon psycho-analysis; in what way we are not told, but no doubt that is for the psycho-analyst to discover once he has adopted the 'right' attitude. Apparently the subject is at present supposed to be vitiated or impeded by working with a blend of Platonism and Positivism—an ill-assorted pair without a doubt. To this one is forced to reply that psycho-analysis, or any other science for



that matter, does not, in fact, presuppose or work with *any* philosophy. Have not the sciences become sciences by cutting themselves off from their philosophic roots?

The book contains some statements so surprising that they are worth quoting without comment: 'That part of the metapsychology is sound which can be understood in the light of common experience and which, for the most part, can be translated into the analytical terms of the traditional anthropology of Aristotle and St. Thomas. That part which is sound is, therefore, not novel or original, for the most part, except in vocabulary. . . . It is not surprising that the greatest novelty of the Freudian doctrine should be in the opinionative part of the metapsychology' (p. 215). 'The Freudian correlates psychic structure with bodily parts; the Aristotelean correlates psychic powers with bodily organs, except in the case of understanding. This difference is, of course, crucial and is the source of all the Freudian errors' (p. 107). 'Unfortunately, the psycho-analyst is seldom a wise man and a competent moralist, because he is seldom if ever a philosopher' (p. 121). 'Psycho-analysis may be useful medically when it is subordinated to sound morals; it is full of danger to human well-being when it is substituted for morality' (p. 137). And we learn of Freud's debt to Plato (p. 69). Other statements illustrate the archaic kind of philosophic language used: 'We must, first, consider the philosophical demonstration that the human soul differs from the vegetative soul, which is not cognitive, and from the animal soul, which is sensitive, by being intellective, i.e. by the power and operations of understanding (abstraction, judgement, inference)' (pp. 51, 52). 'The subject-matter of metaphysics is, therefore, everything which is, according as it is' (p. 145). 'The basic principle of realism in the theory of knowledge is that sensations and ideas are not *that which* we know primarily, but *that by which* we know *what* we know of *that which* we know' (p. 173).

(2) All the author's tributes to psycho-analysis count for nothing in the face of the foregoing uncompromising position. The opposing psycho-analytic attitude is most ably stated by Dr. Alexander in his Introduction. It may be summarized as follows. The scientist is content with whatever partial answers science can provide at any given time, without insisting upon a finished picture of the universe. So far as philosophy aims at painting this finished picture, it must *use* scientific results, never attempt to disprove them, and be ready to be corrected in the light of new scientific discoveries. Again, the reasoning faculty is not *sui generis*, as philosophers incline to believe, beyond the range of empirical investigation. Furthermore, human beings are continuous with the animal world—are not *sui generis*, but have an animal nature and a place in the scale of evolution. Then scientific concepts are incomplete rather than 'eternal' with no gaps to be filled. Finally, there is no ground for asserting that moral values are absolute.



(3) If philosophy on analysis turns out to be a way of dealing with reality and its frustrations, to be continuous with other defensive mechanisms that owe their existence to an incomplete mastery of unconscious wishes, then we shall be more inclined to classify it with the fairy-tale and the myth than with science. This, it is true, would not of itself disprove the objectivity of philosophy; but we are not on that account compelled to believe in it any more than in the objectivity of fairy-tales. Who after all can disprove the truth of fairy-tales? It is enough that we should give an account of man as man, his behaviour, feelings, actions, beliefs, *including* his belief that there hold good independently of all men certain truths, which through the agency of the projective mechanism are not recognized to be very personally about himself. It does not seem therefore that philosophy in this extreme speculative sense can be justified. To such a view, however, Professor Adler replies by saying that if analysts try to dismiss his philosophy by reducing it to unconscious phantasy, he can equally well reduce their views in this way also. The point, however, is not that the objective worth of our activities is nullified by being shewn to be the fruit of unconscious phantasy, but that we may by doing this be able to discover to what extent our activities are masking reality or dealing with it. The thought-processes of the psycho-analyst are determined, just as in the case of the philosopher, by unconscious phantasies; but we choose between the two results of the thought-processes by deciding in which of the two cases the stream of unconscious energy is the more directed towards reality.

(4) The value of a course of philosophy must depend upon the students attending it. A prominent philosopher recently read a paper on psycho-analysis to a London audience in which there were several psycho-analysts. The inevitable mis-statement of psycho-analytic concepts given by the philosopher—or shall we say his philosophical mode of expression—was all that appeared to attract the notice of the analysts. They did not seem to find stimulation in fresh ideas or in the unaccustomed way of putting them, or to wish to know more exactly what was the angle of approach the philosopher was trying to make clear. To judge by his Introduction, Dr. Alexander's audience seemed by comparison to derive considerable stimulation, even if no conviction. Surely the study of philosophy might reasonably be expected to throw light on aspects of the human mind as nothing else could, especially if we regard it not so much as a claimant to truth, but as a relatively modern flowering of ancient mythology. But whatever justification Dr. Alexander had for his experiment, it would be difficult to maintain that the present volume was a contribution, whatever might result if the theme were to be approached from a fresher philosophical angle.



*New Light on Delinquency and its Treatment.* By William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner. (Published for the Institute for Human Relations by Yale University Press, New Haven.)

The subject of juvenile delinquency in the United States in the last two decades has been intimately related to the investigations and studies of Healy and Bronner. Their successive works have reflected the progress of the more serious efforts in the field of social work and in the structure and function of Child Guidance Clinics. The present work represents an attempt at an analysis of the causes and treatments in vogue at the present time. This project as first conceived was to be extensive, to last a period of ten years. Due to external circumstances it was reduced to a period of three years.

In each of three large cities, a fully staffed Child Guidance Clinic, consisting of psychiatrist, psychologist, social workers, etc., carried on its work simultaneously. The children, under the age of sixteen years, were referred by the Children's Court; their delinquencies ran the gamut commonly encountered. An object in view was to discover new orientations and guides in diagnosis, prognosis and treatment and a testing of older concepts. The number of families studied were 133, the number of delinquent children were 153 and the number of non-delinquent siblings studied were 145.

One interesting question posed, one which is often neglected in studies in criminology, asks why the other siblings were non-delinquents. In this project the authors used the non-delinquent siblings as controls in attempting to find out in what way the intimate relationships between the children and the other members of the family played a determining rôle in the development of delinquency or non-delinquency. The conclusion arrived at is that the delinquent child is the one who is frustrated, who feels he is not loved, while the non-delinquent child in the same environment is the one who finds a positive affectionate relationship with the parent or parents or suitable parent substitute. A group of twins were also studied from this angle. The authors propose a rather facile definition for delinquency; i.e. lack of adequate love, frustration plus the idea of delinquency (influence of environment or suggestion) leads to delinquency. This definition leaves too much unanswered. The authors also present a classification of three groupings which they feel offers guides for prognosis and treatment. The classification is undoubtedly helpful, particularly to the social worker.

In the treatment programme the psychiatrist worked with the children, parents and the school. The general features are described rather than the details of the individual techniques, which undoubtedly varied with the different workers. What is stressed is that the family as a unit is to be treated wherever possible, if favourable results are to be obtained.



To the psycho-analyst this work will be of interest and value because of its comprehensive picture of present-day Child Guidance work in delinquency.

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I. T. Broadwin.

*La Conception Inductive de la Vie.* By Enzo Lolli. Traduit de l'italien par Mme de Vesme. (Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1937. Pp. 127. Price 15 francs.)

This book describes a cosmological hypothesis, which purports to explain the origin and persistence of all natural phenomena, including life. The concept of induction that is used derives from electricity, in which one current can set up and endow with a certain independent existence another current. The induced current has, as it were, a life of its own, but its existence is dependent upon that of the inducing current. The author attempts to explain this in terms of rhythm and movement, and applies these ideas to life in general and to a number of miscellaneous activities, including psychotherapy, in particular.

The book is a brief exposition of a longer volume of lectures, and the author has deliberately sacrificed rigour and exactitude of expression to clarity. It cannot be said, however, that the work is particularly clear—it is far too sketchy to be at all suggestive or convincing. The main idea of induction is, none the less, attractive, and it might become a useful scientific concept. But though the author does suggest the possibility of experimental work based on the hypothesis, no indication whatever is given of the lines such research might take; and the book consists, therefore, of nothing more than an arm-chair hypothesis, entirely speculative and outside the domain of empirical verification.

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J. O. Wisdom.

*Coming into Being Among the Australian Aborigines.* By M. F. Ashley-Montagu. (George Routledge & Sons Ltd., London, 1937. Pp. 362. Price 21s.)

This is by far the most valuable study among the large literature which has already accumulated over the vexed question of whether Australian aborigines are really ignorant of the physiological effects of procreation and whether they are 'so to speak' pretending for social and religious reasons to be thus ignorant. The author very impartially and judiciously marshals all the extant evidence and successfully refutes the arguments brought forward by the earlier sceptics like Carveth Read. In his opinion the evidence points strongly to the reality of the native's ignorance, but, he says, 'until further intensive researches have been carried out in connection with this problem, preferably on Australian peoples uncontaminated by foreign influences, the question as to whether



or not the Australian aboriginal is "completely" ignorant of the facts of procreation cannot be definitely settled'.

There remains also the further question of the connection between the ignorance and these cultural institutions based on it 'whether the nescience of the casual relationship between intercourse and childbirth is a result of a primitive unawareness of the facts as Frazer, Hartland, and others believe, or whether this nescience has been secondarily produced by a social dogma which has caused a shift in emphasis to take place which completely obscures the part which intercourse may formerly have played in the native conception of procreation, as Lang, Read, and Westermarck believe, are questions which it has seemed to us impossible to determine'. . . . 'The question as to which preceded the other, the nescience or the dogma, is, I think, falsely broached because it altogether fails to take into consideration the possibility that both the nescience and the dogma may actually be historically and culturally one and the same thing; that the dogma is the nescience, and the nescience is the dogma; or, at least, inseparable parts of one another, and in origin and development contemporaneous with one another, since they are part and parcel of one another. I do not see the necessity of assuming the priority of one to the other, and no very good reason has even been adduced in its support by those who have made the assumption, though much erudition and ingenuity have been expended upon the question. Certainly it is possible to envisage a change in the shift of emphasis during the course of the development of the conceptional beliefs of the Australians from a condition in which intercourse was regarded as playing a more important part than it does to-day in the production of conception to one in which it was finally allowed to play little or no rôle at all in the procreative process; but this is purely speculative and, as far as we are concerned, *unimportant*. What the "facts" may formerly have been there is now no means of telling.'

The word italicized in this passage gives a hint at the only weakness in the author's work, the only one but a vital one. He is throughout concerned with the objective evidence bearing on the state of awareness in the native's consciousness. But he nowhere takes into serious account the complexities in the unconscious mind which may well have an important bearing on the whole matter, nor does he even refer to the psycho-analytical critique of the evidence published by the present reviewer.



# BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY  
EDWARD GLOVER, GENERAL SECRETARY

In conformity with a resolution of the Marienbad Congress the Bulletin of Society Reports has been reduced to a simple record of titles, dates and authorship. Members requiring further information regarding any paper that has not been published should communicate directly with the author. The omission of a Report from the Boston Psychoanalytic Society is due to the fact that during the year the Society and Institute confined its activities solely to various types of seminars, and eliminated Society meetings; this policy was adopted because it was felt that the nature of the group was such that all emphasis should be laid upon training.

No meetings are reported from the Indian Psycho-Analytical Society during the current year. The energies of the Society have been taken up in preparing for the opening in the near future of the long projected Psycho-Analytical Clinic.

During the first term of 1937 the Swedish-Finnish Psycho-Analytical Society held no meetings. This was due to the fact that three members—and the membership is in any case a very small one—felt themselves unable to take part in the work. At present, however, matters have improved, and the group meets regularly for reports and discussions.

Reports have been received from the Italian Psycho-Analytical Society and from the Sendai Psycho-Analytical Society, Japan, of various lectures given, seminars held, and papers published. As these activities do not come within the scope of Society proceedings, they will be published in the next Report of the International Training Commission.

## THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

1936

*December* 28 and 29. Dr. E. R. Eisler: 'Pregenital Regression in a case of Multiple Phobia'.

Dr. D. Feigenbaum: 'The Problem of Depersonalization as a Defence Mechanism'.

Dr. B. Glueck: 'Psycho-analytical Thoughts on the Clinical Manifestations of Induced Hypoglycemia'.

Dr. H. Nunberg: 'Further Contribution to the Theory of Psycho-analytic Therapy'.

Dr. L. D. Powers: 'The Interpretation of Dreams'.



Dr. L. J. Saul, Dr. G. Wilson : 'Significance of the Manifest Dream Content'.

Dr. T. Benedek : 'Defence Mechanisms and Structure of the Personality'.

Dr. F. Wittels : 'A Contribution to Psycho-analytic Technique'.

Dr. H. V. McLean : 'Thomas Mann and the Unconscious'.

Dr. R. Fliess : 'The Preliminary Interviews'.

Dr. P. Schilder : 'Psycho-analytic Remarks on "Alice in Wonderland"'.

T. V. Kovsharova (U.S.S.R.) : 'Experimental Investigation of Psycho-analytic Therapy'.

Dr. I. Hendrick : 'Suicide as a Wish-Fulfilment : A Case Report'.

## 1937

May 12 and 13. Dr. G. W. Smeltz : 'Psycho-analytic Contributions in Private Psychiatric Practice'.

Dr. E. E. Hadley : 'Psycho-analytic Clarification of Typical Personalities'.

Dr. N. L. Blitzsten : 'Psycho-analytic Contributions to the Conception of Disorder Types'.

Dr. M. Ribble : 'Observations on Primitive Reactions in New Born Infants'.

Dr. L. S. Kubie : 'The Phantasy of Dirt'.

Dr. F. Alexander : 'Remarks about the Relations of Inferiority Feeling to Guilt Feeling'.

Dr. H. Deutsch : 'Folie à Deux as a Clinical Picture and in Normal Life'.

Dr. G. Zilboorg : 'The Sense of Immortality'.

L. B. Hill,  
Secretary.

## BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

## 1936

October 7. Miss N. Searl : 'A Note on the Place of Anal Erotism and Sadism in Development'.

October 21. Dr. M. Schmideberg : 'On Motoring'.

Dr. E. Jones : 'Love and Morality'.

November 4. Dr. M. Brierley : 'Affects in Theory and Practice'.

November 18. Mr. R. H. Boyd : 'Recent Views on the Physical Aspects of Causation and Treatment of Homosexual Urges and other Sexual Deviations'.

December 2. Review of Congress Symposium on 'The Theory of Therapeutic Results'.



1937

- January 20.* Dr. J. Rickman: 'The Nature of Ugliness'.
- February 3.* Dr. H. Fuchs: 'On Introjection'.
- February 11.* Dr. G. Róheim (Budapest): 'Origin and Function of Culture'.
- February 17.* Dr. M. Schmideberg: 'After the Analysis—some Phantasies of Patients'.
- April 12.* Dr. H. Thorner: 'The Mode of Suicide as a Phantasy Manifestation'.
- May 5.* Miss N. Searl: 'The Psychical and Physical Difference in Boys and Girls'.
- May 24.* Dr. E. Kris (Vienna): 'Ego Development and the Comic'.
- June 2.* Dr. W. C. Scott: 'Psycho-analysis of a Manic Depressive Patient in an Institution'.
- June 16.* Dr. H. Fuchs: 'Some remarks on a chapter of "The World I Live In", by Helen Keller'.

Ed. Glover,  
Scientific Secretary.

## CHICAGO PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1936

- October 19.* Dr. F. Alexander: 'An Unusual Form of Resistance'.
- Dr. H. V. McLean: 'Dynamic Formulations of Megalomania as shown in a Dream'.
- October 31.* Dr. T. Benedek: 'Defence Mechanisms and Structure of the Total Personality'.
- November 21.* Professor K. Lewin: 'Studies of Regression and Frustration in Children'.
- Professor J. F. Brown: 'Levels of Reality'.
- December 5.* Dr. H. Levey: 'Spontaneous Poetry Production as an Emergency Defence of Anxiety'.

1937

- January 15.* Dr. E. Eisler: 'Alternate Defences in a case of Compulsion Neurosis'.
- Dr. G. Wilson: 'The Red-Headed Man'.
- January 30.* Dr. L. J. Saul: 'Some Observations on a Form of Projection'.
- February 13.* Dr. J. Kasanin: 'Experimental Study of Psycho-analytic Therapy by Means of the Technique on Conditioned Reflexes'.
- March 6.* Dr. H. Deutsch: 'Observations on Vegetative Factors in Mental Mechanisms during Insulin Shock'.
- Dr. J. Steinfeld: 'Observations on Patients under Insulin Shock'.
- March 20.* Dr. T. M. French: 'Insight and Distortion in Dreams'.



*April* 10. Dr. J. F. Brown: 'Demonstration of Psychological Research'.

Dr. R. P. Knight: 'Psycho-Analysis of Hospitalized Patients'.

Dr. N. Reider: 'Psychiatric Care of Hospitalized Patients undergoing Psycho-Analysis'.

Dr. B. Kamm: 'Notes on a Technical Problem in the Analysis of Patients with Severe Character Disorders'.

Dr. C. W. Tidd: 'Increasing Reality Acceptance by a Schizoid Personality during Analysis'.

*May* 10. Dr. M. Grotjahn: 'Psycho-Analysis and Brain Disease'.

*May* 23. Dr. S. Beck: Address on the Rorschach Tests.

*June* 5. Dr. A. W. Hackfield: 'The Aggressive-Submissive Complex and its Physiologic Correlates'.

*June* 10. Dr. J. Benjamin: 'The Rorschach Test in Relation to Psycho-Analysis'.

G. Mohr,  
Secretary.

#### PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY GROUP OF LOS ANGELES

1936-1937

Dr. F. Alexander: 'Hysterical Conversion Symptoms and Organ Neuroses'.

Dr. F. Wittels: 'The Protophallic Psychopath'.

Dr. F. Cohn: 'The Influence of the Erotogenic Zones on the Psyche'.

Mrs. F. Deri: 'Identification and Hysterical Symptom'.

Professor P. Epstein: 'The Ego and the Defence Mechanisms', by Anna Freud.

Dr. K. Menninger: 'Unconscious Motives of Suicide'.

Miss H. Powner: 'Homosexuality as a Problem in Juvenile Delinquency'.

Mrs. M. Leonard: 'Transference and Education'.

#### DANISH-NORWEGIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1936

*September* 30. Mrs. H. Christensen, Dr. O. Raknes: Report on the Fourteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress.

*October* 28. Mrs. H. Christensen: 'Case-Histories'.

*December* 2. Professor H. Schjelderup: 'Repression of Affect, Characterological Development and Experience of Reality'.

1937

*March* 3. Introduced by Dr. N. Hoel: Discussion of Anna Freud's 'The Ego and the Defence Mechanisms'.



*April 13 and May 4.* Discussion of Problems of Technique, partly based on an unpublished paper by Dr. O. Fenichel.

O. Raknes,  
Secretary.

#### DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1936

*December 21* (at Amsterdam). Meeting held in honour of Freud in conjunction with the 'Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor Psychiatrie en Neurologie'.

Dr. J. van der Hoop : 'Theory and Therapy of the Neuroses according to Freud'.

Dr. K. Landauer : 'Freud's Theory of Dreams'.

Dr. F. P. Muller : 'The Theory of Psycho-Analysis'.

Dr. A. Stärcke : 'Parapraxes'.

Dr. A. J. Westerman Holstijn : 'Freud and Art'.

1937

*February 6* (at The Hague). Dr. F. P. Muller : 'Analysis of a Children's Game'.

*March 20* (at Amsterdam). Dr. J. van der Hoop : 'The Objectivity of the Analyst'.

*April 6* (at The Hague). Meeting held jointly with the Society of Psycho-Analysts in Holland.

Dr. A. Citroen : 'A Case of Stammering in a Young Girl'.

*May 29* (at The Hague). Dr. M. Katan : 'Introduction to the Problems of Therapy'.

A. Endtz,  
Secretary.

#### FRENCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1936

*November 17.* Mons. M. Schlumberger : 'Clinical Description of a Case of Sexual Impotence'.

*December 15.* Dr. J. Leuba : 'Clinical Problems Arising in Later Stages of Analysis'.

1937

*January 15.* Mme. M. Bonaparte : 'Paleo-Biological and Bio-Psychical Points of View'.

*February 18.* Dr. G. Róheim : 'Origins and Functions of Civilization'.

*March 20.* Dr. R. de Saussure : 'Aggressiveness'.

*May 25.* Dr. Lagache : 'Mourning and Melancholia'.

*June 15.* Dr. R. Spitz : 'Repetition, Rhythm and Boredom'.

*June 15.* *Business Meeting.* The motion regarding the meeting of the Congress of French-speaking Psycho-Analysts was rejected. The Congress will take place at St. Anne in Paris under the Presidency of Mme.



Marie Bonaparte, approximately in January. The subject for discussion will be: 'Masochism'. Report by Mm. Loewenstein and Nacht.

The Society declares in favour of holding the next International Congress of Psycho-Analysis at Grenoble.

The French Society suffered a serious loss through the death of their member, Jean Frois-Wittmann.

J. Leuba,  
Secretary.

#### GERMAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1936

*May 27.* Opened by Dr. E. von Sydow: Discussion of Dr. von Sydow's paper 'The Conception of the "Angel" in the Later Writings of Rainer Maria Rilke'.

Frau M. Seiff: 'The complaint—"it is of no use" '.

*June 17.* Discussion on Frau Seiff's short communication of May 27.

*July 1.* Dr. H. March: 'Expert Evidence on a Case of Male Impotence'.

Dr. F. Boehm: 'Notes from the Case-History of an Asocial Child'.

*October 3.* Dr. H. Gundert (Stuttgart): 'A Case of Pseudologie Phantastica'.

*October 4.* Dr. G. Scheunert (Erfurt): 'Minor Psychotherapy in a Panel Practice'.

*November 25.* Frau L. Mitscherlich (Koenigsberg): 'Infantile Aggression as the Basis of Schizophrenic Symptoms'.

*December 23.* Dr. K. Horney (New York): "The Neurotic Craving for Love'.

1937

*February 27.* Frau L. Werner: 'Analysis of a Child'.

*April 10.* Dr. F. Boehm: 'Some Technical Difficulties in a Case of Obsessional Neurosis'.

*April 20.* Herr T. Ekman: Report on Anna Freud's 'The Ego and the Defence Mechanisms'.

*May 8.* Dr. F. Schottlaender: 'Contributions to the Problem of Obsessional Neurosis'.

*May 25.* Dr. F. Boehm, Dr. C. Müller-Braunschweig, Dr. W. Kemper: Report on the Four Countries Conference in Budapest.

Dr. E. von Sydow: Report on Anna Freud's 'The Ego and the Defence Mechanisms'.

*June 7.* Herr T. Ekman, Dr. W. Kemper, Frau M. Sieff, Herr Rieman, Dr. H. Schultz-Hencke, Dr. C. Müller-Braunschweig: Reports on the Symposium on the Theory of Therapeutic Results.

*June 14.* Frau Dr. v. Wimmersperg: 'Technical Modifications in the Treatment of a Borderline Case'.



*June 29.* Frl. K. Dräger: Report on Aichhorn's 'Notes on the Technique of Child Guidance Clinics: Transference'.

*September 9, 1936.* *Business Meeting.* (1) The President announced the death of Dr. Margarete Stegmann, for many years a member of the Society, and paid a warm tribute to her memory.

(2) The discussion of the subject considered at the General Meeting on May 13 was renewed, and it was agreed that the decision then taken to resign from the International Psycho-Analytical Association had been too hasty. The Council was requested to ask the I.P.A. to rescind the notice of resignation.

C. Müller-Braunschweig,  
*Secretary.*

### STUTTGART PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL STUDY CIRCLE

1935

*October 9* (at Berlin). Dr. F. Schottlaender: 'Clinical Contributions to the Problem of the Fixation of Ambivalence'.

1936

*April 26* (at Basle). Dr. G. Graber: 'The Two-fold Mechanisms of Identification'.

1937

*January 26.* Dr. G. Graber: 'A Case of Frigidity'.

*February 28.* Dr. H. Gundert: 'A Case of Psychogenic Aspermia'.

*April 13.* Dr. F. Schottlaender: 'A Case of Epilepsy'.

*May 8.* Dr. F. Schottlaender: 'Notes on Obsessional Neurosis'.

*May 25.* Dr. Römer (guest): 'Psycho-Diagnostic Tests'.

*June 27* (at Basle). Dr. G. Graber: 'Deliverance from Suffering—(a tentative metapsychology of the religious experience of salvation)'.

Dr. F. Schottlaender: 'Concerning the Origin of Obsession'.

G. Graber,  
(*Leader*).

### HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1936

*October 2.* Dr. L. Rotter: 'The Dynamics of Puberty'.

*October 16.* Dr. Z. Pfeifer: Report on the Fourteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress.

*October 26.* Dr. O. Fenichel: 'The Idea of the Trauma in the Present-day Theory of the Neuroses'.

*November 9.* Frau E. Gyömrői: 'Lying the Truth: Forestalling as a Means of Defence'.

Dr. E. Peto: 'Contributions to the Ætiology of Chronic Appendicitis'.

*November 18.* Dr. J. Lampl de Groot: 'Masochism and Narcissism'.

*December 18.* Frau A. Bálint: 'A Nervous Child'.



1937

*February 19.* Frau L. P. Liebermann : 'Stammering'.

*March 5.* Dr. G. Róheim : 'Burial Customs in the Island of Duau'.

*April 2.* Discussion of Róheim's paper.

*April 16.* Dr. G. Róheim : 'Origins and Functions of Civilization'.

*May 9.* Dr. L. Révész : 'The Significance of Infantile Traumas'.

I. Hermann,

*Secretary.*

## THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1936

*October 20.* Dr. A. Eisendorfer : 'A Case of Cyclothymia'.

Dr. A. Spurgeon English : 'Object Love Hampered by Incompatibility of the Introjected Parental Images'.

Dr. R. L. Frank : 'A Note on the Breakdown of Defences Established through Analysis'.

Dr. G. S. Goldman : 'The Course of a Severe Compulsion Neurosis in Analysis'.

*October 27.* Dr. H. Deutsch : 'Some Considerations on Certain Forms of Resistance'.

*November 24.* Dr. S. Lorand : 'Lilliputian Dreams : their Relation to Fairy Tales and Neurosis'.

*December 15.* Dr. F. Wittels : 'The Position of the Psychopath in the Psycho-analytic System'.

1937

*January 26.* Dr. G. Zilboorg : 'An Hypothesis on the Psychogenesis of Suicide'.

*February 23.* Dr. A. Kardiner : 'Criteria for a Dynamic Sociology'.

*March 30.* Dr. L. S. Kubie : 'The Phantasy of Dirt'.

*April 27.* Dr. R. Fliess : 'Toward the Metapsychology of Pain'.

*May 18.* Dr. B. Mittelmann : 'Euphoric Reactions in the Course of Psycho-Analytic Treatment'.

The Society announces the death of two of its Members. On September 25, 1936, Dr. Frankwood E. Williams died while returning from a visit to Russia, where he had made important social and psychiatric observations on the new order. Dr. Williams was a prominent figure in psycho-analysis, psychiatry, and mental hygiene at home and abroad. He was one of the co-founders of the Psychoanalytic Quarterly, and organized and administered the International Congress for Mental Hygiene in Washington, D.C., in the spring of 1930, at which many prominent European analysts were guests and speakers. Dr. Williams had long been a member of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, and gave it the benefit of his wise experience and influence.



*January 2, 1937.* News was received of the sudden death of Dr. Dorian Feigenbaum, who had been ill only a few days with pneumonia. Dr. Feigenbaum was a very active and loyal member, whose founding and editorship of the Psychoanalytic Quarterly has served to stimulate and foster psycho-analytic literature of high standards. As a Memorial to Dr. Feigenbaum, funds were raised among the members for the purpose and installation of his medical and psycho-analytic library at the Institute, to be known as the Feigenbaum Memorial Library.

*June 1, 1937. Special Meeting.* The Society accepted the report of a special Committee concerning paragraphs 3 and 4 of the proceedings of the International Training Commission, *Zeitschrift*, 1937, pages 193-194 and Chapter IV—in the German version, Chapter III—of the proceedings of the International Psycho-Analytical Association (*JOURNAL*, 1937—p. 100; *Zeitschrift*, 1937—p. 188). A communication stating the Society's objections to and corrections of these reports has been addressed to the President of the International Psycho-Analytical Association.

During the year the Society has been the recipient, through the efforts of Dr. Lawrence S. Kubie, of gifts amounting to about \$20,000, the income from which is to be used for general operating expenses and special scientific purposes in the Society and the Institute.

G. E. Daniels,  
*Secretary.*

#### PALESTINE PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1936

*November 17.* Dr. M. Eitingon: Report on the Fourteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress in Marienbad.

Professor M. Pappenheim: 'Jackson and Freud'.

Dr. G. Brandt: 'A Special Form of Day-Dreaming'.

*December 18.* Dr. M. Marcuse: 'Sexual Problems in the Kibuz'.

1937

*January 22.* Herr A. Zweig: 'Emigration and Neurosis'.

*May 8.* Dr. M. Eitingon: 'A Visit to Freud, Thirty Years Ago'.

Dr. M. Wulff: 'Freud at Tegel in 1928 and 1929'.

Herr A. Zweig: 'The True Founders of: (a) Goethe's Works; (b) Psycho-Analysis'.

*June 5.* Dr. D. Dreyfuss: 'Remarks on the Theory of the Traumatic Neuroses'.

I. Schalit,  
*Secretary.*

#### SWISS PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1936

*December 5* (at Zurich). Dr. O. Pfister: 'The Experience of Inspiration'.



*December 12* (at Zurich). Dr. H. Zulliger : 'A Gap in Psycho-Analytical Pedagogy'.

1937

*January 30.* Dr. C. Schultz : 'Analysis of a Case of Hebephrenia'.

*February 20.* Dr. M. Boss : 'Contribution to the Psycho-Pathology of Dreams'.

*March 13.* Dr. E. Blum : 'Work and Play'.

*April 17.* Dr. H. Meng : 'Problems of Psychological Hygiene, with Special Reference to the Prophylaxis of Neuroses'.

*June 27.* Dr. G. Graber : 'Deliverance from Suffering'.

Dr. F. Schottlaender : 'Concerning the Origin of Obsession'.

H. Zulliger,

*Secretary.*

#### VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1936

*October 7.* Dr. A. Angel : 'The Rôle of Displacement in Agoraphobia'.

*October 10.* Dr. O. Isakower : 'A Contribution to the Psycho-Pathology of Falling Asleep'.

*November 18.* Dr. H. Hartmann : 'A Report on the Publications of Alexander, Wilson and Lasswell'.

Dr. E. Hitschmann : Report on his own Publications.

*December 16.* Dr. E. Hitschmann : 'Contribution to the Psycho-Pathology of Falling Asleep'.

Frl. Anna Freud : 'Phenomena of Disintegration in the Waking Thoughts of Children'.

Dr. R. A. Spitz : 'On Falling Asleep'.

1937

*January 13.* Dr. L. Eidelberg : 'Instinctual Vicissitudes and Instinctual Defence'.

*January 27.* Dr. E. Stengel : 'On Disturbances in Naming, in Conjunction with Obscured Consciousness'.

*February 10.* Dr. E. Stengel : 'Disturbances in Speaking Among Epileptics'.

*February 24.* Dr. L. Eidelberg : 'Condemnation' and 'A Stubborn Case of Misreading'.

*March 10.* Dr. H. Hartmann : Report on the Symposium held at the Fourteenth International Congress (the Theory of Therapeutic Results).

*April 7.* Dr. K. Eissler : 'Contribution to the Problem of Rhythm in Instinctual Events'.

*April 21.* Dr. E. Bibring : 'The Urge to Realize'.

*May 5.* Dr. J. van der Hoop : 'The Objectivity of the Analyst'.

*May 26.* Dr. G. Gerö : 'The Problem of Oral Fixation'.



*June 9.* *Discussion*, introduced by Dr. E. Hitschmann : on 'Neurosis and Aggressiveness'.

*June 23.* Dr. H. Löwenfeld : 'The Development of the Artist, and Preparedness for a Trauma'.

*July 7.* Dr. M. Katan : 'Report on Freud's publication on the Psychoses'.

R. Wälder,  
Secretary.

#### THE WASHINGTON-BALTIMORE PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1936

*October.* Dr. C. Thompson : 'Development of Awareness of Transference in a Markedly Detached Personality'.

*November.* Dr. J. O. Chassell : 'The Problem of Anxiety in Dreams'.

*December.* Led by Dr. L. B. Hill : Symposium on 'Opening Hours of Analysis'.

1937

*January.* Dr. W. V. Silverberg : 'Towards a Theory of the Instincts'.

*February.* Dr. E. B. Hadley : 'Living'.

*March.* Dr. H. Stack Sullivan : 'Transference, Displacement and other terms representing Complex Interpersonal Relations'.

*April.* Dr. B. D. Lewin : 'A Type of Neurotic Hypomanic Reaction'.

*April.* Dr. L. S. Kubie : 'Modifications in a Schizophrenic Reaction with Psychoanalytic Treatment'.

*May.* Dr. K. Horney : 'The Problem of Anxiety'.

A. Stoughton,  
Secretary.

#### FOUR-COUNTRIES CONFERENCE

The second Four-Countries Conference convened by the Hungarian, Vienna and Italian Psycho-Analytical Societies and the Czecho-Slovakian Study Group took place at Whitsuntide, May 15-17, 1937, in Budapest. The Conference was thrown open not only to the members of the local groups which convened it, but to all members of the I.P.A. and to any guests introduced by the Presidents of the groups. There were 118 persons present, of whom 73 were members, and 45 guests. In addition to this 26 guests—educationists—were admitted to the second symposium.

*Saturday, May 15. Reception :* Opening of the Conference by Dr. Istvan Hollós (Budapest). It was decided to send telegrams of greeting to Professor Freud and to Dr. Ernest Jones.

*Special Meeting* (for members or permanent guests of a local group or of the I.P.A. only). *In the Chair :* Dr. Paul Federn (Vienna). *Subject for discussion :* 'Methods and Technique of Control Analysis'. *Papers*



were read by Dr. Edward Bibring (Vienna) and Dr. Karl Landauer (Amsterdam), who treated the subject from the point of view of an individual living outside a large social group.<sup>1</sup>

*Sunday, May 16. First Symposium : In the Chair : Anna Freud (Vienna). Subject for discussion : 'Early Stages of Development of the Ego. Primary Object—Love'. Paper read by Dr. Otto Fenichel (Prague).* Methodological difficulties in investigating the earliest phases of the ego. A summary of our knowledge on this topic. Discussion of the proposition, 'the new-born baby has no ego'. The first irruptions of quantities of excitation. Alternations of sleep and hunger. Origin of the first object—presentations. Relationship of 'object-finding', and the appearance of the ego. Special situation of the individual's own body.

First reactions to objects. The first ego-functions are integrated. Original unity of perception and motility.

Primitive types of perception. Their relationship with incorporation and identification. Contents of primitive perceptions. Traces of the archaic perceptual type in later life. Omnipotence. Longing to re-attain an objectless state. The rôle of the mechanisms of introjection and projection. Primitive ego-feeling and its regulation.

The primitive motor sphere. Nature and development of the function of judging. Judging and acting. Learning to walk, to control the sphincters and to speak. Motor development and the reality-principle. Misconception of the external world, owing to archaic mechanisms (magic, animism).

Rôle played by anxiety in the individual's increasing mastery of the external world. Primary traumatic anxiety. Alteration of anxiety through the function of judging. The anxiety signal. Earliest fears and their development. The libidinalization of anxiety. Learning to speak and the reality-principle. The significance of verbal images. The magic of names.

A brief account of the relations of the organism to the external world. Inertia and craving for stimulus. Some remarks on Freud's dualism of the instincts.

Primitive modes of apprehending reality. Overcoming and not overcoming primitive anxieties and primitive (magical) ways of thought.

Discussion and evaluation of analytical literature on these topics, with special regard to the views of Melanie Klein.

*Paper read by Dr. Mihály Bálint (Budapest).* Up to the present our ideas about the earliest stages of development of the mind have been unsatisfactory (e.g. the efforts of the London School and the criticism of

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<sup>1</sup> Published in the Report of the International Training Commission, this JOURNAL, Vol. XVIII, 1937.



their views by the Vienna Society). Assumption of primitive narcissism. Problem of the earliest object-relations. The views of the Budapest analysts concerning early infantile mental life have this in common, that they proceed from well-observed and easily verifiable primitive object-relations. *The phenomena of a fresh beginning* (M. Bálint). *The theory of 'clinging'* (I. Hermann). *The instinctual interdependence of mother and child* (A. Bálint). The significance of these views in relation to the analytic situation, i.e. for technique-conclusions.

*Contribution to the discussion by Dr. Endre Petö (Budapest).* Cases of refusal to take nourishment in infants from six days to seven months old lead to the assumption that object-relations already exist at that age. Theoretical inferences.

*Second Symposium: In the Chair:* Dr. Edoardo Weiss (Rome). *Subject for discussion:* 'A Review of Psycho-analytic Pedagogy'. *Paper read by Anna Freud (Vienna).* *Part I.* Historical survey of the gradual development of psycho-analytic pedagogy. Psycho-analytic pedagogy as a continual by-product of analytic theory. This piecemeal emergence of analytic pedagogy is responsible for many contradictions and misconceptions that are to be found in it. Instances of this. *Part II.* Discussion of a special instance. Training of the child in regard to masturbation and the resultant problems as understood in the light of psycho-analysis. *Paper read by Steff Bornstein (Prague).* Development of the child as a result of errors in analytic education. These are due to fear of the child's anxiety and to a tendency to save it from deprivations and conflicts of conscience. *Contribution to the discussion by Dorothy Burlingham (Vienna).* Various types of analytic pedagogues and their varying methods of work. Danger of over-emphasizing and over-valuing a particular analytic principle and neglecting all the others. Examples of the effect of this on children. Analytical pedagogy in the conflict between the demands of the individual and the requirements of the child-group. Differences between the requirements of children coming from an analytical and a non-analytical environment. The analytic educationist must not overstep his legitimate sphere of activity. When to translate analytic understanding into direct interpretation and when not. Establishing lines of demarcation between analytic pedagogy and child-analysis.

*Paper read by Alice Bálint (Budapest).* The two main foundations of any system of education are: (1) The natural, instinctual interrelation of mother and child; and (2) social (economic) necessity. The first is constant; the second extremely variable. Our civilization is characterized by the extension of the child's period of dependence. As a result:—

(1) More expenditure of love is necessary in order to bring up children to be civilized beings. This expenditure of love exceeds the capacity



of the original relation between mother and child and leads to over-compensations, e.g. a moral prohibition against the natural tendency on both sides to undo the bonds.

(2) Sexual maturity is eliminated as a motive force in growing-up. Our system of education puts forward no single measure which deals officially with sexual maturity, such as is found, for instance, in the puberty rites of primitive races. Any derivations of such customs which still exist tend to be deprived of their significance.

Educational difficulties of an essentially cultural nature are presented in a crudely schematic way as a contrast between primitive and present-day culture. Advisability of knowing more about whether among peoples in whom primitive maternal feelings are less inhibited the strength of the attachment between mother and child is greater or less than among us. In the reader's opinion, less; but the relevant data is far too scanty to make any judgement on the subject.

*Monday, May 17. Third Symposium: In the Chair: Dr. Otto Fenichel (Prague). Subject for discussion: 'Forms of Defence and Ego-Reactions in Analysis'. Paper read by Dr. Grete Bibring (Vienna).* Enrichment of our analytic knowledge through the extension of data and establishment of important connections brought about by the study of forms of defence and ego-reactions. The importance of the subject for technique. Individual analytic situations as they appear in the light of id—and resistance-interpretation, and as our knowledge of them is enlarged by taking into account the forms of defence and ego-reactions which belong to them. Further possible applications of ego-analysis. *Paper read by Dr. Edoardo Weiss (Rome).* Not every factor which makes it difficult or impossible to remember and feel is retrospect; unconscious impulses can be regarded as a defensive measure on the part of the ego. In the course of its development ego-feeling, its contents, needs and general attitude, as well as the extent of the mental ego-boundaries—changes. For instance, the ego of the adult cannot remember infantile occurrences with the same affectivity with which they were experienced in childhood, for the relevant affect is strangulated as long as the ego remains in its present-day state. In order for the strangulated load of affect to be able to be discharged, either the early state of the ego—the state which answers to the experience in question—must be re-awakened, or the early experience must be repeated in the transference, or in a present-day edition. Examples of this process of 'levelling'. If this 'levelling' process does not occur it is difficult or impossible for the patient to feel the truth of the situation in question or to deal with it affectively. This fact should be regarded as something distinct from a defence on the part of the ego.

Discussion of various forms of defence with reference to superficial



or deep strata of the ego. Technical hints. Examination of dreams, especially in regard to phenomena of introjection and projection, in relation to defence mechanisms. Their practical and theoretical importance much greater than was supposed. Implications of this for questions of technique. *Contribution to the discussion by Dr. Lilian Kertész-Rotter (Budapest)*. Some forms of defence which have not as yet been sufficiently explained: depreciation, exaggeration, false feelings, etc. Attempted classification into functions of the ego and of the super-ego. *Contribution by Dr. Otto Fenichel (Prague)*. In psycho-analysis technique and theory are constantly interacting. Thus both the dynamic aspect ('to remove resistances') and the economic aspect ('to remove those resistances—working always from the surface downwards—which are the most important at the moment') are to be considered with reference on the one hand to the technique of interpretation, and on the other to the theory of defence. Clinical investigation of the defensive impulses of the ego (and of any ego-impulses which modify instinctual impulsions in some way) is made possible by having due regard to the instinctual economy of the patient in the treatment; and, conversely, the theoretical knowledge obtained in this way greatly facilitates the building up of a systematic technique.

M. Bálint.



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